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Créée par le pouvoir royal après la débâcle du financier John Law, puis démantelée lors de la Révolution française, la Bourse de Paris acquiert ses traits caractéristiques sous Napoléon: dans un lieu officiel, les agents de change, commerçants et officiers ministériels bénéficient, jusqu'au démantèlement amiable de leur corporation en 1988, du monopole légal sur les transactions boursières. A l'aube du XXIe siècle, la Bourse de Paris, transformée en société par actions, s'associe avec ses homologues amstellodamoise, bruxelloise, portugaise et le marché londonien de produits dérivés. En 2007, cet attelage paneuropéen fusionne avec la Bourse de New York. Désormais, la bourse parisienne est la filiale d'un groupe transatlantique, lui-même coté en bourse. Adopter une perspective diachronique aide à se défaire des représentations en apesanteur de la "finance" qui entravent l'analyse comme la critique. Ainsi, ce livre explicite l'entrelacs de contingence et de nécessité qui fait l'histoire économique et sociale de la Bourse de Paris et des activités boursières en France.
Stock exchanges --- Bourse --- History --- Histoire --- Bourse de Paris --- 331.162.1 --- 333.610 --- AA / International- internationaal --- Bulls and bears --- Commercial corners --- Corners, Commercial --- Equity markets --- Exchanges, Securities --- Exchanges, Stock --- Securities exchanges --- Stock-exchange --- Stock markets --- Capital market --- Efficient market theory --- Speculation --- Geschiedenis van de financiële markten --- Effectenbeurzen: algemeenheden --- Paris. --- History. --- France --- Economic conditions.
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Over the course of the nineteenth century, the struggles of Paris Bourse to manage counterparty risk revealed the awkward choices that face derivatives exchanges. Shortly after it was founded, the stock exchange, primarily a forward market, instituted a mutual guarantee fund to prevent broker failures from snowballing into a general liquidity crisis. The creation of the fund then forced the Bourse to search for mechanisms to control moral hazard. To study the determinants of broker failures, we collected new individual data on defaulting brokers and describe the evolving regulatory regime. To identify the factors behind the annual number of broker failures we use negative binominal regressions. To explain individual brokers' duration in office, we employ a proportional hazard model, while logit regressions examine the causes of individual broker failures. In addition to declines in asset prices and trading volume, the moral hazard from the mutual guarantee fund contributed to brokers' defaulting on their obligations. The Bourse faced a conundrum; when it finally imposed a tight regulatory regime that limited risk, trading began to migrate off the exchange to less regulated markets.
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When faced with a run on a “systemically important” but insolvent bank in 1889, the Banque de France pre-emptively organized a lifeboat to ensure that depositors were protected and an orderly liquidation could proceed. To protect the Banque from losses on its lifeboat loan, a guarantee syndicate was formed, penalizing those who had participated in the copper speculation that had caused the crisis bringing the bank down. Creation of the syndicate and other actions were consistent with mitigating the moral hazard from such an intervention. This episode contrasts the advice given by Bagehot to the Bank of England to counter a panic by lending freely at a high rate on good collateral, allowing insolvent institutions to fail.
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Créée par le pouvoir royal après la débâcle du financier John Law, puis démantelée lors de la Révolution française, la Bourse de Paris acquiert ses traits caractéristiques sous Napoléon : dans un lieu officiel, les agents de change, commerçants et officiers ministériels bénéficient, jusqu'au démantèlement amiable de leur corporation en 1988, du monopole légal sur les transactions boursières. À l'aube du XXIe siècle, la Bourse de Paris, transformée en société par actions, s'associe avec ses homologues amstellodamoise, bruxelloise, portugaise et le marché londonien de produits dérivés. En 2007, cet attelage paneuropéen fusionne avec la Bourse de New York. Désormais, la bourse parisienne est la filiale d'un groupe transatlantique, lui-même coté en bourse. Adopter une perspective diachronique aide à se défaire des représentations en apesanteur de la « finance » qui entravent l'analyse comme la critique. Ainsi, ce livre explicite l'entrelacs de contingence et de nécessité qui fait l'histoire économique et sociale de la Bourse de Paris et des activités boursières en France.
Stock exchanges --- Finance --- Business & Economics --- Investment & Speculation --- History --- Bourse de Paris --- History. --- France --- Economic conditions.
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Over the course of the nineteenth century, the struggles of Paris Bourse to manage counterparty risk revealed the awkward choices that face derivatives exchanges. Shortly after it was founded, the stock exchange, primarily a forward market, instituted a mutual guarantee fund to prevent broker failures from snowballing into a general liquidity crisis. The creation of the fund then forced the Bourse to search for mechanisms to control moral hazard. To study the determinants of broker failures, we collected new individual data on defaulting brokers and describe the evolving regulatory regime. To identify the factors behind the annual number of broker failures we use negative binominal regressions. To explain individual brokers' duration in office, we employ a proportional hazard model, while logit regressions examine the causes of individual broker failures. In addition to declines in asset prices and trading volume, the moral hazard from the mutual guarantee fund contributed to brokers' defaulting on their obligations. The Bourse faced a conundrum; when it finally imposed a tight regulatory regime that limited risk, trading began to migrate off the exchange to less regulated markets.
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When faced with a run on a "systemically important" but insolvent bank in 1889, the Banque de France pre-emptively organized a lifeboat to ensure that depositors were protected and an orderly liquidation could proceed. To protect the Banque from losses on its lifeboat loan, a guarantee syndicate was formed, penalizing those who had participated in the copper speculation that had caused the crisis bringing the bank down. Creation of the syndicate and other actions were consistent with mitigating the moral hazard from such an intervention. This episode contrasts the advice given by Bagehot to the Bank of England to counter a panic by lending freely at a high rate on good collateral, allowing insolvent institutions to fail.
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