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Can we voluntarily reform ourselves? In Being and Nothingness, Sartre rejects this possibility. For him, all attempts at voluntary self-reform are in “bad faith”. In this thesis, I argue that Sartre’s rejection is incompatible with several aspects of his theory. To do this, I first trace Sartre’s arguments for the rejection of voluntary self-reform back to the theory of motivation and to their ontological foundations. For Sartre, the motive is a non-being. Since the in-itself is full and solid of being, it cannot be the condition of possibility for the motive. This leads him to the for-itself. The for-itself is responsible for the motive in two ways: it is the conditions of possibilities for “there to be” a world and for the world to have a meaning. As the ontological foundation for meaning, the for-itself chooses its fundamental project via ontological freedom and maintains this choice by determining particular projects. Following these ontological arguments, Sartre moves onto the rejection of voluntary self-reform. Voluntary self-reform is a particular project. In addition, it requires the recognition of the fundamental project. However, recognition implies the nihilation of the thing recognized. Since the for-itself chooses particular projects in accordance with the fundamental project, a genuine voluntary self-reform is impossible. In my opinion, Sartre’s rejection contradicts with three elements of his work, namely his positions on self-determination, radical conversion and existential psychoanalysis. First, I argue that the alignment between the particular project and the fundamental project implies that once the for-itself chooses its fundamental project, it cannot change this choice. Second, I attempt to show that radical conversion requires the nihilation of recognition. This nihilation implies two paradoxes: the for-itself must choose without values, and it must nihilate itself without recognizing itself. Third, I suggest that existential psychoanalysis requires the open possibility for recognition. In the final section, I propose lifting Sartre’s ban on voluntary self-reform would make Being and Nothingness more consistent.