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Deze studie analyseert de door elektrische energiebeurzen georganiseerde veilingen in Europa. Beurzen zijn instituties die de groothandel in elektrische energie vergemakkelijken. De meeste beurzen organiseren aparte veilingen een dag voordat de levering plaatsvindt voor elk uur van de volgende dag. Generatoren, grootverbruikers, leveranciers en handelaars optimaliseren hun portfolio’s via deze handelsplatformen. Initieel organiseerden de meeste beurzen in Europa handel binnen nationale grenzen. In toenemende mate worden ze ook betrokken bij het organiseren van grensoverschrijdende handel. De veranderende context impliceert nieuwe uitdagingen maar hernieuwt ook de discussie over hoe vroegere uitdagingen werden aangepakt. Dit werk geeft inzicht in de problemen waarmee beurzen te kampen hebben. Het veilingsysteem is gemodelleerd als een optimalisatieprobleem met beperkingen en alternatieve oplossingen worden onderzocht. In zijn rol als veilingmeester, ontvangt de beurs door marktpartijen geïntroduceerde orders en beslist dan welke orders te aanvaarden en aan welke prijzen de contracten worden afgerekend. Het nemen van deze beslissing is niet vanzelfsprekend door netwerkbeperkingen, order formaten (blokorders) en politieke beperkingen. De tekst is onderverdeeld in drie delen die respectievelijk deze thema’s bespreken. This study analyzes the auctions organized by power exchanges in Europe. Power exchanges are institutions that facilitate wholesale trade in electric energy. Most exchanges organize separate auctions day ahead for every hour of the next day. Generators, large consumers, suppliers and traders fine-tune their portfolios via these trading platforms. Most exchanges originally only organized trade within national borders. Increasingly, they are also involved in facilitating cross-border trade. The changing context implies new challenges but also renews the discussion on how former challenges have been addressed. This work provides insight into the problems faced by exchanges. The auction problem is modeled as a constrained optimization problem and alternative solutions are analyzed. In its role of auctioneer, the exchange receives orders introduced by market parties and then decides which to accept and at which prices to settle the contracts. Taking this decision is not straightforward due to network constraints, order formats (block orders), and political constraints. The text is divided in three parts, respectively addressing these issues.

Academic collection --- 621.3 <043> --- 620.9 <043> --- 620.9 <043> Economics of energy in general--Dissertaties --- Economics of energy in general--Dissertaties --- 621.3 <043> Electrical engineering--Dissertaties --- Electrical engineering--Dissertaties --- Theses

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The UK model of incentive regulation of power grids was at one time the most advanced, and elements of it were adopted throughout the EU. This model worked well, particularly in the context of limited investment and innovation, a single and strong regulatory authority, and limited coordination between foreign grid operators. This enlightening book demonstrates how the landscape has changed markedly since 2010 and that regulation has had to work hard to catch up and evolve. As the EU enters a wave of investment and an era of new services and innovation, this has created growing tensions between national regulatory authorities in terms of coordinating technical standards and distribution systems. This is being played out against an increasingly disruptive backdrop of digitization, new market platforms and novel business models. Electricity Network Regulation in the EU adopts a truly European approach to the complex issues surrounding the topic, focusing on the grey areas and critical questions that have traditionally been difficult to answer. Incentive regulation and grids are addressed simultaneously at the theoretical and practical level, providing the reader with fundamental concepts and concrete examples. This timely book is an invaluable read for energy practitioners working in utility companies, regulators and other public bodies. It will also appeal to academics involved in the world of electricity regulation. The book utilizes language that would make it suitable for interdisciplinary students, including engineering and law scholars. --

Electric utilities --- Energy industries --- Services de l'électricité --- Industries énergétiques --- Law and legislation --- Droit

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What is the European energy strategy for 2050? How different is it from the 2020 energy strategy? What are the technology options? What are the policy options? This volume discusses the European ""2050 Energy Roadmap to a Low Carbon Economy: Energy Policy & Innovation."" The book represents the outcome of the Third Academic Roundtable of the Loyola de Palacio Chair at the European University Institute, held in Florence in May 2011. It introduces the most recent thinking regarding the European transition towards a low carbon future. The views presented include those of experts of the European C

