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Digital
Vote-Buying and Reciprocity
Authors: ---
Year: 2011 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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Abstract

While vote-buying is common, little is known about how politicians determine who to target. We argue that vote-buying can be sustained by an internalized norm of reciprocity. Receiving money engenders feelings of obligation. Combining survey data on vote-buying with an experiment-based measure of reciprocity, we show that politicians target reciprocal individuals. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of social preferences in determining political behavior.


Book
Vote-Buying and Reciprocity
Authors: --- ---
Year: 2011 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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Abstract

While vote-buying is common, little is known about how politicians determine who to target. We argue that vote-buying can be sustained by an internalized norm of reciprocity. Receiving money engenders feelings of obligation. Combining survey data on vote-buying with an experiment-based measure of reciprocity, we show that politicians target reciprocal individuals. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of social preferences in determining political behavior.

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Book
Imperfect Competition and Sanitation : Evidence from Randomized Auctions in Senegal
Authors: --- --- --- ---
Year: 2022 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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Abstract

We study the extent to which collusion can explain the under-provision of clean sanitation technologies in developing countries. Using desludging services in Dakar as a case-study, we document that prices are 66% higher in areas where prices are likely coordinated by a large trade association, compared to nearby neighborhoods supplied by unaffiliated companies. We then develop an experimental just-in-time auction platform with random variation in several design features aimed at learning about the extent of competition. Consistent with the collusion hypothesis, we find that most bidders systematically avoid competition by placing round bids and refusing to undercut rivals.

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Book
Privatization of Public Goods : Evidence from the Sanitation Sector in Senegal
Authors: --- --- --- --- --- et al.
Year: 2021 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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Abstract

Privatization of a public good (the management of sewage treatment centers in Dakar, Senegal) leads to an increase in the productivity of downstream sewage dumping companies and a decrease in downstream prices of the services they provide to households. We use the universe of legal dumping of sanitation waste from May 2009 to May 2018 to show that legal dumping increased substantially following privatization--on average an increase of 74%, or an increase of about 1640 trips to treatment centers each month. This is due to increased productivity of all trucks, not just those associated with the company managing the privatized treatment centers. Household-level survey data shows that downstream prices of legal sanitary dumping decreased by 5% following privatization, and DHS data shows that diarrhea rates among children under five decreased in Dakar relative to secondary cities in Senegal following privatization with no similar effect on respiratory illness as a placebo.

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