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SERVICE PUBLIC --- SERVICE PUBLIC --- CREATION D'EMPLOIS --- SERVICE PUBLIC --- SERVICE PUBLIC --- CREATION D'EMPLOIS
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SERVICE PUBLIC --- UNION EUROPEENNE --- CREATION D'EMPLOIS --- SERVICE PUBLIC --- UNION EUROPEENNE --- CREATION D'EMPLOIS
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A well-functioning public expenditure management (PEM) system is considered a critical pillar of government efficiency, on par with a low-distortion tax system and efficient tax administration. The paper discusses PEM systems in developing countries using an analytical framework based on principal-agent theory. This simple model can be applied to various PEM systems, and allows for comparisons between institutional settings. To illustrate this, we analyze the benefits derived from the use by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) of two control instruments; ex post audits and ex ante controls, and assess their value in terms of their ability to deter cheating. We derive a set of possible "control regimes" which can be used by the MoF. Although we illustrate the use of the model using developing countries, it is also relevant to developed economies.
Electronic books. -- local. --- Expenditures, Public -- Developing countries. --- Government spending policy -- Management -- Developing countries. --- Political Science --- Law, Politics & Government --- Public Finance --- Government spending policy --- Expenditures, Public --- Management --- Appropriations and expenditures --- Government appropriations --- Government expenditures --- Government spending --- Public expenditures --- Public spending --- Spending, Government --- Public spending policy --- Spending policy, Government --- Government policy --- Finance, Public --- Public administration --- Economic policy --- Full employment policies --- Unfunded mandates --- Taxation --- Auditing --- Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General --- National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General --- Public Administration --- Public Sector Accounting and Audits --- Management accounting & bookkeeping --- Public finance & taxation --- Expenditure --- External audit --- Internal controls --- Tax incentives --- Revenue --- France
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Health services --- supply and distribution --- Health services --- supply and distribution
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Delivery of Health Care --- Delivery of Health Care --- methods. --- organization & administration.
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This paper analyzes the pervasiveness and persistence of rent seeking, misgovernance, and public sector inefficiency in many developing and transition economies. We formalize evidence from country experiences and empirical studies into a stylized analytical framework that reflects realistic constraints faced in these countries. Our work departs from the standard economic literature by assuming that (i) the relationship between the government and its population is regulated through an implicit social consensus; (ii) traditional incentives (in the form of public expenditure controls, sanctions, or monetary incentives to perform) are, for various reasons, ineffective in many of these countries; and (iii) the persistence of high corruption reflects a very stable equilibrium, which in turn reflects the fact that several constraints are simultaneously binding. We argue that, when traditional incentives fail, transparency-information provision and disclosure, together with the means to use it-by relaxing different constraints, can contribute to improving public outcomes.
Corruption -- Developing countries -- Prevention -- Econometric models. --- Electronic books. -- local. --- Rent (Economic theory) -- Econometric models. --- Transparency in government -- Econometric models. --- Law, Politics & Government --- Human Rights --- Corruption --- Rent (Economic theory) --- Transparency in government --- Prevention --- Econometric models. --- Economic rent --- Ground-rent --- Government in the sunshine --- Openness in government --- Sunshine, Government in the --- Transparence in government --- Corrupt practices --- Economics --- Land use --- Rent seeking --- Open government (Transparency in government) --- Public administration --- Ethics --- Labor --- Taxation --- Criminology --- Demography --- Bureaucracy --- Administrative Processes in Public Organizations --- Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General --- Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General --- Employment --- Unemployment --- Wages --- Intergenerational Income Distribution --- Aggregate Human Capital --- Aggregate Labor Productivity --- Demographic Economics: General --- Corporate crime --- white-collar crime --- Labour --- income economics --- Public finance & taxation --- Civil service & public sector --- Population & demography --- Tax incentives --- Civil service --- Population and demographics --- Population --- Bolivia --- Income economics --- White-collar crime
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