Search
Feedback
About UniCat 
Help
News
| Listing 1 - 3 of 3 |
Sort by
|
Book
Year: 2020 Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Abstract | Keywords | Export | Availability | Bookmark
Loading...Choose an application
- Reference Manager
- EndNote
- RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)
Object
Year: 2012 Publisher: Mumbai : Moser Baer,
Abstract | Keywords | Export | Availability | Bookmark
Loading...Choose an application
- Reference Manager
- EndNote
- RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)
Sachin is a regular guy-22 year old engineering graduate from a middle class family in Mumbai who is in love with the world of cinema. As a struggler in the film industry-where his long days are filled with waiting and then some more waiting, surviving on his father's pocket money and desperately trying to make an entry into any of the main film camps-there is nothing that makes each day worth looking forward to. And that's when he sees Jessie, and it is love at first sight for him. Jessie is beautiful, elegant, smart and classy. But Jessie is not that simple. Jessie belongs to an orthodox Malayali Christian family where watching movies, partying or falling in love are completely taboo.
Feature films --- Feature films. --- Interfaith dating --- Interfaith dating. --- Man-woman relationships --- Man-woman relationships. --- Manners and customs. --- Musical films --- Musical films. --- India --- India. --- Social life and customs
Book
Year: 2020 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research
Abstract | Keywords | Export | Availability | Bookmark
Loading...Choose an application
- Reference Manager
- EndNote
- RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)
We study how reelection concerns affect reciprocity by elected leaders to the voters who elected them. If showing kindness to past voters reduces the chances of reelection, will an elected leader reduce or eliminate such intrinsic reciprocity? We present a signalling model of candidate behavior, where we show that candidates may limit intrinsic reciprocity to past voters to signal congruence with voters important for reelection, and selfish candidates may mimic reciprocal behavior for instrumental purposes. We then present an experiment that tests these ideas in the laboratory and finds support for the model. Both candidates and voters behave as the signalling model predicts. Our key finding is that the desire to be reelected may limit intrinsic reciprocity of an elected leader to the voters who put her in office, but does not eliminate it entirely.
| Listing 1 - 3 of 3 |
Sort by
|