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Balance of power. --- European cooperation. --- Europe --- Foreign relations --- Economic integration. --- Military relations. --- International relations. Foreign policy --- European Community
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The construction of the European Community (EC) has widely been understood as the product of either economic self-interest or dissatisfaction with the nation-state system. In Europe United, Sebastian Rosato challenges these conventional explanations, arguing that the Community came into being because of balance of power concerns. France and the Federal Republic of Germany-the two key protagonists in the story-established the EC at the height of the cold war as a means to balance against the Soviet Union and one another.More generally, Rosato argues that international institutions, whether military or economic, largely reflect the balance of power. In his view, states establish institutions in order to maintain or increase their share of world power, and the shape of those institutions reflects the wishes of their most powerful members. Rosato applies this balance of power theory of cooperation to several other cooperative ventures since 1789, including various alliances and trade pacts, the unifications of Italy and Germany, and the founding of the United States. Rosato concludes by arguing that the demise of the Soviet Union has deprived the EC of its fundamental purpose. As a result, further moves toward political and military integration are improbable, and the economic community is likely to unravel to the point where it becomes a shadow of its former self.
Balance of power. --- European cooperation. --- Power, Balance of --- Power politics --- International relations --- Political realism --- International cooperation --- Europe --- Council of Europe countries --- Eastern Hemisphere --- Eurasia --- Military relations. --- Economic integration. --- Foreign relations
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"It is one of the great unexamined assumptions of the realist school of foreign policy that nations cannot know each others' intentions. Scholars outside the realist school, such as Robert Jervis, Michael Doyle or Francis Fukuyama, believe that intentions are knowable at least some of the time. Besides being important for the theory of international relations, this question has huge practical significance: whether the United States and China can find some mutual accommodation in the western Pacific, for instance, depends a great deal on how well each side thinks it knows what the other really plans to do. But no one has rigorously studied the issue. In The Road to Hell, IR scholar Sebastian Rosato looks at four cases in which theorists believe rival nations had faith in each other's benign intentions-- Germany and Russia in the Bismarck era (1871-90); Britain and the United States during the great rapprochement (1895-1905); France and Germany, and Japan and the United States in the early interwar period (1919-32); and the Soviet Union and the United States at the end of the Cold War (1985-90)-and shows that in each case, neither nation's leaders had much confidence in the other's, and they constantly pursued heightened security. When any nation lessened its security stance, it was only because it had grown too weak to keep pace with its rival. Rosato concludes with a chapter on what his findings mean for the most important rivalry in the world today, that between the U.S. and China. As the first exercise in testing one of IR's key theoretical assumptions against historical reality, The Road to Hell will make a significant-and controversial-impact on international relations scholarship"--
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"To understand world politics, you need to understand how states think. Are states rational? Much of international relations theory assumes that they are. But many scholars believe that political leaders rarely act rationally. The issue is crucial for both the study and practice of international politics, for only if states are rational can scholars and policymakers understand and predict their behavior. John J. Mearsheimer and Sebastian Rosato argue that rational decisions in international politics rest on credible theories about how the world works and emerge from deliberative decision‑making processes. Using these criteria, they conclude that most states are rational most of the time, even if they are not always successful. Mearsheimer and Rosato make the case for their position, examining whether past and present world leaders, including George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin, have acted rationally in the context of momentous historical events, including both world wars, the Cold War, and the post-Cold War era. By examining this fundamental concept in a novel and comprehensive manner, Mearsheimer and Rosato show how leaders think, and how to make policy for dealing with other states"
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