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Theory of knowledge --- Skepticism --- Truth --- Coherence theory of truth --- Scepticism --- Unbelief --- Coherence theory --- Agnosticism --- Belief and doubt --- Free thought

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Perhaps the most fundamental question of epistemology asks on what grounds our knowledge of the world ultimately rests. The traditional Cartesian answer is that it rests on indubitable facts arrived at through rational insight or introspection. Coherentists reject this answer, claiming instead that knowledge arises from relations of coherence or mutual support: if our beliefs cohere, we can be sure that they are mostly true. The first part of this Element introduces the reader to the main ideas and problems of coherentism. The next part describes the 'probabilistic turn', leading up to recent demonstrations that coherence fails to be conducive to truth. The final part reassesses the current debate about the proper definition of coherence from the standpoint of Rudolf Carnap's methodology of explication. The upshot is a tentative and qualified defence of one of the early coherence measures.

Knowledge, Theory of. --- Truth --- Coherence theory. --- Coherence theory of truth --- Epistemology --- Theory of knowledge --- Philosophy --- Psychology

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Pragmatism --- History --- Levi, Isaac,

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Belief revision theory and philosophy of science both aspire to shed light on the dynamics of knowledge – on how our view of the world changes (typically) in the light of new evidence. Yet these two areas of research have long seemed strangely detached from each other, as witnessed by the small number of cross-references and researchers working in both domains. One may speculate as to what has brought about this surprising, and perhaps unfortunate, state of affairs. One factor may be that while belief revision theory has traditionally been pursued in a bottom- up manner, focusing on the endeavors of single inquirers, philosophers of science, inspired by logical empiricism, have tended to be more interested in science as a multi-agent or agent-independent phenomenon.

Belief change. --- Science -- Philosophy. --- Science --- Belief change --- Physical Sciences & Mathematics --- Philosophy & Religion --- Sciences - General --- Philosophy --- Nonmonotonic reasoning. --- Conditionals (Logic) --- Knowledge, Theory of. --- Formalization (Philosophy) --- Epistemology --- Theory of knowledge --- Conditional statements (Logic) --- Non-monotonic reasoning --- Philosophy. --- Logic. --- Philosophy and science. --- Philosophy of Science. --- Form (Philosophy) --- Knowledge, Theory of --- Logic --- Methodology --- Psychology --- Grammar, Comparative and general --- Reasoning --- Argumentation --- Deduction (Logic) --- Deductive logic --- Dialectic (Logic) --- Logic, Deductive --- Intellect --- Thought and thinking --- Normal science --- Philosophy of science --- Science and philosophy