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The Republic of China (Taiwan) faces a growing challenge as the number of countries that extend it formal diplomatic recognition continues to shrink. In the past, Taiwan was able to expend substantial amounts of money in competition with China for global diplomatic recognition. Today, however, as China has grown richer and more influential, Taipei has to spend smarter and tailor its giving more strategically if it wants to continue to leverage development assistance as an incentive for countries to refrain from swapping recognition of Beijing in exchange for economic rewards. How can Taiwan optimize its development assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean to ensure that it gets the maximum diplomatic value out of its generosity? What aid programs does Taiwan currently undertake in the region, and what does it get from its efforts? How does Taiwan's assistance fit with U.S. policy goals and giving in the region? Are there areas where adjustments could be made that would produce synergies between Taiwan and U.S. efforts while also reducing the temptation on the part of regional governments to de-recognize Taipei and switch ties to Beijing? This report explores these questions and finds that, on the whole, Taiwan's assistance to the governments of Latin America and the Caribbean is well-received, improving desired outcomes such as enhancing local livelihoods and contributing to greater resilience and more rapid disaster recovery and relief.

Economic assistance, Taiwan --- Economic assistance, Taiwan --- Taiwan --- Taiwan --- China --- Foreign relations --- Foreign relations --- Foreign relations.

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A long-standing rivalry between China and Japan has intensified in recent years, owing in part to growing parity between the two Asian great powers. Although the competition involves many issues and spans political, economic, and security domains, the dispute over the Senkaku Islands remains a focal point. The authors examine how China has stepped up its surface and air activities near Japan, in particular near the Senkaku Islands. They survey the patterns in Chinese vessel and air activity and consider Japan's responses to date. The authors conclude that resource constraints and limited inventories of fighter aircraft pose formidable obstacles to the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force's ability to match Chinese air activity. Given China's quantitative advantage in fighter aircraft, Japan's current approach may not be sustainable. The authors offer recommendations for the United States and Japan to manage emerging challenges.

Japan. --- Senkaku Islands --- Japan --- China --- International status. --- Foreign relations

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As China pursues its rise as a global power, it is incrementally orienting its People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy toward power projection missions. At the same time, the U.S. Navy is working to enhance its capabilities to conduct counter-power projection missions. Command and control (C2) in naval competition presents one lens with which to view these evolving missions. Mission command, a pillar of the U.S. Navy's culture for centuries, is central to its execution of power projection missions: leaders throughout the command chain are disciplined, apprised of their commander's intent, and empowered to make decisions and execute actions. Historically, the PLA Navy has utilized a C2 system that reflects the Chinese Communist Party's authoritarian rule and overall culture, which is fundamentally different from that of the U.S. Navy. The PLA Navy operates under tightly managed C2 — better described as control and command — that allows for little delegation of authority or independent action. The U.S. Navy and the PLA Navy are both likely to face challenges as they shift to new maritime missions unless they adapt their existing concepts of C2. The authors identified key questions about China's shift toward power projection that require additional examination. What is more valuable to China: the ability to project power globally or retaining its rigid control and command system? Will the PLA Navy's increased experience and professional development affect the trust placed in PLA Navy personnel by senior PLA commanders? How will increased PLA Navy professionalism affect control and command? Would the Chinese Communist Party tolerate a PLA Navy that is more empowered to make independent decisions? And, would a shift by the PLA Navy to a mission command approach be a threat to the United States?

Command and control systems --- China. --- United States.

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China's leaders' quest to achieve an artificial intelligence (AI) capability to perform a variety of civilian and military functions starts with mastering big data analytics — the use of computers to make sense of large data sets. The research conducted by the authors of this report indicates that China is aggressively working toward becoming a global leader in big data analytics as part of its plan to achieve great power status; indeed, President Xi Jinping has articulated that China should become the global center for AI by 2030. Beijing's efforts are guided by a national big data strategy, an effort that encompasses economic, military, police, and intelligence functions. The authors find that Beijing is already using big data analytics to survey the country's domestic population and enhance its military capabilities. Improvements in big data analytics have supported Beijing's monitoring and control of its citizens — including ethnic minorities.

Big data --- Government policy --- China.

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Since its establishment in 1949, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has viewed itself as an underdeveloped country-economically backward, physically weak, and vulnerable to exploitation by more powerful states. Even as the PRC has grown stronger economically and militarily, especially since launching the reform and opening policies of Deng Xiaoping in 1978, PRC officials continue to insist China is a developing country. In the initial stages of reform and opening, China's relations with the developed world were shaped by its desire to expand trade and attract investment. In the 1990s, China increased its attention to the Developing World, negotiating economic agreements and creating new China-centric institutions. This accelerated in the 2000s and especially after the 2008 financial crisis, when there were worldwide doubts about the developed-world, and especially the U.S., economic model. China's attention to the Developing World has culminated in numerous institutions and in the new Belt and Road Initiative. The authors analyze China's political and diplomatic, economic, and military engagement with the Developing World, region by region, focusing on the 21st century through the beginning of the Belt and Road Initiative, an ambitious vision that builds on China's previous activities. The authors discuss specific countries in each region-so-called pivotal states-that are most important to China. The authors show that China has oriented its security concerns and its overall engagement in concentric circles of importance. Near neighbors merit the most attention. The authors conclude with policy implications for the United States.

China --- Economic policy --- Since 2000