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China's coercive options for Taiwan range from routine violations of Taiwan's declared Air Defense Identification Zone to a full-scale invasion. Within the spectrum are efforts to isolate Taiwan to prevent it from sending exports or receiving imports. Typically, this would be called a blockade. However, because China does not view the government on Taiwan as sovereign and thus rejects the idea that a state of war could exist, blockade is not the correct term. Therefore, in this report, the authors examine how China might implement a quarantine of Taiwan. Unlike in a blockade scenario, China's goals for the quarantine would not be to completely cut off food and supplies to Taiwan, but rather to demonstrate de facto sovereignty by controlling the air and maritime space around the island, as well as which cargo deliveries, ships, aircraft, and people have access to Taiwan. Reducing the risk of escalation and increasing the probability of a favorable outcome depends on creating more time and more options for both sides. Neither side can count on a prolonged military campaign ending favorably. Both sides might agree to outcomes below their preferred outcomes, although Taiwan and the United States are hoping for nothing much greater than maintenance of the status quo. But compressed timelines rapidly force decisions that leave neither side significant room for alternate paths; this is a dangerous and unstable set of conditions.

China --- Taiwan --- Military relations --- Military relations

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The Department of Defense is likely to face years of declining resources as the U.S. government grapples with fiscal challenges. These challenges affect every account, including those associated with surface ship maintenance and operations. At the same time, there has been widespread concern that surface ship materiel readiness is declining due to a high pace of operations and a sense that there have been many instances of deferred maintenance. The need to balance fiscal reality and a continued need for ready ships is likely to be an ongoing challenge. At the request of the Assessment Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, this report: (1) determines the impact on long-term fleet readiness, Operational Availability (Ao), and Expected Service Life (ESL) caused by near-term reductions in Operations and Maintenance (O&M) accounts; (2) recommends potential strategies to minimize negative impacts to Ao and ESL and maintain the largest, most capable fleet possible; (3) develops a maintenance requirement concept, per ship class, that supports ESL, but allows for some risk within the maintenance strategy; and (4) defines the risks to Ao and ESL resulting from the new requirement. The methodology could be applicable to multiple ship classes.

Warships --- Navires de guerre --- Maintenance and repair. --- Entretien et réparations. --- United States. --- United States. --- Appropriations and expenditures --- Evaluation. --- United States.

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Semiconductors have become an integral part of nearly every industry in advanced economies. The production of these semiconductors is largely centered in the western Pacific region and, for the highest-end semiconductors, exists almost entirely in Taiwan. To assess the geopolitical implications of Taiwan's semiconductor dominance, the authors conducted a tabletop exercise (TTX) with representatives from the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government and a variety of industries that rely on semiconductors. The exercise revealed that there are generally no good short-term options for responding to the disruption to the global semiconductor supply chain that would result if China attempted to unify with Taiwan. The importance of semiconductors in the broader economy means that strategic competition should be framed more broadly than its potential effect on military or political outcomes. The countries that can most easily withstand disruptions to semiconductor capacity in Taiwan have an upper hand in strategic competition. If the United States and its allies have this advantage, it could be a powerful deterrent to Chinese action against Taiwan. If China has the advantage, it could act against Taiwan with reduced likelihood of interference from the United States and its allies to mitigate its global economic risk. In the TTX, the United States never gained an advantage and faced unfavorable outcomes in both peaceful and contested unification scenarios. This should be a call to action for the United States to assess options to increase semiconductor fabrication capacity.

Semiconductor industry --- Globalization. --- Business logistics. --- Simulation games. --- Strategic aspects. --- Taiwan