Listing 1 - 10 of 15 | << page >> |
Sort by
|
Choose an application
Choose an application
Choose an application
Renewable policies have grown in popularity across states in the US, and worldwide. The costs and benefits from renewable policies are unevenly distributed across several margins. The incidence of alternative designs varies substantially across producers and consumers, across types of producers, across types of consumers, and across regions. In particular, the efficiency and distributional implications of large-scale policies crucially depend on the design of wholesale policies and how targets are set, but also on how the costs of such policies are passed-through to consumers. Given that renewable costs are mostly non-marginal, due to the large presence of fixed costs, there are many different ways to implement these policies on both the environmental design and retail pass-through margins. Using data from the California electricity market, I develop a model to illustrate the interaction between large-scale renewable policies (carbon taxes, feed-in tariffs, production subsidies and renewable portfolio standards) and their pricing to final consumers under alternative retail pricing schemes (no pass-through, marginal fees, fixed flat tariffs and Ramsey pricing). I focus on the trade-off between charging residential versus industrial consumers to highlight tensions between efficiency, distributional and environmental objectives.
Choose an application
We measure the pass-through of emissions costs to electricity prices and explore its determinants. We perform both reduced-form and structural estimations based on optimal bidding in this market. Using rich micro-level data, we estimate the channels affecting pass-through in a flexible manner, with minimal functional form assumptions. Contrary to many studies in the general pass-through literature, we find that emissions costs are almost fully passed-through to electricity prices. Since electricity is traded through high-frequency auctions for highly inelastic demand, firms have weak incentives to adjust markups after the cost shock. Furthermore, the costs of price adjustment are small.
Choose an application
We develop a theoretical framework to characterize strategic behavior in sequential markets under imperfect competition and limited arbitrage. Our theory predicts that these two elements can generate a systematic price premium. We test the model predictions using micro-data from the Iberian electricity market. We show that the observed price differences and firm behavior are consistent with the model. Finally, we quantify the welfare effects of arbitrage using a structural model. In our setting, we show that full arbitrage is not necessarily welfare-enhancing in the presence of market power, reducing consumer costs but decreasing productive efficiency.
Choose an application
We assess the long-run dynamic implications of market-based regulation of carbon dioxide emissions in the US Portland cement industry. We consider several alternative policy designs, including mechanisms that use production subsidies to partially offset compliance costs and border tax adjustments to penalize emissions associated with foreign imports. Our results highlight two general countervailing market distortions. First, following Buchanan (1969), reductions in product market surplus and allocative inefficiencies due to market power in the domestic cement market counteract the social benefits of carbon abatement. Second, trade exposure to unregulated foreign competitors leads to emissions “leakage” which offsets domestic emissions reductions. Taken together, these forces result in social welfare losses under policy regimes that fully internalize the emissions externality. In contrast, market-based policies that incorporate design features to mitigate the exercise of market power and emissions leakage can deliver welfare gains.
Choose an application
Renewable policies have grown in popularity across states in the US, and worldwide. The costs and benefits from renewable policies are unevenly distributed across several margins. The incidence of alternative designs varies substantially across producers and consumers, across types of producers, across types of consumers, and across regions. In particular, the efficiency and distributional implications of large-scale policies crucially depend on the design of wholesale policies and how targets are set, but also on how the costs of such policies are passed-through to consumers. Given that renewable costs are mostly non-marginal, due to the large presence of fixed costs, there are many different ways to implement these policies on both the environmental design and retail pass-through margins. Using data from the California electricity market, I develop a model to illustrate the interaction between large-scale renewable policies (carbon taxes, feed-in tariffs, production subsidies and renewable portfolio standards) and their pricing to final consumers under alternative retail pricing schemes (no pass-through, marginal fees, fixed flat tariffs and Ramsey pricing). I focus on the trade-off between charging residential versus industrial consumers to highlight tensions between efficiency, distributional and environmental objectives.
Choose an application
In the United States, consumers invest billions of dollars annually in energy efficiency, often on the assumption that these investments will pay for themselves via future energy cost reductions. We study energy efficiency upgrades in K-12 schools in California. We develop and implement a novel machine learning approach for estimating treatment effects using high-frequency panel data, and demonstrate that this method outperforms standard panel fixed effects approaches. We find that energy efficiency upgrades reduce electricity consumption by 3 percent, but that these reductions total only 24 percent of ex ante expected savings. HVAC and lighting upgrades perform better, but still deliver less than half of what was expected. Finally, beyond location, school characteristics that are readily available to policymakers do not appear to predict realization rates across schools, suggesting that improving realization rates via targeting may prove challenging.
Choose an application
We develop a theoretical framework to characterize strategic behavior in sequential markets under imperfect competition and limited arbitrage. Our theory predicts that these two elements can generate a systematic price premium. We test the model predictions using micro-data from the Iberian electricity market. We show that the observed price differences and firm behavior are consistent with the model. Finally, we quantify the welfare effects of arbitrage using a structural model. In our setting, we show that full arbitrage is not necessarily welfare-enhancing in the presence of market power, reducing consumer costs but decreasing productive efficiency.
Choose an application
We measure the pass-through of emissions costs to electricity prices and explore its determinants. We perform both reduced-form and structural estimations based on optimal bidding in this market. Using rich micro-level data, we estimate the channels affecting pass-through in a flexible manner, with minimal functional form assumptions. Contrary to many studies in the general pass-through literature, we find that emissions costs are almost fully passed-through to electricity prices. Since electricity is traded through high-frequency auctions for highly inelastic demand, firms have weak incentives to adjust markups after the cost shock. Furthermore, the costs of price adjustment are small.
Listing 1 - 10 of 15 | << page >> |
Sort by
|