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United States. --- Inventory control. --- U.S. Army --- US Army

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The United States has entered a new phase of global conflict in which adversaries might seek to delay or disrupt Army installations' ability to power project, mobilize forces, and conduct other wartime missions. As noted in the 2018 National Defense Strategy, "it is now undeniable that the homeland is no longer a sanctuary." Adversary actions might involve complex attacks that are conducted over an extended period of time and targeted at multiple continental United States (CONUS) installations, their surrounding communities, and critical communication nodes. To address this challenge, RAND researchers cataloged innovative and emerging threats to installations, identified deficiencies in the Army's current threat assessment methodologies, and developed a framework to assess potential solutions and the resources required to defend against these threats. The framework was presented to and discussed with a group of experts at an Army installation and at U.S. Army North.In practice, most of the threat and risk-assessment methodologies used by the Army focus on known threats. For example, emphasis is placed on terrorist attacks, active shooters, and cyberattacks. However, it is unlikely that future threats to power projection in a contested environment will mimic previous events. Although the assessments provide valuable information, they are not calibrated to measure how well Army installations would respond to a coordinated attack by a capable adversary employing a combination of effects. Significant changes need to take place to ensure that installations are adequately protected from a capable adversary's ability to disrupt CONUS installations' wartime missions.

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In recent years, the Air Force and its suppliers have adopted a variety of practices that have improved efficiency and effectiveness but have also made supply chains more brittle and increased risks of supply disruption. This document seeks to help the Air Force develop a strategy for managing supply chain risks during sustainment. In it, the authors review literature on supply chain risk management (SCRM), examine current Air Force practices for and guidance on SCRM, and describe emerging commercial best practices for SCRM. They find that many supply chain risks are not considered directly within the Air Force sustainment community and that, while others are acknowledged, there is little or no strategy in place to mitigate them. They recommend that the Air Force establish an enterprise-level organization to proactively manage supply chain risks.

Purchasing --- Business logistics. --- Management. --- United States. --- Supplies and stores. --- Appropriations and expenditures --- Evaluation. --- Procurement. --- Materials management.

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This report examines mechanisms, sources, and inter-Service agreements for funding special operations forces (SOF) operations and provides recommendations to reduce the frequency and duration of disputes between the United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM), the Military Departments, and Geographic Combatant Commands over their respective funding responsibilities for SOF, especially with respect to when Service Common (Major Force Program (MFP) 2) and SOF Peculiar (MFP 11) funds should be used. The Geographic Combatant Commanders, in accordance with guidance received from the President and Secretary of Defense, generate requests for unplanned activities and operations, sometimes in response to unanticipated events. Such events fall outside planned and programmed activities, creating validated operational support requirements that are unfunded and/or unbudgeted. Each time this occurs, it leads to prolonged negotiations to work out funding responsibility disputes among a variety of stakeholders to secure the funding necessary to execute the new requirement. SOCOM's Global SOF Network (GSN) envisions increased use of SOF, which would further increase the frequency of such disputes and could be hindered by current funding processes, motivating the research conducted to produce this report. If the President and Congress agree to expand the use of SOF as described by the GSN concept, it would be necessary to increase the flexibility of funding available for validated but unfunded operations. To increase the effectiveness of SOF, the Department of Defense needs funding solutions that are responsive to global events while enabling effective financial stewardship that satisfies the needs of all stakeholders.

Unified operations (Military science) --- Military planning --- Military & Naval Science --- Law, Politics & Government --- Armies --- Planning --- War planning --- Joint operations (Military science) --- Unified commands (Military science) --- Military administration --- Military policy --- Military art and science --- Strategy --- Tactics --- U.S. Special Operations Command --- United States. --- Finance. --- Appropriations and expenditures. --- Rules and practice. --- United States --- Military policy. --- D.O.D. --- DOD (Department of Defense) --- Mei-kuo kuo fang pu --- Ministerstvo oborony SShA --- Министерство обороны США --- National Military Establishment (U.S.) --- US Special Operations Command --- USSOCOM --- SOCOM --- Military planning.