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Medical care prices in the United States are not only the most expensive in the world, but there are wide variations in what physicians are paid. Doctors at the frontlines of medical care who manage complex conditions argue that they receive disproportionately lower fees than physicians performing services such as minor surgeries and endoscopies. Fixing Medical Prices goes to the heart of the U.S. medical pricing process: to a largely unknown yet influential committee of medical organizations affiliated with the American Medical Association that advises Medicare. Medicare’s ready acceptance of this committee’s recommendations typically sets off a chain reaction across the entire American health care system. For decades, the U.S. policymaking structure for pricing has reflected the influence of physician organizations. What Miriam Laugesen’s rich analysis shows is how these organizations navigate the arcane and complex work of this advisory committee. Contradicting the story of a profession in political decline, Fixing Medical Prices demonstrates that the power of physician organizations has simply become more subtle. Laugesen’s investigation into the exorbitant cost of American medical care will be of interest to those who follow the politics of health care policy, the influence of interest groups on rate setting, and the medical profession’s past and future role in our health care system.

Medical economics --- Medical care --- Medicare. --- Health services administration --- Medicare --- Health insurance --- Older people --- Medicaid --- Medigap --- Evaluation. --- American Medical Association. --- A.M.A. (American Medical Association) --- AMA (American Medical Association) --- 美國醫學會 --- National Medical Association (1847- ) --- Ittiḥādīyah-ʼi Pizishkān-i Amrīkā --- اتحاديۀ پزشکان امريکا

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We analyze the effects of states' expansions of CHIP eligibility to children in higher income families during 2002-2009 on take-up of public coverage, crowd-out of private coverage, and rates of uninsurance. Our results indicate these expansions were associated with limited uptake of public coverage and only a two percentage point reduction in the uninsurance rate among these children. Because not all of the take-up of public insurance among eligible children is accounted for by children who transfer from being uninsured to having public insurance, our results suggest that there may be some crowd-out of private insurance coverage; the upper bound crowd-out rate we calculate is 46 percent.

Zonder onderwerpscode: economie