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Abstract In the testimonial exchange, the way the information offered by the speaker is perceived by the hearer can be influenced by a myriad of factors. Many circumstances can contribute to the distortion of presented facts - among which notably, prejudice. By succumbing to prejudice, the hearer may lose valuable knowledge. This is characterized by Miranda Fricker (2007) as a particular form of epistemic injustice, namely testimonial injustice. Fricker offers a virtue theoretic account thereof; according to Fricker, the virtue of testimonial justice is such that the hearer corrects for any influence of prejudice by reinflating credibility to non-prejudiced levels. Fricker furthermore argues that what is interesting about this particular virtue is that it is, at the same time, an epistemic and an ethical virtue. This thesis purports to show that Fricker’s notion of the virtue of testimonial justice needs revisiting. Roughly, the thesis is motivated by the following thought: prejudicial dysfunction can be of two kinds. The speaker can be afforded either too much or too little credibility, which results in either credibility excess in the former situation, or credibility deficit in the latter situation. Both, arguably, are epistemically defectuous. However, it is plausible that, in most situations, credibility deficit is practically disadvantageous whereas credibility excess is advantageous for the testifier. Furthermore, complications of ethical utilitarianism aside, on most occasions, the ethically good thing to do will supervene on the practically good thing to do. If that is the case, it looks as though the epistemic virtue of testimonial justice will come apart from the corresponding ethical virtue in cases of credibility excess. In the light of this, it will be argued here that: (1) no coherent account of the virtue of testimonial injustice is available on the mixed, ethical and epistemic picture, and (2) it is not trivial to isolate one dimension from the other either.
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