Listing 1 - 5 of 5 |
Sort by
|
Choose an application
Russian efforts to influence the populations of the United States and its allies and partners — including such aggressive means as disinformation campaigns and social media "troll farms" — are a central element of the strategic competition taking place between the United States and Russia. Both countries use public communication campaigns, sometimes referred to as "information warfare," to try to gain advantage over the other. But how effective are these efforts? The authors of this report systematically reviewed rigorous evaluations of the effectiveness of communications campaigns to develop insights into what types of public communications campaigns and messages are most effective and in what contexts. The authors detail their findings and provide recommendations for how the United States can maximize the effectiveness of its public communications in competition with Russia.
Choose an application
The Biden administration has made strengthening U.S. alliances and partnerships a core element of its foreign policy. But some analysts and policymakers have raised concerns about the costs and risks associated with these security relationships, arguing that they cause the United States to adopt its partners' interests as its own, incentivize U.S. allies and partners to engage in reckless behaviors that make conflict more likely, and risk dragging the United States into conflict to protect its reputation for upholding commitments. Other strategists dismiss these concerns. They contend that the United States avoids entanglement by keeping its own interests in mind and restraining its allies and partners from engaging in risky behavior. In this report—the second in a series on the security and economic trade-offs associated with competing visions for U.S. grand strategy—RAND Corporation researchers assess the evidence for these competing claims by examining and synthesizing the existing empirical literature. They consider one aspect of the larger debate about the future of U.S. security relationships: whether they entangle the United States in wars contrary to its direct interests. This report summarizes the existing research on these questions for U.S. policymakers and offers researchers recommendations on where more research is needed to inform this debate.
Security, International. --- United States --- Foreign relations.
Choose an application
From 2001 to 2021, the United States pursued an unchanging policy objective in Afghanistan: to prevent a terrorist group from using the country as a safe haven in which to plan or launch an attack on the United States. However, despite deteriorating conditions and no apparent hope of military victory, the U.S. goal remained constant even as successive leaders experimented with different strategies to achieve it. The authors examined the reasons behind this policy inertia through interviews with the senior leaders involved in the policy deliberations between 2001 and 2016. They interviewed the decisionmakers involved in high-level discussions and policy formulation to establish the institutional, informational, and interpersonal dynamics that informed major decisions; capture common interpretations and assumptions; and reconstruct how the deliberative process functioned in practice. As this analysis details, decisions for how to navigate de-escalation from a conflict under conditions short of victory are tremendously difficult, both practically and politically. With no clear definition of success, bureaucratic inertia took hold, extending the conflict and enabling focus on mechanical details of its execution rather than its ultimate intent. The dynamics of the policy process further prevented dramatic policy change. Psychological factors promoted risk aversion and a continued escalation of commitment, even when the mission itself became poorly aligned with national priorities. Additionally, frictions between civilian and military leaders and with the Intelligence Community further prevented fundamental reassessments of the mission.
Choose an application
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has changed and expanded its efforts in violence prevention in the past five years. DHS asked the Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center (HSOAC) to examine the change in efforts by the Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships (CP3) and its predecessor organizations in preventing terrorism and other violence and explore options for CP3 moving forward. In the United States, the full potential value of countering violent extremism (CVE) has never been realized because of key disconnects between the intent of CVE programs and the realities of their implementation. Although it might not have been the intent, efforts singled out and stigmatized American Muslim communities. The disconnect between stated intention and reality stimulated potent opposition to CVE as a concept. In response, the federal government decided to make significant changes in its approaches in this policy area. In late 2021, DHS asked HSOAC to examine and characterize the changes that had been made, providing an outside viewpoint on the extent of change and how those changes had responded to the concerns about CVE efforts. This report documents the researchers' approach, findings, and recommendations.
Choose an application
The authors of this report assess the role of U.S. Army special operations forces (ARSOF) in great-power competition, focusing on the types of activities the United States will need to conduct in competition with Russia and ARSOF's effectiveness in conducting them, as well as ARSOF's advantages and disadvantages relative to conventional military forces and the efforts of nonmilitary agencies. The authors find that, under steady-state conditions, ARSOF can help to strengthen the resilience of allies and partners while improving the United States' situational awareness. When the risk of armed conflict is high, ARSOF can help to defend against proxy forces used by U.S. adversaries and can be used to disrupt adversary operations in denied environments or to impose costs on adversaries. However, unconventional warfare intended to overthrow adversary governments has historically had low rates of success. Finally, ARSOF can be used to better target U.S. operations in the information environment and work with local surrogates to strengthen the impact of such efforts.
Special forces (Military science) --- Great powers. --- Evaluation.
Listing 1 - 5 of 5 |
Sort by
|