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"This report assesses the annexation of Crimea by Russia (February--March 2014) and the early phases of political mobilization and combat operations in Eastern Ukraine (late February--late May 2014). It examines Russia's approach, draws inferences from Moscow's intentions, and evaluates the likelihood of such methods being used again elsewhere. These two distinct campaigns overlap somewhat but offer different lessons for participants and observers. The report finds that Russia's operation to annex Crimea represented a decisive and competent use of military force in pursuit of political ends. Russia's operations in Crimea benefited from highly favorable circumstances--political, historical, geographical, and military--that limit their generalizability. Analysis of the operation underscores that there are many remaining unknowns about Russia's military capabilities, especially in the aftermath of its military reforms and modernization program. The report also finds that the campaign in Eastern Ukraine was an ineffectually implemented--and perhaps ill-conceived--effort to achieve political fragmentation of Ukraine via federalization and retain Russian influence. Russia achieved its primary objectives but at a much higher cost than desired and through a fitful cycle of adaptation. This study thus questions the desirability for Moscow to replicate a course of events similar to the campaign in Eastern Ukraine. Conversely, the operation to annex Crimea was a highly successful employment of select elements within Russia's armed forces, making it an attractive use of military power, but the structural and operation factors contributing to its success raise doubts whether it can be repeated elsewhere."--Publisher's description.

Ukraine Conflict, 2014 --- -Russia-Ukraine Conflict, 2014 --- -Russo-Ukraine War, 2014 --- -Ukraine-Russia Conflict, 2014 --- -Occupied territories. --- Crimea (Ukraine) --- Russia (Federation) --- Ukraine --- Russian Federation --- Rossiyskaya Federatsiya --- Rossiya (Federation) --- Rossii︠a︡ (Federation) --- Российская Федерация --- Rossiĭskai︠a︡ Federat︠s︡ii︠a︡ --- Російська Федерація --- Rosiĭsʹka Federat︠s︡ii︠a︡ --- Federazione della Russia --- Russische Föderation --- RF --- Federation of Russia --- Urysye Federat︠s︡ie --- Правительство России --- Pravitelʹstvo Rossii --- Правительство Российской Федерации --- Pravitelʹstvo Rossiĭskoĭ Federat︠s︡ii --- Правительство РФ --- Pravitelʹstvo RF --- Rosja (Federation) --- O-lo-ssu (Federation) --- Roshia Renpō --- Federazione russa --- OKhU --- Orosyn Kholboony Uls --- Russian S.F.S.R. --- An Úcráin --- I-Yukreyini --- IYukreyini --- Malorosii︠a︡ --- Małorosja --- Oekraïne --- Ookraan --- Oukraïne --- Oykrania --- Petite-Russie --- U.S.R.R. --- Ucrægna --- Úcráin --- Ucraina --- Ucrania --- Ucrayena --- ʻUkelena --- Ukraïna --- Ukrainæ --- Uḳraʼinah --- Ukrainian Council Socialist Republic --- Ukrainian S.S.R. --- Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic --- Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic --- Ukrainio --- Ukrainmudin Orn --- Ukraïnsʹka Radi︠a︡nsʹka Sot︠s︡ialistychna Respublika --- Ukrainska Radyanska Sotsialistychna Respublika --- Ukrainska Sotsialistychna Radianska Respublika --- Ukraïnsʹka Sot︠s︡ii︠a︡listychna Radi︠a︡nsʹka Respublika --- Ukrainskai︠a︡ Sovetskai︠a︡ Sot︠s︡ialisticheskai︠a︡ Respublika --- Ukrainskaya Sovetskaya Sotsialisticheskaya Respublika --- Ukrainujo --- Ukrajina --- Ūkrāniyā --- Ukranya --- Ukrayiina --- Ukrayina --- Ukrayna --- Ukuraina --- Ukyáña --- Wcráin --- Yn Ookraan --- Yr Wcráin --- Yukrain --- Ουκρανία --- Украинæ --- Украина --- Украинэ --- Украинмудин Орн --- Україна --- אוקראינע --- אוקראינה --- أوكرانيا --- ウクライナ --- 우크라이나 --- Ukraine (Hetmanate : 1648-1782) --- Krym (Ukraine) --- Krim (Ukraine) --- Krimm (Ukraine) --- Republic of Krym (Ukraine) --- Taurida (Ukraine) --- Republic of Crimea (Ukraine) --- Respublika Krym (Ukraine) --- Crimean Republic (Ukraine) --- Avtonomna Respublika Krym (Ukraine) --- Autonomous Republic of Crimea (Ukraine) --- ARK (Ukraine) --- Krymskai︠a︡ oblastʹ (Ukraine) --- History, Military --- Relations --- Eluosi (Federation) --- 俄罗斯 (Federation) --- Крим (Ukraine) --- Krym-Tavrida (Ukraine) --- Крым-Таврида (Ukraine) --- Tavrida (Ukraine) --- Таврида (Ukraine) --- Республіка Крим (Ukraine) --- Автономна Республіка Крим (Ukraine) --- АРК (Ukraine) --- RF (Russian Federation) --- Россия (Federation) --- Russo-Ukrainian War, 2014

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Policymakers across the federal government have begun to recognize the potential of social media as a source of information and have commissioned studies to explore how social media can improve disaster situational awareness, influence public opinion, augment traditional data sources, and counter disinformation. In this project, RAND Corporation researchers developed an approach for analyzing social media data to derive insights about chemical incidents and conducted a proof of concept of that approach by applying it to the case of chemical weapons employment in Syria between 2017 and 2018. They identified a four-step process: (1) Identify operationally relevant factors and examine known events to find incident indicators, (2) develop a feed of social media data, (3) conduct automated daily scans for elevated keyword use in Twitter data, and (4) analyze posts to verify detection and extract information. The procedure showed promise. Based on the analysis, it is recommended that the Defense Threat Reduction Agency initiate three activities to further the development of this procedure.

Chemical weapons --- Social media --- Social sciences --- Research --- Methodology. --- Network analysis. --- Syria --- History