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Jonas Olson presents an original account of the historical background of moral error theory, and examines in particular J.L. Mackie's influential contributions to the debate. In Part I (History), Olson provides the historical context of the debate, and discusses the moral error theories of David Hume and some of the more or less influential twentieth century philosophers, including Axel Hägerström, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Richard Robinson. He argues that the early cases for moral error theory are suggestive but that they would have been stronger had they included something like Mackie's arguments that moral properties and facts are metaphysically queer. Part II (Critique) focuses on these arguments. Olson identifies four queerness arguments, concerning supervenience, knowledge, motivation, and irreducible normativity, and goes on to establish that while the first three are not compelling, the fourth has considerable force, especially when combined with debunking explanations of why we tend to believe that there are moral properties and facts when in fact there are none. One conclusion of Part II is that a plausible error theory takes he form of an error theory about irreducible normativity. In Part III (Defense), Olson considers challenges according to which that kind of error theory has problematic ramifications regarding hypothetical reasons, epistemic reasons, and deliberation. He ends his discussion with a consideration of the upshots of moral error theory for ordinary moral thought and talk, and for normative theorizing. -- Book jacket.
General ethics --- Moral realism. --- Ethics --- Realism --- Mackie, J. L. --- Hume, David, --- Hägerström, Axel, --- Hägerström, Axel Anders Theodor, --- Haegerstroem, Axel, --- Hsiu-mo, Ta-wei, --- Юм, Д., --- I︠U︡m, D., --- Yum, Daṿid, --- יום, דוד --- Hume, Dawid, --- Hyūma, Ḍeviḍa, --- Hyūma, --- Home, David, --- Mackie, John Leslie --- Philosophy. --- Metaethik. --- Skeptizismus. --- Etik. --- ukslc. --- Mackie, John L., --- Philosophy --- Ukslc. --- Hume, David --- Moral realism
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Value theory, or axiology, looks at what things are good or bad, how good or bad they are, and, most fundamentally, what it is for a thing to be good or bad. Questions about value and about what is valuable are important to moral philosophers, since most moral theories hold that we ought to promote the good (even if this is not the only thing we ought to do). This Handbook focuses on value theory as it pertains to ethics, broadly construed, and provides a comprehensive overview of contemporary debates pertaining not only to philosophy but also to other disciplines-most notably, political theory and economics. The Handbook's twenty-two newly commissioned chapters are divided into three parts. Part I: Foundations concerns fundamental and interrelated issues about the nature of value and distinctions between kinds of value. Part II: Structure concerns formal properties of value that bear on the possibilities of measuring and comparing value. Part III: Extensions, finally, considers specific topics, ranging from health to freedom, where questions of value figure prominently.--
General ethics --- Values. --- Värdefilosofi.
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Outside of philosophy, value theory branches out to economics. As is reflected in some of the chapters in the Handbook, there are theories and conceptual distinctions in value theory that are highly relevant to economic theory and there are methods and results in economics that are useful in analysing the formal structure of value. This Handbook focuses on value theory as it pertains to ethics, broadly construed, and its purpose is to provide a comprehensive and state-of-the-art overview of the debate.
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