Energy policy --- Technology and state

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One characteristic of the ongoing transition towards a sustainable energy system is the emergence of distributed energy resources (DERs), e.g., rooftop photovoltaics (PV) and home batteries. Residential consumers are no longer passive end-users with an inelastic demand but they can also generate and store electricity, and thereby actively participate in the electricity system. This paradigm shift introduces new challenges for the design of distribution grid tariffs. Traditional volumetric tariffs (in &euro;/kWh) do not reflect the underlying cost of the grid, which is governed by the grid capacity, and as such lead to cross-subsidies, e.g., between households with and without PV. Additionally, they do not provide an adequate response to the challenge of increasing peak loads, caused by the electrification of heating and transport, which may require significant grid reinforcements.To address these challenges, policy makers are looking to increase the economic efficiency of distribution tariffs. This requires tariff structures with larger shares of fixed and capacity-based (&euro;/kW) components, time-varying tariffs, and finer locational granularity. Economic efficiency may also be enhanced by adopting marginal cost-based methods to allocate network costs to the tariff structure components, instead of the traditional historical cost-based methods.The first main objective of this dissertation is to investigate the direct impact of different tariff structures on the operational and investment decisions of active residential consumers, as well as the indirect impact on passive consumers and wholesale markets, via the interactions of these active consumers. To this end, equilibrium models are developed, capable of interlinking decision processes endogenously, leveraging concepts from game theory. The first equilibrium model represents a non-cooperative game between consumers shifting distribution costs to each other while cost recovery for the distribution system operator (DSO) is ensured. A case study illustrates that different fixed, volumetric, and capacity-based tariff structures induce varying operational schedules of a PV-battery system, thereby enabling active consumers to achieve cost savings at the expense of passive consumers.By incorporating the first equilibrium model in a wholesale market equilibrium model, the relationship between distribution tariffs and wholesale electricity markets is also endogenized. The developed model is used to investigate how different distribution tariff structures in one country affect the welfare and PV-battery investments in another country via coupled wholesale markets. A case study demonstrates that there can be both positive and negative welfare and storage investment spillovers. The underlying mechanisms, considering both sunk and variable network costs, are presented in depth. The results provide relevant insights for the policy discussion on the potential harmonization of tariff structures in Europe.The second main objective of this dissertation is to investigate the gap between the theory and practice of network cost allocation based on long-run marginal costs (LRMC). In an idealized setting, a coincident peak tariff signaling the LRMC has been shown to be efficient. In practice, however, the LRMC is not easy to define due to lumpy network investments. As a result, engineering estimates of the LRMC are required, using forward-looking cost models that combine network expansion planning models and peak demand forecasts.Considering investment lumpiness and elastic demand functions, the optimal coincident peak network tariff is analytically derived. The optimal tariff level, although it can be construed as the marginal network cost, is shown to be dependent on the characteristics of the network and the demand. This result demonstrates that optimal forward-looking network tariffs require information on the willingness to pay for peak demand. This is typically unknown to regulators and is thus not accounted for in practical forward-looking cost models.To gain further insights on the efficiency of forward-looking cost models in practice, a social welfare analysis of the specific Long-Run Incremental Cost (LRIC) methodology is performed. It is compared to a traditional historical cost allocation method and a theoretical benchmark. The results show that LRIC always achieves a social welfare gain compared to historical cost allocation but that the magnitude of this gain varies significantly with the demand growth rate, demand elasticity, and network upgrade cost. The mechanisms driving the social welfare gains are also analyzed, revealing that these are sometimes driven by network cost savings, and sometimes by an increase in consumer surplus.

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The ongoing transformation of energy systems, characterised by the rising adoption of renewable energy sources, offers both sustainability gains and increased complexity. This transition introduces variability, which, when coupled with the integration of distributed energy resources, brings about network strain and congestion challenges. To address these issues, the concept of grid users providing flexibility services gains prominence as a strategic means to alleviate congestion and enhance grid stability. Within this evolving landscape, the European Union promotes a market-based approach to secure flexibility services. However, this adoption of market-oriented solutions raises concerns about the potential for strategic gaming within these frameworks. The combination of zonal wholesale markets with real-time redispatch or flexibility markets creates an opportunity for arbitrage between markets, thus sparking discussions about the effectiveness of these market-driven mechanisms in mitigating strategic behaviour and ensuring cost-effective grid operation. This thesis develops an optimization model using the Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) formulation, capturing the behaviour of a strategic balance-responsible party (BRP) within a market sequence encompassing a zonal wholesale market, a flexibility market, and a redispatch market. The model comprises a bilevel structure, featuring an upper level where the BRP seeks to maximise profit and a lower level representing market clearing. The model is extended into a stochastic MPEC framework, capable of simulating demand uncertainty by generating scenarios with varying demand levels and probabilities. This model is subsequently applied to a reference power grid. this thesis delves into two forms of strategic behaviour: inc-dec gaming and market power. The impact of demand uncertainty on these behaviours and the strategies employed by the strategic BRP to maximise profit are analysed. Additionally, a potential mitigation measure that constrains bids within a defined margin is investigated. Results demonstrate that inc-dec gaming is feasible across various model variations, and the potential for market power emerges, particularly beneficial for the BRP engaged in the increase-game. Intriguingly, the presence of demand uncertainty appears to amplify the profitability of these strategies. Furthermore, the explored mitigation measure proves ineffectual in curbing inc-dec gaming and has minimal influence on the strategic bidding employed by the BRP. The findings collectively underscore the complexities of market-driven mechanisms and strategic behaviour within evolving energy systems, yielding insights into their interplay and potential implications for grid management and stability.