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The internalism-externalism debate is one of the oldest debates in epistemology. Internalists assert that the justification of our beliefs can only depend on facts internal to us, while externalists insist that justification can depend on additional, for example environmental, factors. In this book Clayton Littlejohn proposes and defends a new strategy for resolving this debate. Focussing on the connections between practical and theoretical reason, he explores the question of whether the priority of the good to the right (in ethics) might be used to defend an epistemological version of consequentialism, and proceeds to formulate a new 'deontological externalist' view. His discussion is rich with insights and will be valuable for a wide range of readers in epistemology, ethics and practical reason.
Justification (Theory of knowledge). --- Knowledge, Theory of. --- Truthfulness and falsehood. --- Epistemics. --- Belief and doubt. --- Justification (Theory of knowledge) --- Believability --- Credibility --- Falsehood --- Lying --- Post-truth --- Untruthfulness --- Reliability --- Truth --- Honesty --- Epistemology --- Theory of knowledge --- Philosophy --- Psychology --- Knowledge, Theory of --- General semantics --- Conviction --- Doubt --- Consciousness --- Credulity --- Emotions --- Religion --- Will --- Agnosticism --- Rationalism --- Skepticism --- Arts and Humanities
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Epistemic norms play an increasingly important role in many current debates in epistemology and beyond. Paramount among these are debates about belief, action, and assertion. Three primary questions organise the literature. What epistemic requirements constrain appropriate belief, assertion and appropriate action? With the tremendous but disparate growth of the literature on epistemic norms, the time is ripe for a volume bringing together papers by established and emerging figures, with an eye toward the interconnections among these three questions
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Epistemic norms play an increasingly important role in many current debates in epistemology and beyond. Paramount among these are debates about belief, action, and assertion. Three primary questions organise the literature. What epistemic requirements constrain appropriate belief, assertion and appropriate action? With the tremendous but disparate growth of the literature on epistemic norms, the time is ripe for a volume bringing together papers by established and emerging figures, with an eye toward the interconnections among these three questions.
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What are epistemic reasons? What are epistemic norms? What is our basic epistemic goal? In recent years, questions about epistemic reasons, norms, and goals have seen an upsurge of interest. Pursuing these questions has not only proven fertile for our understanding of key concepts and phenomena studied in epistemology, but also for a wide area of issues in philosophy of mind and action and in philosophy of language and meta-ethics. The present volume brings together eighteen essays, seventeen of them new, by established and upcoming philosophers in the field. The contributions are arranged into four sections: (1) epistemic reasons, (2) different aspects of epistemic norms, (3) epistemic consequentialism, and (4) epistemic goals and values. The volume is key reading for researchers and students of philosophy interested in epistemic normativity and beyond.
Epistemics. --- Knowledge, Theory of. --- Normativity (Ethics) --- Ethical norms --- Normativeness (Ethics) --- Ethics --- Epistemology --- Theory of knowledge --- Philosophy --- Psychology --- General semantics --- Knowledge, Theory of --- Epistemology. --- philosophy of action. --- philosophy of language. --- philosophy of mind.
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