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On November 4, 1979, militant students and revolutionaries occupied the U.S. embassy in Tehran, taking American diplomats hostage and demanding the end of contact with the United States and the extradition of the shah to Iran. The occupation lasted 444 days and galvanized the attention of the world and of the Carter administration. Despite concerted efforts on the part of the Carter administration, negotiations - public and private, direct and through third parties - stalled. Russell Moses evaluates the strategies and policies of the Carter administration, Soviet behavior during the crisis, and Iranian attitudes, assumptions, and actions, providing new interpretations of how negotiations work or don't work and of the assumptions underlying each side's position. Because President Carter and his advisers where never able to identify the precise nature of factional infighting within the Iranian leadership nor fully comprehend the Ayatollah Khomeini's understanding of the hostage situation and negotiations, their efforts to compel the hostages' release were doomed to fail. Moses contends that a fragile consensus for settling the crisis that developed within Iran in early 1981 - born more by accident than by U.S. design - led to the release of the hostages. Freeing the Hostages is based primarily on interviews with high-level officials in the Carter administration, new information about Iranian actions, and a fresh analysis of Soviet behavior during the hostage crisis. Much of it challenges traditional interpretations of the hostage crisis as well as accepted notions of the course and conduct of negotiations.

Iran Hostage Crisis, 1979-1981. --- Iran Hostage Crisis, 1979-1981 --- Regions & Countries - Americas --- History & Archaeology --- United States - General --- Hostages