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Since 1950, the economies of East Asia grew rapidly but received little inter-national capital, while Latin America received considerable international capitaleven as their economies stagnated. The literature typically explains the failureof capital to flow to high growth regions as resulting from international capitalmarket imperfections. This paper proposes a broader thesis that country-specificdistortions, such as domestic labor and capital market distortions, also impactcapital flows. We develop a DSGE model of Asia, Latin America, and the Rest ofthe World that features an open-economy business cycle accounting framework tomeasure these domestic and international distortions, and to quantify their con-tributions to international capital flows. We find that domestic distortions havebeen the predominant drivers of international capital flows, and that the generalequilibrium effects of these distortions are very large. International capital market distortions also matter, but less.
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Since 1950, the economies of East Asia grew rapidly but received little inter-national capital, while Latin America received considerable international capitaleven as their economies stagnated. The literature typically explains the failureof capital to flow to high growth regions as resulting from international capitalmarket imperfections. This paper proposes a broader thesis that country-specificdistortions, such as domestic labor and capital market distortions, also impactcapital flows. We develop a DSGE model of Asia, Latin America, and the Rest ofthe World that features an open-economy business cycle accounting framework tomeasure these domestic and international distortions, and to quantify their con-tributions to international capital flows. We find that domestic distortions havebeen the predominant drivers of international capital flows, and that the generalequilibrium effects of these distortions are very large. International capital market distortions also matter, but less.
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This paper quantifies the positive and normative impact of Bretton Woods capital controls on global and regional economic activity. A three-region DSGE capital flows accounting framework consisting of the U.S., Western Europe, and the Rest of the World (ROW) is developed to quantify capital controls and evaluate their impact on the world economy. We find these controls had large effects. Counterfactual analysis show world output would have been 0:5 percent higher had there been perfect capital mobility, with substantial capital flowing from the ROW to the U.S. Bretton Woods capital controls raised welfare substantially in the ROW, but at the expense of much lower U.S. welfare. Given the U.S.'s goal of keeping capital within these countries to preserve their stability during this period, we interpret lower U.S. welfare due to Bretton Woods as the implicit value the U.S. placed on preserving geopolitical stability in ally countries during the Cold War.
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Emerging economies that are large oil producers have sizable external debt, their country risk rises when oil prices fall, and several of them have defaulted at least once since 1979. Moreover, while oil and non-oil output reduce country risk on impact and in the long-run, oil reserves reduce it marginally on impact but increase it in the long-run. We propose a model of sovereign default and oil extraction consistent with these observations. The sovereign manages oil reserves strategically to make default less painful by altering the value of autarky, and hence its sustainable debt falls. All else equal, default is less likely in states in which reserves or oil prices are higher, or non-oil GDP is lower, but the equilibrium dynamics of reserves and country risk in response to oil-price shocks switch from negatively correlated on impact to positively correlated for several years.
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