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VIE INTERNATIONALE --- THEORIES DES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES --- SECURITE
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World politics --- Great powers. --- International relations.
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327 --- Great Powers --- International relations --- World politics --- -World politics --- -Colonialism --- Global politics --- International politics --- Political history --- Political science --- World history --- Eastern question --- Geopolitics --- International organization --- Coexistence --- Foreign affairs --- Foreign policy --- Foreign relations --- Global governance --- Interdependence of nations --- International affairs --- Peaceful coexistence --- World order --- National security --- Sovereignty --- Powers, Great --- Super powers --- Superpowers --- 327 Buitenlandse betrekkingen. Buitenlandse politiek. Internationale betrekkingen. Internationale politiek. Wereldpolitiek --- Buitenlandse betrekkingen. Buitenlandse politiek. Internationale betrekkingen. Internationale politiek. Wereldpolitiek --- -Coexistence --- Colonialism --- Great powers --- Grandes puissances --- -#SBIB:327.1H10 --- 930.3 --- #SBIB:327.1H10 --- anno 1900-1999 --- anno 2000-2099 --- Internationale betrekkingen: theorieën --- Internationale politiek. Buitenlandse politiek --- Wereldgeschiedenis --- #A0507PO --- International relations. Foreign policy --- Politique mondiale --- Relations internationales
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Conventional Deterrence is a book about the origins of war. Why do nations faced with the prospect of large-scale conventional war opt for or against an offensive strategy? John J. Mearsheimer examines a number of crises that led to major conventional wars to explain why deterrence failed. He focuses first on Allied and German decision making in the years 1939-1940, analyzing why the Allies did not strike first against Germany after declaring war and, conversely, why the Germans did attack the West. Turning to the Middle East, he examines the differences in Israeli and Egyptian strategic doctrines prior to the start of the major conventional conflicts in that region. Mearsheimer then critically assays the relative strengths and weaknesses of NATO and the Warsaw Pact to determine the prospects for conventional deterrence in any future crisis. He is also concerned with examining such relatively technical issues as the impact of precision-guided munitions (PGM) on conventional deterrence and the debate over maneuver versus attrition warfare.Mearsheimer pays considerable attention to questions of military strategy and tactics. Challenging the claim that conventional detrrence is largely a function of the numerical balance of forces, he also takes issue with the school of thought that ascribes deterrence failures to the dominance of "offensive" weaponry. In addition to examining the military consideration underlying deterrence, he also analyzes the interaction between those military factors and the broader political considerations that move a nation to war.
Military history, Modern --- Deterrence (Strategy) --- Military policy --- Psychology, Military --- Strategy --- First strike (Nuclear strategy) --- Nuclear crisis stability --- History --- 327.54 --- #SBIB:327.5H10 --- 327.54 Afschrikkingsstrategie . Koude oorlog. Veiligheidspolitiek--(buitenlandse politiek) --- Afschrikkingsstrategie . Koude oorlog. Veiligheidspolitiek--(buitenlandse politiek) --- Strategie: algemeen --- Militærhistorie --- Strategi
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For more than two decades, John J. Mearsheimer has been regarded as one of the foremost realist thinkers on foreign policy. Clear and incisive as well as a fearlessly honest analyst, his coauthored 2007 New York Times bestseller, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, aroused a firestorm with its unflinching look at the making of America's Middle East policy. Now he takes a look at another controversial but understudied aspect of international relations: lying.In Why Leaders Lie, Mearsheimer provides the first systematic analysis of lying as a tool of statecraft, identifying the varieties, the reasons, and the potential costs and benefits. Drawing on a wealth of examples, he argues that leaders often lie for good strategic reasons, so a blanket condemnation is unrealistic and unwise. Yet there are other kinds of deception besides lying, including concealment and spinning. Perhaps no distinction is more important than that between lying to another state and lying to one's own people. Mearsheimer was amazed to discover how unusual interstate lying has been; given the atmosphere of distrust among the great powers, he found that outright deceit is difficult to pull off and thus rarely worth the effort. Moreover, it sometimes backfires when it does occur. Khrushchev lied about the size of the Soviet missile force, sparking an American build-up. Eisenhower was caught lying about U-2 spy flights in 1960, which scuttled an upcoming summit with Krushchev. Leaders are more likely to mislead their own publics than other states, sometimes with damaging consequences. Though the reasons may be noble--Franklin Roosevelt, for example, lied to the American people about German U-boats attacking the destroyer USS Greer in 1940, to build a case for war against Hitler-they can easily lead to disaster, as with the Bush administration's falsehoods about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.There has never been a sharp analysis of international lying. Now a leading expert provides a richly informed and powerfully argued work that will change our understanding of why leaders lie
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In this major statement, the renowned international-relations scholar John Mearsheimer argues that liberal hegemony, the foreign policy pursued by the United States since the Cold War ended, is doomed to fail. It makes far more sense, he maintains, for Washington to adopt a more restrained foreign policy based on a sound understanding of how nationalism and realism constrain great powers abroad. It is widely believed in the West that the United States should spread liberal democracy across the world, foster an open international economy, and build institutions. This policy of remaking the world in America's image is supposed to protect human rights, promote peace, and make the world safe for democracy. But this is not what has happened. Instead, the United States has ended up as a highly militarized state fighting wars that undermine peace, harm human rights, and threaten liberal values at home. Mearsheimer tells us why this has happened.
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