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Religion and politics

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"This report assesses the annexation of Crimea by Russia (February--March 2014) and the early phases of political mobilization and combat operations in Eastern Ukraine (late February--late May 2014). It examines Russia's approach, draws inferences from Moscow's intentions, and evaluates the likelihood of such methods being used again elsewhere. These two distinct campaigns overlap somewhat but offer different lessons for participants and observers. The report finds that Russia's operation to annex Crimea represented a decisive and competent use of military force in pursuit of political ends. Russia's operations in Crimea benefited from highly favorable circumstances--political, historical, geographical, and military--that limit their generalizability. Analysis of the operation underscores that there are many remaining unknowns about Russia's military capabilities, especially in the aftermath of its military reforms and modernization program. The report also finds that the campaign in Eastern Ukraine was an ineffectually implemented--and perhaps ill-conceived--effort to achieve political fragmentation of Ukraine via federalization and retain Russian influence. Russia achieved its primary objectives but at a much higher cost than desired and through a fitful cycle of adaptation. This study thus questions the desirability for Moscow to replicate a course of events similar to the campaign in Eastern Ukraine. Conversely, the operation to annex Crimea was a highly successful employment of select elements within Russia's armed forces, making it an attractive use of military power, but the structural and operation factors contributing to its success raise doubts whether it can be repeated elsewhere."--Publisher's description.

Ukraine Conflict, 2014 --- -Russia-Ukraine Conflict, 2014 --- -Russo-Ukraine War, 2014 --- -Ukraine-Russia Conflict, 2014 --- -Occupied territories. --- Crimea (Ukraine) --- Russia (Federation) --- Ukraine --- Russian Federation --- Rossiyskaya Federatsiya --- Rossiya (Federation) --- Rossii︠a︡ (Federation) --- Российская Федерация --- Rossiĭskai︠a︡ Federat︠s︡ii︠a︡ --- Російська Федерація --- Rosiĭsʹka Federat︠s︡ii︠a︡ --- Federazione della Russia --- Russische Föderation --- RF --- Federation of Russia --- Urysye Federat︠s︡ie --- Правительство России --- Pravitelʹstvo Rossii --- Правительство Российской Федерации --- Pravitelʹstvo Rossiĭskoĭ Federat︠s︡ii --- Правительство РФ --- Pravitelʹstvo RF --- Rosja (Federation) --- O-lo-ssu (Federation) --- Roshia Renpō --- Federazione russa --- OKhU --- Orosyn Kholboony Uls --- Russian S.F.S.R. --- An Úcráin --- I-Yukreyini --- IYukreyini --- Malorosii︠a︡ --- Małorosja --- Oekraïne --- Ookraan --- Oukraïne --- Oykrania --- Petite-Russie --- U.S.R.R. --- Ucrægna --- Úcráin --- Ucraina --- Ucrania --- Ucrayena --- ʻUkelena --- Ukraïna --- Ukrainæ --- Uḳraʼinah --- Ukrainian Council Socialist Republic --- Ukrainian S.S.R. --- Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic --- Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic --- Ukrainio --- Ukrainmudin Orn --- Ukraïnsʹka Radi︠a︡nsʹka Sot︠s︡ialistychna Respublika --- Ukrainska Radyanska Sotsialistychna Respublika --- Ukrainska Sotsialistychna Radianska Respublika --- Ukraïnsʹka Sot︠s︡ii︠a︡listychna Radi︠a︡nsʹka Respublika --- Ukrainskai︠a︡ Sovetskai︠a︡ Sot︠s︡ialisticheskai︠a︡ Respublika --- Ukrainskaya Sovetskaya Sotsialisticheskaya Respublika --- Ukrainujo --- Ukrajina --- Ūkrāniyā --- Ukranya --- Ukrayiina --- Ukrayina --- Ukrayna --- Ukuraina --- Ukyáña --- Wcráin --- Yn Ookraan --- Yr Wcráin --- Yukrain --- Ουκρανία --- Украинæ --- Украина --- Украинэ --- Украинмудин Орн --- Україна --- אוקראינע --- אוקראינה --- أوكرانيا --- ウクライナ --- 우크라이나 --- Ukraine (Hetmanate : 1648-1782) --- Krym (Ukraine) --- Krim (Ukraine) --- Krimm (Ukraine) --- Republic of Krym (Ukraine) --- Taurida (Ukraine) --- Republic of Crimea (Ukraine) --- Respublika Krym (Ukraine) --- Crimean Republic (Ukraine) --- Avtonomna Respublika Krym (Ukraine) --- Autonomous Republic of Crimea (Ukraine) --- ARK (Ukraine) --- Krymskai︠a︡ oblastʹ (Ukraine) --- History, Military --- Relations --- Eluosi (Federation) --- 俄罗斯 (Federation) --- Крим (Ukraine) --- Krym-Tavrida (Ukraine) --- Крым-Таврида (Ukraine) --- Tavrida (Ukraine) --- Таврида (Ukraine) --- Республіка Крим (Ukraine) --- Автономна Республіка Крим (Ukraine) --- АРК (Ukraine) --- RF (Russian Federation) --- Россия (Federation) --- Russo-Ukrainian War, 2014

