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Research suggests that a donor country's decision to provide post-disaster assistance is not only driven by the severity of a disaster and the resulting humanitarian needs in the recipient country, but also by strategic considerations. The authors argue that the identification of the determinants of the size of disaster assistance is a first step in the analysis of the donor's behavior. Since all aid is not motivated by the same reasons, the evaluation of the donor country's behavior requires a second step accounting for the type and the channel of aid provided. Using data on international disaster assistance between 2000 and 2007, the analysis examines both the donor countries' decision on the channel (bilateral versus multilateral) and the type of disaster relief (cash versus in-kind). The empirical results suggest that international disaster relief is not as much driven by the needs of the recipient country, but also by strategic interests (for example, oil or trade relationships) of the donor country. Bilateral and cash transfers are used as a vehicle to signal strategic interests, while multilateral and in-kind transfers are chosen to control for misuse in badly governed recipient countries.

Coastal and Marine Environment --- Conflict and Development --- Death tolls --- Development Economics and Aid Effectiveness --- Development network --- Disaster --- Disaster aid --- Disaster assistance --- Disaster Management --- Disaster reduction --- Disaster relief --- Disaster risk --- Disaster risk reduction --- Disaster type --- Economic Theory and Research --- Emergency assistance --- Emerging Markets --- Environment --- Fatalities --- Flood --- Floods --- Gender --- Gender and Health --- Governance --- Governance Indicators --- Hazard Risk Management --- Humanitarian assistance --- International agencies --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Natural Disaster --- Natural Disasters --- Post Conflict Reconstruction --- Private Sector Development --- Tsunami --- Type of disaster --- Urban Development

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• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Research suggests that a donor country's decision to provide post-disaster assistance is not only driven by the severity of a disaster and the resulting humanitarian needs in the recipient country, but also by strategic considerations. The authors argue that the identification of the determinants of the size of disaster assistance is a first step in the analysis of the donor's behavior. Since all aid is not motivated by the same reasons, the evaluation of the donor country's behavior requires a second step accounting for the type and the channel of aid provided. Using data on international disaster assistance between 2000 and 2007, the analysis examines both the donor countries' decision on the channel (bilateral versus multilateral) and the type of disaster relief (cash versus in-kind). The empirical results suggest that international disaster relief is not as much driven by the needs of the recipient country, but also by strategic interests (for example, oil or trade relationships) of the donor country. Bilateral and cash transfers are used as a vehicle to signal strategic interests, while multilateral and in-kind transfers are chosen to control for misuse in badly governed recipient countries.

Coastal and Marine Environment --- Conflict and Development --- Death tolls --- Development Economics and Aid Effectiveness --- Development network --- Disaster --- Disaster aid --- Disaster assistance --- Disaster Management --- Disaster reduction --- Disaster relief --- Disaster risk --- Disaster risk reduction --- Disaster type --- Economic Theory and Research --- Emergency assistance --- Emerging Markets --- Environment --- Fatalities --- Flood --- Floods --- Gender --- Gender and Health --- Governance --- Governance Indicators --- Hazard Risk Management --- Humanitarian assistance --- International agencies --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Natural Disaster --- Natural Disasters --- Post Conflict Reconstruction --- Private Sector Development --- Tsunami --- Type of disaster --- Urban Development

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Since the passage of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, corporate terrorism insurance is sold as a separate policy from commercial property coverage. In this paper, we determine whether companies differ in their demand for property and terrorism insurance. Using a unique dataset of insurance policies purchased by large U.S. firms, combined with financial information of the corporate clients and of the insurance provider, we apply a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach to obtain consistent estimates of premium elasticity of corporate demand for property and terrorism coverage. Our findings suggest that both are rather price inelastic and that corporate demand for terrorism insurance is significantly more price inelastic than demand for property insurance. We further find a negative relation between the solvency ratios of both property and terrorism risk coverage, with a stronger effect on the latter, indicating that companies use their ability to self-insure as a substitute for market insurance. Our results are robust to the application of alternative estimators as well as changes in the econometric specifications.

Zonder onderwerpscode: economie

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Using a unique dataset of insurance decisions by over 1,800 large U.S. corporations, this study provides the first empirical analysis of firm behavior that compares corporate demand for property and catastrophe insurance (here, terrorism). We combine demand and supply data and apply a simultaneous-equation approach to address the problem of endogenous premium decisions. The main finding is that demand for property and catastrophe insurance are not very different and that the demand for catastrophe coverage is actually more price inelastic. We also show that a corporation's ability to self-insure affects the demand for catastrophe insurance but not for property insurance.