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"The laws that govern the U.S. Army have changed little since 1940. These laws have become so familiar that many may assume they constitute a 'traditional' U.S. military policy, emanating from the Constitution's division of federal and state powers. Drawing on a RAND study of the history of the U.S. Army and the evolution of laws that authorize, empower, and govern it, the authors of this report show that the current set of foundational laws for the Army were not an inevitable interpretation of the 'raise and support armies' or 'militia' clauses of the Constitution. Rather, U.S. military policy has evolved over time through changes in statutory law. These laws emerged from long-standing debates over the role of civilian-soldiers, the necessity of a standing professional force (i.e., the Regular Army), the relationship between the Army and the potential sources of manpower for expansion, the balance of federal and state authorities, and the nation's security needs. A series of legislative compromises between 1903 and 1940 established a consensus that forms the foundation of current military policy. By highlighting the evolution of military policy, this history introduces new questions about the so-called 'traditional' nature of the Army that exists today and supplies a context for future efforts to rethink how the Army might continue to evolve to meet the nation's changing security needs." -- Back cover.

Military law --- Civil-military relations --- Civil-military relations. --- Military law. --- Military policy. --- History. --- History. --- United States. --- United States. --- History. --- United States --- United States. --- Military policy --- History.

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For five years, RAND researchers have worked with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to explore a more expansive approach to readiness assessments—one that looks beyond the narrow lens of operational readiness more typical of readiness systems in use in the Department of Defense (DoD) and considers a broader set of dimensions that could have an impact on readiness outcomes. This more expansive perspective can lead to a better understanding of the root cause of readiness shortfalls—or, at a minimum, better insights into how to uncover the root cause—and, in turn, inform more-effective solutions to remedy them. Each research effort conducted over this period has built on the prior and culminated in this report's novel methodology that could be adopted by DoD to assess its strategic readiness. In May 2019, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD [P&R]), asked RAND to provide a method and specific metrics to enable OUSD (P&R) and the entire defense community to more fully answer questions about the nation's readiness to execute the National Defense Strategy. In developing those methods and metrics, the research team was asked to focus on seven core dimensions of strategic readiness, as newly defined by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, to assess whether those seven dimensions were sufficiently broad for effective evaluation of DoD's strategic readiness—and to define additional dimensions if needed.

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"This Executive Summary highlights findings from a comparative historical analysis of the four Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDRs) conducted after 1997 (in 2001, 2006, 2010, and 2014), identifying trends, implications, and recommendations for the Army and Defense Department in order to shape the conduct of and improve future reviews. The summary systematically compares these most-recent four QDRs -- developed during a period of nearly a decade and a half of conflict in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere -- by examining them in the following categories: organization and process, strategy development, force planning, resources, risk assessment, and reception. The analysis is based on reviews of QDR documentation and defense budget, force structure, and manpower data, as well as structured conversations with individuals involved in each QDR. The authors find that the period under review ended much as it began, with an increasingly apparent gap among U.S. military strategy, forces, and resources, reflected in the changing defense strategies of each QDR. Most QDRs failed to adequately address the growing portfolio of demands on the force, as well as the risks associated with different end strengths and mixes of active- and reserve-component forces. Thus, the focus of future defense reviews should be assessing the adequacy of U.S. forces to support the chosen strategy at an acceptable level of risk, and the budgets needed to support those forces in the near, mid-, and long terms. It will be left to leaders in the U.S. Department of Defense to estimate the funding levels needed to execute the stated defense strategy, and it will be left to the White House and Congress both to agree on the level of defense funding that keeps risk at an acceptable level and to determine how best to pay that bill."--Publisher's description.

Military planning --- National security --- United States. --- United States. --- Planning. --- Planning. --- United States --- Military policy --- Evaluation.

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"This report presents a comparative historical analysis of the four Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDRs) conducted after 1997 (in 2001, 2006, 2010, and 2014) and identifies trends, implications, and recommendations for the Army and U.S. Department of Defense, in order to shape the conduct of and improve future reviews. The study systematically compares these four QDRs-developed during a period of nearly a decade and a half of conflict in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere-by examining them in the following areas: organization and process, strategy development, force planning, modernization and transformation, resources, defense reform and infrastructure, risk assessment, and reception. The analysis is based on reviews of QDR documentation and defense budget, force structure, and manpower data, as well as structured conversations with individuals involved in each QDR. The authors find that the situation for U.S. defense strategy in the period under review ended much as it began, with an increasingly apparent gap among U.S. military strategy, forces, and resources, reflected in the changing defense strategies of each QDR. Most QDRs did not adequately address either the growing portfolio of demands on the force or risks associated with different end strengths and mixes of active- and reserve-component forces. To avoid a similar outcome, future defense reviews should focus on assessing the adequacy of U.S. forces to support the chosen strategy at an acceptable level of risk and on characterizing the budgets needed to support those forces in the near, mid-, and long terms. It will be left to leaders in the Department of Defense to estimate the funding levels needed to execute the stated defense strategy, and it will be left to the White House and Congress both to agree on the level of defense funding that keeps risk at an acceptable level and to determine how best to pay that bill."--Publisher's description.

Military planning --- National security --- United States. --- Planning. --- 2000-2099 --- United States --- Military policy --- Evaluation.