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As outer space becomes more congested, contested, and competitive, the risks to space safety, security, and sustainability heighten. Against this backdrop, the authors used a review of relevant literature and official documents, as well as interviews and workshops with subject-matter experts, to identify possible lessons for future space traffic management (STM) from past approaches to international traffic management and common resource management and offer recommendations to make progress in STM. Lessons from the history of the maritime and air domains and the development and implementation of international organizations within those domains help provide a pathway for the development of an international space traffic management organization (ISTMO). An ISTMO will need to achieve sufficient legitimacy and operational power to effectively manage the space domain.

Space environment. --- Environnement spatial.

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In this report, the authors examine the issue of space traffic management (STM) and the significant challenge that it poses to spacefaring nations, operators, stakeholders, and all who rely on critical space services and benefits. The ability to maneuver safely in space is at significant risk from increasing levels of space debris and increasing satellite congestion. These risks compound existing spectrum limits for satellite communications and decrease the number of orbits into which satellites and other objects can be placed. STM is essential to avoid interference and collision. Yet the international community lacks both an agreed-upon STM governance framework and a dedicated coordination mechanism to resolve these risks and limitations. In this report, the authors examine the treaty-based governance systems from both the air and maritime domains as potential models for space and offer key insights from each that may serve as building blocks for an international STM system.

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The deterrence of armed conflict has been studied intensively for decades, as have escalation dynamics along the path to such conflicts. The deterrence of forms of aggression below the level of armed conflict — such hostile measures as economic coercion, political subversion, and military intimidation — has received much less attention. In this report, the authors investigate how the United States might use its military posture in Europe (specifically, ground forces) as part of a strategy to deter these Russian malign activities. The authors identify how forward posture could deter hostile measures through signaling the United States' commitment to its allies and partners, providing irregular capabilities for those partners and allies threatened with political subversion, providing conventional capabilities to neutralize hostile powers' coercion attempts, and providing support for other instruments of U.S. power, such as sanctions. However, forward posture can also lead to an escalation in competitor activities, increasing their sense of threat, incentivizing partners to undertake aggression at levels below armed conflict, and incentivizing third parties to act in ways that increase the likelihood of confrontation. The authors propose ways to calibrate U.S. forward posture to minimize such risks while enhancing deterrence. An Executive Summary of this report is also available.

Deterrence (Strategy) --- Escalation (Military science) --- Dissuasion (Stratégie) --- Escalade (Science militaire) --- United States --- Russia (Federation) --- États-Unis --- Europe --- Military relations --- Relations militaires

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The deterrence of armed conflict has been studied intensively for decades, as have escalation dynamics along the path to such conflicts. The deterrence of forms of aggression below the level of armed conflict — such hostile measures as economic coercion, political subversion, and military intimidation — has received much less attention. In this report, the authors investigate how the United States might use its military posture in Europe (specifically, ground forces) as part of a strategy to deter these Russian malign activities. The authors identify how forward posture could deter hostile measures through signaling the United States' commitment to its allies and partners, providing irregular capabilities for those partners and allies threatened with political subversion, providing conventional capabilities to neutralize hostile powers' coercion attempts, and providing support for other instruments of U.S. power, such as sanctions. However, forward posture can also lead to an escalation in competitor activities, increasing their sense of threat, incentivizing partners to undertake aggression at levels below armed conflict, and incentivizing third parties to act in ways that increase the likelihood of confrontation. The authors propose ways to calibrate U.S. forward posture to minimize such risks while enhancing deterrence.

Deterrence (Strategy) --- Escalation (Military science) --- National security --- Europe --- United States --- Russia (Federation) --- Strategic aspects --- Armed Forces --- Military policy --- Military relations

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To counter increasingly capable near-peer competitors, the U.S. military services have been developing new concepts for multidomain operations (MDOs), which aim to more fully integrate operations in the air, land, maritime, space, and cyber domains, as well as the electromagnetic spectrum and information environment. Although the joint force already conducts some MDOs, current initiatives aim to expand the scope and scale of such operations and to change command-and-control (C2) constructs to better enable MDOs. To identify potential impediments to MDOs, the authors reviewed joint warfighting principles; current laws, regulations, and doctrine; and interview responses. The authors identified aspects of the current C2 construct for joint operations that could prevent multidomain options from being considered, make MDOs too time consuming to plan, or create too much planning uncertainty. The authors propose four alternative approaches to joint all-domain command and control (JADC2) and provide criteria for assessing alternative constructs.

Command and control systems --- Military doctrine --- Strategy. --- Unified operations (Military science) --- Commandement militaire --- Doctrines militaires --- Stratégie. --- Opérations interarmes (Science militaire) --- United States.