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Readings in games and information
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ISBN: 0631215573 9780631215578 Year: 2001 Publisher: Oxford Blackwell


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Jeux et information : introduction à la théorie des jeux
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ISSN: 07772823 ISBN: 2804125408 9782804125400 Year: 2004 Volume: *19 Publisher: Bruxelles : De Boeck,

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Games and information : an introduction to game theory
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ISBN: 0631157093 9780631157090 Year: 1989 Publisher: Oxford Blackwell

Games and information : an introduction to game theory
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ISBN: 9781405136662 1405136669 Year: 2009 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. Blackwell

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Games and information : an introduction to game theory
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ISBN: 1557865027 Year: 1994 Publisher: Oxford Blackwell

Game theory and the law
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ISBN: 9781845426408 Year: 2007 Publisher: Cheltenham Elgar

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Measuring judicial independence : the political economy of judging in Japan.
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ISBN: 1282537695 9786612537691 0226703878 9780226703879 9780226703886 0226703886 9781282537699 6612537698 Year: 2003 Publisher: Chicago University of Chicago press

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The role of the U.S. Supreme Court in the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election raised questions in the minds of many Americans about the relationships between judges and political influence; the following years saw equally heated debates over the appropriate role of political ideology in selecting federal judges. Legal scholars have always debated these questions-asking, in effect, how much judicial systems operate on merit and principle and how much they are shaped by politics. The Japanese Constitution, like many others, requires that all judges be "independent in the exercise of their conscience and bound only by this Constitution and its laws." Consistent with this requirement, Japanese courts have long enjoyed a reputation for vigilant independence-an idea challenged only occasionally, and most often anecdotally. But in this book, J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen use the latest statistical techniques to examine whether that reputation always holds up to scrutiny-whether, and to what extent, the careers of lower court judges can be manipulated to political advantage. On the basis of careful econometric analysis of career data for hundreds of judges, Ramseyer and Rasmusen find that Japanese politics do influence judicial careers, discreetly and indirectly: judges who decide politically charged cases in ways favored by the ruling party enjoy better careers after their decisions than might otherwise be expected, while dissenting judges are more likely to find their careers hampered by assignments to less desirable positions. Ramseyer and Rasmusen's sophisticated yet accessible analysis has much to offer anyone interested in either judicial independence or the application of econometric techniques in the social sciences.

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