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Neil Levy presents an original theory of freedom and responsibility. Cognitive neuroscience and psychology provide a great deal of evidence that our actions are often shaped by information of which we are not conscious; some psychologists have concluded that we are actually conscious of very few of the facts we respond to. But most people seem to assume that we need to be conscious of the facts we respond to in order to be responsible for what we do. Some thinkers have argued that this naive assumption is wrong, and we need not be conscious of these facts to be responsible, while others think it is correct and therefore we are never responsible. Levy argues that both views are wrong. He sets out and defends a particular account of consciousness-the global workspace view-and argues this account entails that consciousness plays an especially important role in action. We exercise sufficient control over the moral significance of our acts to be responsible for them only when we are conscious of the facts that give to our actions their moral character. Further, our actions are expressive of who we are as moral agents only when we are conscious of these same facts. There are therefore good reasons to think that the naive assumption, that consciousness is needed for moral responsibility, is in fact true. Levy suggests that this entails that people are responsible less often than we might have thought, but the consciousness condition does not entail that we are never morally responsible. -- Provided by publisher.
Philosophical anthropology --- General ethics --- Consciousness. --- Responsibility. --- Apperception --- Mind and body --- Perception --- Philosophy --- Psychology --- Spirit --- Self --- Accountability --- Moral responsibility --- Obligation --- Ethics --- Supererogation --- Consciousness --- Responsibility
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General ethics --- Neurosciences --- Moral and ethical aspects. --- Aspect moral --- neuroethiek --- neuroéthique --- Neural sciences --- Neurological sciences --- Neuroscience --- Medical sciences --- Nervous system --- Moral and ethical aspects
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Postmodernism. --- Postmodernisme --- Heidegger, Martin, --- Sartre, Jean-Paul, --- Foucault, Michel,
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Addiction seems to involve a significant degree of loss of control over behaviour, yet it remains mysterious how such a loss of control occurs and how it can be compatible with the retention of agency. This collection, which arose out of a conference held at the University of Oxford, brings together philosophers, neuroscientists and psychologists with the aim of understanding this loss of control from a perspective informed by cutting-edge science and philosophical reflection.
Substance abuse --- Addicts. --- Self-control. --- Self-discipline --- Self-mastery --- Control (Psychology) --- Discipline --- Addicted persons --- Addictive persons --- Sick --- Treatment.
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The concept of luck plays an important role in debates concerning free will and moral responsibility. Neil Levy presents an original account of luck and argues that it undermines our freedom and moral responsibility no matter whether determinism is true or not.
Fortune --- Free will and determinism --- Responsibility --- Accountability --- Moral responsibility --- Obligation --- Compatibilism --- Determinism and free will --- Determinism and indeterminism --- Free agency --- Freedom and determinism --- Freedom of the will --- Indeterminism --- Liberty of the will --- Luck --- Moral and ethical aspects --- General ethics --- Ethics --- Supererogation --- Determinism (Philosophy) --- Opportunity --- Fortune. --- Free will and determinism. --- Responsibility. --- Moral and ethical aspects. --- Glück. --- Moralische Verantwortung. --- Willensfreiheit. --- Viljans frihet. --- Determinism.
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"Why do people come to reject climate science or the safety and efficacy of vaccines, in defiance of the scientific consensus? A popular view explains bad beliefs like these as resulting from a range of biases that together ensure that human beings fall short of being genuinely rational animals. This book presents an alternative account. It argues that bad beliefs arise from genuinely rational processes. We've missed the rationality of bad beliefs because we've failed to recognize the ubiquity of the higher-order evidence that shapes beliefs, and the rationality of being guided by this evidence. The book argues that attention to higher-order evidence should lead us to rethink both how minds are best changed and the ethics of changing them: we should come to see that nudging - at least usually - changes belief (and behavior) by presenting rational agents with genuine evidence, and is therefore fully respectful of intellectual agency. We needn't rethink Enlightenment ideals of intellectual autonomy and rationality, but we should reshape them to take account of our deeply social epistemic agency"--
Rationalism. --- Knowledge management. --- Belief and doubt. --- Rationalism --- Conviction --- Doubt --- Consciousness --- Credulity --- Emotions --- Knowledge, Theory of --- Philosophy --- Psychology --- Religion --- Will --- Agnosticism --- Skepticism --- Belief and doubt --- Deism --- Free thought --- Realism
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Ethical relativism. --- Ethical relativism. --- Ethik --- Relativismus --- Relativismus --- Ethik
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Peer review is supposed to ensure that published work, in philosophy and in other disciplines, meets high standards of rigor and interest. But many people fear that it no longer is fit to play this role. This Element examines some of their concerns. It uses evidence that critics of peer review sometimes cite to show its failures, as well as empirical literature on the reception of bullshit, to advance positive claims about how the assessment of scholarly work is appropriately influenced by features of the context in which it appears: for example, by readers' knowledge of authorship or of publication venue. Reader attitude makes an appropriate and sometimes decisive difference to perceptions of argument quality. This Element finishes by considering the difference that author attitudes to their own arguments can appropriately make to their reception. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Academic writing --- Peer review. --- Evaluation. --- Publishing. --- Philosophy --- Peer Review --- Authorship --- Standards. --- standards
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