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Philosophy of science

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A new approach to Hume's problem of induction that justifies the optimality of induction at the level of meta-induction. Hume's problem of justifying induction has been among epistemology's greatest challenges for centuries. In this book, Gerhard Schurz proposes a new approach to Hume's problem. Acknowledging the force of Hume's arguments against the possibility of a noncircular justification of the reliability of induction, Schurz demonstrates instead the possibility of a noncircular justification of the optimality of induction, or, more precisely, of meta-induction (the application of induction to competing prediction models). Drawing on discoveries in computational learning theory, Schurz demonstrates that a regret-based learning strategy, attractivity-weighted meta-induction, is predictively optimal in all possible worlds among all prediction methods accessible to the epistemic agent. Moreover, the a priori justification of meta-induction generates a noncircular a posteriori justification of object induction. Taken together, these two results provide a noncircular solution to Hume's problem. Schurz discusses the philosophical debate on the problem of induction, addressing all major attempts at a solution to Hume's problem and describing their shortcomings; presents a series of theorems, accompanied by a description of computer simulations illustrating the content of these theorems (with proofs presented in a mathematical appendix); and defends, refines, and applies core insights regarding the optimality of meta-induction, explaining applications in neighboring disciplines including forecasting sciences, cognitive science, social epistemology, and generalized evolution theory. Finally, Schurz generalizes the method of optimality-based justification to a new strategy of justification in epistemology, arguing that optimality justifications can avoid the problems of justificatory circularity and regress.

Induction (Logic) --- Hume, David, --- Inductive logic --- Logic, Inductive --- Logic --- Reasoning --- Hume, David

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Logic --- Mathematics --- Knowledge, Theory of --- Congresses --- Philosophy --- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, --- -Knowledge, Theory of --- -Epistemology --- Theory of knowledge --- Psychology --- Math --- Science --- -Congresses --- Wittgenstein, Ludwig --- -Logic --- Congresses. --- -Philosophy --- Sciences. Philosophie. (Congrès) --- Wetenschap. Filosofie. (Congres) --- Philosophy&delete& --- Wei-tʻe-ken-ssu-tʻan, --- Wei-tʻe-ken-ssu-tʻan, Lu-te-wei-hsi, --- Wittgenstein, L. --- Vitgenshteĭn, L., --- Wei-ken-ssu-tʻan, --- Pitʻŭgensyutʻain, --- Vitgenshteĭn, Li︠u︡dvig, --- Weitegenshitan, --- Wittgenstein, Ludovicus, --- Vitgenshtaĭn, Ludvig, --- ויטגנשטיין, לודוויג --- 维特根斯坦, --- Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef Johann, --- Logic - Congresses --- Mathematics - Philosophy - Congresses --- Knowledge, Theory of - Congresses --- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, - 1889-1951 - Congresses --- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, - 1889-1951