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It Takes More than a Network presents a structured investigation of the Iraqi insurgency's capacity for and conduct of organizational adaptation. In particular, it answers the question of why the Iraqi insurgency was seemingly so successful between 2003 and late 2006 and yet nearly totally collapsed by 2008. The book's main argument is that the Iraqi insurgency failed to achieve longer-term organizational goals because many of its organizational strengths were also its organizational weaknesses: these characteristics abetted and then corrupted the Iraqi insurgency's ability to adapt. The book further compares the organizational adaptation of the Iraqi insurgency with the organizational adaptation of the Afghan insurgency. This is done to refine the findings of the Iraq case and to present a more robust analysis of the adaptive cycles of two large and diverse covert networked insurgencies. The book finds that the Afghan insurgency, although still ongoing, has adapted more successfully than the Iraqi insurgency because it has been better able to leverage the strengths and counter the weaknesses of its chosen organizational form.

Insurgency --- Iraq War, 2003-2011. --- Organizational change --- Organizational effectiveness --- Afghan War, 2001 --- -Operation Enduring Freedom, 2001 --- -War on Terrorism, 2001-2009 --- Insurgent attacks --- Rebellions --- Civil war --- Political crimes and offenses --- Revolutions --- Government, Resistance to --- Internal security --- Management --- Organization --- Change, Organizational --- Organization development --- Organizational development --- Organizational innovation --- Manpower planning --- Anglo-American Invasion of Iraq, 2003-2011 --- Dawn, Operation New, 2010-2011 --- Gulf War II, 2003-2011 --- Iraqi Freedom, Operation, 2003-2010 --- New Dawn, Operation, 2010-2011 --- Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003-2010 --- Operation New Dawn, 2010-2011 --- Operation Telic, 2003-2011 --- Persian Gulf War, 2003-2011 --- Telic, Operation, 2003-2011 --- War on Terrorism, 2001-2009 --- -Afghan War, 2001 --- -Insurgency --- Afghan War, 2001-2021.

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During the early years of the Iraq War, the US Army was unable to translate initial combat success into strategic and political victory. Iraq plunged into a complex insurgency, and defeating this insurgency required beating highly adaptive foes. A competition between the hierarchical and vertically integrated army and networked and horizontally integrated insurgents ensued. The latter could quickly adapt and conduct networked operations in a decentralized fashion; the former was predisposed to fighting via prescriptive plans under a centralized command and control. To achieve success, the US A

Strategic culture --- Organizational change. --- Organizational effectiveness. --- United States. --- History --- Reorganization.

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Despite the scope of the threat they pose to Mexico's security, violent drug-trafficking organizations are not well understood, and optimal strategies to combat them have not been identified. While there is no perfectly analogous case to Mexico's current security situation, historical case studies may offer lessons for policymakers as they cope with challenges related to violence and corruption in that country.

Drug control -- Mexico. --- Drug traffic -- Mexico. --- Insurgency -- Mexico. --- Internal security -- Mexico. --- Violence -- Mexico. --- Violent crimes -- Mexico. --- Drug traffic --- Violent crimes --- Violence --- Drug control --- Internal security --- Insurgency --- Insurgent attacks --- Rebellions --- Security, Internal --- Crimes, Violent --- Crimes of violence --- Civil war --- Political crimes and offenses --- Revolutions --- Government, Resistance to --- Subversive activities --- Crime --- E-books

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Violent nonstate actors (VNSAs) - terrorist groups, drug trafficking organizations, and others - are increasingly part of the environment in which the Army and other government forces operate. Such organizations pose durable and direct threats to U.S. security interests. The capacity of VNSAs to wage war, inflict violence, and engage in vast transnational criminal activity make them a persistent danger. Countering these organizations is difficult because they are generally flexible and structured in ways that facilitate their ability to adapt to changes occurring within their operational environments and, in some cases, beyond. This report summarizes research into how VNSAs adapt to changes in their operational environments and provides recommendations on how the Army might anticipate such adaptations and mitigate them before they occur. The authors have drawn from a series of historical case studies and relevant literature to offer insights on the most common VNSA adaptations and means of detecting and mitigating each. Among other observations, the authors note that VNSAs reach their peak adaptive capacity within the first five years of their existence but that not all VNSAs have the same level of adaptive capacity.