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Computer architecture. Operating systems --- Distribution strategy --- Electronic commerce --- Cybercommerce --- E-business --- E-commerce --- E-tailing --- eBusiness --- eCommerce --- Electronic business --- Internet commerce --- Internet retailing --- Online commerce --- Web retailing --- Commerce --- Information superhighway --- Electronic commerce.

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This paper studies implicitly colluding oligopolists facing fluctuating demand. The credible threat of future punishments provides the discipline that facilitates collusion. However, we find that the temptation to unilaterally deflate from the collusive outcome is often greater when demand is high. To moderate this temptation,the optimizing oligopoly reduces its profitability at such times,resulting in lower prices. If the oligopolists' output is an input to other sectors, their output may increase too. This explains the co-movements of outputs which characterize business cycles. The behavior of the railroads in the 1880's, the automobile industry in the 1950's and the cyclical behavior of cement prices and price-cost margins support our theory. (J.E.L. Classification numbers:020, 130, 610).

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This paper shows that the imposition of an import quota by one country can lead to increased competitiveness; protection can reduce the price in the country that imposes the quota, the foreign country, or both. This emerges from a model in which the firms are assumed to sustain collusion by the threat of reversion to more competitive pricing. We consider both prices and quantities as the strategic variables and study competition both in the domestic and the foreign market taken individually, and in the two markets taken together.

Import quotas --- Competition. --- Mathematical models.

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We consider a model with several regions whose technological ability and factor endowments are identical and in which transport costs between regions are non-negligible. Nonetheless, certain goods are sometimes produced by multiple firms all of which are located in the same region. These goods are then exported from the regions in which their production is agglomerated. Regional agglomeration of production and trade stem from two forces. First, competition between firms for the services of trained workers is necessary for the workers to recoup the cost of acquiring industry-specific human capital. Second, the technology of production is more efficient when plants are larger than a minimum efficient scale and local demand is insufficient to support several firms of that scale. We also study the policy implications of our model.

Skilled labor --- Human capital. --- Supply and demand.