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This paper develops a model of optimal government debt maturity in which the government cannot issue state-contingent bonds and cannot commit to fiscal policy. If the government can perfectly commit, it fully insulates the economy against government spending shocks by purchasing short-term assets and issuing long-term debt. These positions are quantitatively very large relative to GDP and do not need to be actively managed by the government. Our main result is that these conclusions are not robust to the introduction of lack of commitment. Under lack of commitment, large and tilted positions are very expensive to finance ex-ante since they exacerbate the problem of lack of commitment ex-post. In contrast, a flat maturity structure minimizes the cost of lack of commitment, though it also limits insurance and increases the volatility of fiscal policy distortions. We show that the optimal maturity structure is nearly flat because reducing average borrowing costs is quantitatively more important for welfare than reducing fiscal policy volatility. Thus, under lack of commitment, the government actively manages its debt positions and can approximate optimal policy by confining its debt instruments to consols.

Zonder onderwerpscode: economie

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Yes, it makes a lot of sense. This paper studies how to design simple loss functions for central banks, as parsimonious approximations to social welfare. We show, both analytically and quantitatively, that simple loss functions should feature a high weight on measures of economic activity, sometimes even larger than the weight on inflation. Two main factors drive our result. First, stabilizing economic activity also stabilizes other welfare relevant variables. Second, the estimated model features mitigated inflation distortions due to a low elasticity of substitution between monopolistic goods and a low interest rate sensitivity of demand. The result holds up in the presence of measurement errors, with large shocks that generate a trade-off between stabilizing inflation and resource utilization, and also when ensuring a low probability of hitting the zero lower bound on interest rates.

Banks and banking, Central. --- Banker's banks --- Banks, Central --- Central banking --- Central banks --- Banks and banking --- Inflation --- Labor --- Macroeconomics --- Production and Operations Management --- Time-Series Models --- Dynamic Quantile Regressions --- Dynamic Treatment Effect Models --- Diffusion Processes --- State Space Models --- Central Banks and Their Policies --- Policy Objectives --- Policy Designs and Consistency --- Policy Coordination --- Macroeconomics: Production --- Price Level --- Deflation --- Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General --- Demand and Supply of Labor: General --- Labour --- income economics --- Output gap --- Wages --- Production growth --- Labor markets --- Production --- Prices --- Economic theory --- Labor market --- United States

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Is aggressive monetary policy response to inflation feasible in countries that suffer from fiscal dominance? We find that if nominal interest rates are allowed to respond to government debt, even aggressive rules that satisfy the Taylor principle can produce unique equilibria. However, resulting inflation is extremely volatile and zero lower bound on nominal interest rates is frequently violated. Within the set of feasible rules the optimal response to inflation is highly negative, and more aggressive inflation fighting is inferior from a welfare point of view. The welfare gain from responding to fiscal variables is minimal compared to the gain from eliminating fiscal dominance.

Banks and Banking --- Inflation --- Public Finance --- Price Level --- Deflation --- Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects --- National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General --- Fiscal Policy --- Macroeconomics --- Finance --- Public finance & taxation --- Expenditure --- Zero lower bound --- Real interest rates --- Fiscal policy --- Prices --- Interest rates --- Expenditures, Public --- Monetary policy --- Econometric models.

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This paper develops a model of optimal government debt maturity in which the government cannot issue state-contingent bonds and cannot commit to fiscal policy. If the government can perfectly commit, it fully insulates the economy against government spending shocks by purchasing short-term assets and issuing long-term debt. These positions are quantitatively very large relative to GDP and do not need to be actively managed by the government. Our main result is that these conclusions are not robust to the introduction of lack of commitment. Under lack of commitment, large and tilted positions are very expensive to finance ex-ante since they exacerbate the problem of lack of commitment ex-post. In contrast, a flat maturity structure minimizes the cost of lack of commitment, though it also limits insurance and increases the volatility of fiscal policy distortions. We show that the optimal time-consistent maturity structure is nearly flat because reducing average borrowing costs is quantitatively more important for welfare than reducing fiscal policy volatility. Thus, under lack of commitment, the government actively manages its debt positions and can approximate optimal policy by confining its debt instruments to consols.