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This paper examines the issue of controlling fiscal corruption by providing incentives to fiscal officers. First, a case study of a successful attack on corruption is presented that shows the importance of attending to the conditions of service of fiscal officers. Second, a model is developed drawing on the conclusions of the case study that shows their consistency with optimization behavior. It confirms that simply providing bonuses is not enough. Corruption at higher levels of management has to be contained so as to allow bonuses to become more effective, and thereby to initiate a virtuous circle.

Labor --- Taxation --- Criminology --- Firm Behavior --- Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty --- Fiscal Policy --- Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits --- Private Pensions --- Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law --- Formal and Informal Sectors --- Shadow Economy --- Institutional Arrangements --- Bureaucracy --- Administrative Processes in Public Organizations --- Corruption --- Tax Evasion and Avoidance --- Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies --- Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General --- Employment --- Unemployment --- Wages --- Intergenerational Income Distribution --- Aggregate Human Capital --- Aggregate Labor Productivity --- Labour --- income economics --- Public finance & taxation --- Corporate crime --- white-collar crime --- Civil service & public sector --- Bonuses --- Tax evasion --- Income and capital gains taxes --- Tax administration core functions --- Crime --- Revenue administration --- Civil service --- Employee fringe benefits --- Income tax --- Tax administration and procedure --- Ghana

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Equality can multiply due to the complementarity between wage determination and welfare spending. A more equal wage distribution fuels welfare generosity via political competition. A more generous welfare state fuels wage equality further via its support to weak groups in the labor market. Together the two effects generate a cumulative process that adds up to an important social multiplier. We focus on a political economic equilibrium which incorporates this mutual dependence between wage setting and welfare spending. It explains how almost equally rich countries differ in economic and social equality among their citizens and why countries cluster around different worlds of welfare capitalism---the Scandinavian model, the Anglo-Saxon model and the Continental model. Using data on 18 OECD countries over the period 1976-2002 we test the main predictions of the model and identify a sizeable magnitude of the equality multiplier. We obtain additional support for the cumulative complementarity between social spending and wage equality by applying another data set for the US over the period 1945-2001.

Zonder onderwerpscode: economie

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Développement économique --- Economic development --- Economic growth --- Economische ontwikkeling --- Endogenous growth (Economics) --- Economic development. --- Growth models (Economics) --- Development, Economic --- Growth, Economic --- Economic policy --- Economics --- Statics and dynamics (Social sciences) --- Development economics --- Resource curse --- Mathematical models. --- Mathematical models

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