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Overseas military access and basing is a critical component of China's global military ambitions. With the opening of its first overseas military facility in Djibouti in 2017, China appeared to take a major step toward global power projection. The strategic implications of such access and basing outside of China's immediate periphery are hotly debated. In this report, the authors look to the past to help anticipate what Chinese overseas access and basing might look like in the 2030s. They focus on three case studies of overseas military access and basing among the United States' competitors - French bases in francophone Africa during De Gaulle's presidency, Soviet bases ringing the Mediterranean and Red Seas region under Brezhnev, and Russian bases in Syria during the ongoing Syrian civil war - to understand how major powers have conceived of and used strategic basing in the past. France, the Soviet Union, and Russia - together with the United States (also examined) - have had the largest networks of overseas military bases in the post-World War II period. These cases represent a range of competitive behaviors, reflecting the uncertainty of Chinese behavior ten to 20 years in the future. Drawing on a combined examination of case studies and a literature review of U.S. basing experiences, the authors assess the potential risks posed by Chinese military expansion and recommend principles for the U.S. government, U.S. Department of Defense, and U.S. Army to adopt now to help shape the environment in which Chinese ambitions for global military presence will unfold.

Military bases, Chinese --- Military bases, Soviet --- Military bases, American --- Military bases, Foreign --- History. --- China --- Soviet Union --- Russia (Federation) --- United States --- China. --- Mediterranean Region. --- Soviet Union. --- Syria. --- United States. --- Military relations.

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School leaders across the United States face the challenge of creating safe and secure environments across their campuses in a way that helps promote the achievement of schools' educational objectives. To help them meet this challenge, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency asked the Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center to conduct a review of the literature on physical security in kindergarten-through–12th grade (K–12) schools and other, comparable sectors to improve school leaders' understanding of how system-based security operations and physical elements can protect school occupants and mitigate the impact of threats and risks. In this report, the authors define and present a systems approach to school physical security in which five protection and mitigation elements—security equipment and technology, site and building design, people and personnel, policies and procedures, and training and exercises—integrate and work together to provide layered security benefits. Specifically, the approach to protection and mitigation elaborated here emphasizes that the policies, procedures, and training developed around school physical security tie together people and personnel with equipment, technology, and design choices to build a coherent system. School leaders need to think about how the protection and mitigation options they have in place affect the broader school mission, operations, and climate. Schools with diversity in student bodies, campus locations, and other traits will approach physical security in unique ways that match their unique needs, recognizing that there is no one-size-fits-all solution to protection and mitigation.

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Shooting incidents at kindergarten through grade 12 (K–12) schools in the United States, including mass attacks like the one that killed 19 students and two teachers at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde, Texas, have sparked calls to increase security or adopt altogether new approaches to school safety. These approaches include allowing teachers or staff to carry firearms in some schools. To learn what teachers across the United States think about school safety generally and about specific proposals to enhance safety in schools, such as teacher-carry policies, RAND researchers administered a survey to a randomly sampled set of 973 K–12 teachers using the American Teacher Panel. The survey focused on teachers' views of safety in their schools, including their main safety concerns, perceptions of security measures in place, the effect of those measures on school climate, and whether they were concerned for their own safety and that of their students. On the specific issue of firearms in school, the survey asked whether allowing teachers to carry firearms would make schools more or less safe and whether teachers would personally carry a firearm if given the choice to do so. Findings note that teachers, like the U.S. population as a whole, are divided about armed teachers at school: Fifty-four percent of respondents reported believing that teachers carrying firearms will make schools less safe, 20 percent reported believing that it will make schools safer, and the final 26 percent reported feeling that it would make schools neither more nor less safe.

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Racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism (REMVE) and extremists (REMVEs) present some of the most pressing threats to the United States. REMVE also has been identified as the White identity terrorist movement (WITM). REMVEs are among the most lethal domestic violent extremists, and they are the most likely to commit mass-casualty attacks. These movements are characterized by a broad ideological orientation toward xenophobic, anti-Semitic, racist, and misogynistic sentiment. For this report, the authors reviewed the relevant literature on REMVE networks and collected and analyzed social media data from six social networks (Twitter, Reddit, Gab, Ruqqus, Telegram, and Stormfront) to produce a global network map of the digital REMVE space. That network map evaluates each network's construction, connectivity, geographic location, references to prominent organizations, and proclivity to violence. The authors also reviewed ten countries' experiences with REMVE to sketch out an understanding of the REMVE space in these countries and how REMVEs in those countries relate to those in the United States.

Extremists --- Radicalism --- White supremacy movements --- Social media --- Social aspects --- Political aspects --- United States.

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The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), from its most-senior leaders to military operators in the field, has expressed a strong commitment to complying with the law of war and to mitigating civilian harm for legal, moral, and strategic reasons and for reasons related to mission-effectiveness. But above and beyond its law of war obligations, DoD implements policies and procedures at multiple levels to mitigate civilian harm during armed conflict. In this report, researchers from the RAND Corporation and CNA conduct an independent assessment of DoD standards, processes, procedures, and policies relating to civilian casualties resulting from U.S. military operations. In particular, the researchers examine DoD's efforts to assess, investigate, and respond to civilian harm, as well as DoD's resourcing and structure to address such issues. The researchers outline their findings and recommendations for how DoD can improve in these areas.

War --- Civilian war casualties --- Humanitarian law --- Military doctrine --- Protection of civilians --- United States. --- Rules and practice --- Evaluation