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The Proposition 47 grant program, administered by the California Board of State and Community Corrections (BSCC), provides discretionary grant funding to localities to provide community-based supportive services to individuals who have been involved in the criminal justice system. In June 2017, the Los Angeles Mayor's Office of Reentry was awarded Proposition 47 grant funding under its first cohort of grantees ("Cohort 1") to implement Project imPACT. Project imPACT is a voluntary program designed to serve individuals who were arrested or convicted of a crime in the past year or who are currently on community-based supervision and who also have a history of mental health and/or substance use concerns. This program provides employment, behavioral health, and legal services in an effort to help participants obtain and retain employment and reduce criminal recidivism. Project imPACT serves four regions of Los Angeles: South Los Angeles, Watts, Downtown, and San Fernando Valley. RAND Corporation and Harder+Company conducted a process and outcome evaluation of the program. This final evaluation report summarizes the authors' findings from a process and outcome evaluation of Cohort 1 of Project imPACT, which provided services from July 2018 to December 2020.

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Project imPACT is a reentry program designed by the City of Los Angeles Mayor's Office and funded through Proposition 47 funds by the California Board of State and Community Corrections. The program initially received funds in 2018 and was awarded additional funds in 2020 to continue and expand the program through February 15, 2023. Project imPACT provides employment, behavioral health, and legal services to individuals in four regions across Los Angeles, with the goal of improving employment outcomes as a way to reduce future criminal justice system involvement. The additional funding allowed the program to add a transition-age youth pilot and housing services support. The RAND Corporation and Harder+Company conducted a mixed methods process and outcome evaluation of Cohort 2. This report presents findings related to individuals served between June 2020 (when Cohort 2 began enrolling Fellows) through September 2022. The process evaluation focuses on the implementation of Project imPACT, and the outcome evaluation examines whether the program achieved expected short-term and intermediate outcomes. Fellows achieved several of the program goals through their work with the Project imPACT providers: About 52 percent of Fellows obtained employment and 53 percent of employed Fellows remained employed one year after starting the program. Of the 87 individuals who were in unstable housing settings when they entered the program, 64 percent had moved into a more stable setting by the time they exited the program. Only 22 enrolled Fellows were convicted for a new arrest after their enrollment.

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Russia's conventional capabilities pose a serious threat to NATO that remains mostly untested. Where it has historically succeeded is in using various types of hostile measures to sow disorder, weaken democratic institutions, and undermine NATO cohesion and what Russia perceives as the eastward expansion of Western institutions. However, Russia also has a long track record of strategic shortfalls, and even some ineptitude. Formulating strategies for addressing these actions demands a clear understanding of how and why Russian leaders employ hostile measures—for example, economic embargoes, limited military incursions, cyberattacks, and information campaigns. A historical review of Soviet-era power dynamics and detailed case studies of Russian hostile measures in the post-Soviet era help clarify the conditions under which Russia employs hostile measures and the vulnerabilities it exploits in the countries it targets—as well as the messages these measures send to other key audiences, such as Russia's domestic public, the Russian diaspora, and Western powers that Russia perceives as encroaching on its sphere of influence. NATO and other Western powers will benefit from exploring opportunities to deter, prevent, and counter Russian hostile behavior in the so-called gray zone short of war, where daily adversarial competition occurs. Many of the behaviors that Russia exhibits in the gray zone will no doubt extend to conventional war.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization --- North Atlantic Treaty Organization. --- Russia (Federation) --- Europe --- Europe. --- Foreign relations --- Military policy.