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The philosophical issues raised by perception make it one of the central topics in the philosophical tradition. In this introduction to the philosophy of perception Barry Maund highlights the importance of a good theory of perception not only in an epistemological context but also in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind. The book centres on two fundamental and interrelated problems: whether perception is direct or indirect, and what is the best account that we can give of perceptual experiences. The author develops a framework that provides the means for making progress towards solving these problems and sets out a strategy for developing a correct philosophical theory of perception. Among the many ideas discussed are forms of natural realism, representationalism, the argument from illusion, the dual aspect of perceptual experiences (phenomenal character and intentional content), the representationalist or intentionalist theory of phenomenal character, conceptual and non-conceptual forms of content, and adverbialist accounts of perceptual experience. The author argues that most philosophical debates about the respective merits of direct and indirect realism are deeply flawed, and that it is possible to defend a hybrid theory of perceptual experience that has direct and indirect components.

Perception (Philosophy) --- Philosophy --- Theory of knowledge --- Perception (Philosophy).