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The space-based capabilities of the United States have become integral to economic prosperity, to the defense of both the United States and its allies across all domains, and to facilitating cross-domain joint military operations. The U.S. government thus views the protection of these capabilities and the deterrence of any activity that could degrade them as vital to national security. Concurrently, China regards space capabilities as both a key enabler in terrestrial conflict and a means of bolstering its overall strength, and views United States activity in space as an obstacle to these goals. Accordingly, China may be motivated to exploit any evident U.S. vulnerabilities in the space domain to further its own objectives. Deterring China in space is therefore a priority for the United States Department of Defense and its allies and partners. The authors of this report consider deterrence concepts and examine how a deterrence strategy could be tailored to recognize the unique characteristics of the space domain and the particular objectives of China in space. To accomplish this, they review literature on classical deterrence theory and identify some key features that are particularly relevant to deterrence in the space domain. They then build a foundation for tailoring deterrence for China in space by examining Beijing's goals and approach to space deterrence as stated in openly available Chinese primary-source materials and identifying the implications of these findings for the United States and its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific.

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The concept of first mover advantage (FMA) is used often by military planners without clarification about what it means to move first or what sort of advantage such a first move is expected to provide to the mover. In space, there is often a perceived offense dominance that provides a first mover advantage to an adversary. To help build an understanding of when and whether exploitation of this concept should be considered in a broader military strategy, as well as when an adversary may consider such exploitation, the authors of this report seek to provide more-explicit definitions of what these first moves are and what objectives are sought with each. Furthermore, they seek to provide an explicit definition of advantage that distinguishes between the expected outcome should a mover wait versus the expected outcome should they move first. This foundational typology is intended to be a base for further analysis. The authors' recommendations reflect the nuanced view required to determine whether engaging in a first move indeed provides an advantage.

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"In an effort to support U.S. Air Force space community resilience objectives, researchers conducted a review of the academic literature defining and describing resiliency in various domains, and case-study reports about how organizations build resilient missions. This report summarizes key findings from this review that have broad application to any organization seeking to enhance resilience, which includes the space community. This report presents the approaches taken by three different types of communities to develop and maintain resilient operations. The discussion presented in this report illustrates three methods for building resilience, each illustrated by the approach of one community; resilience through withstanding an adverse event (impact avoidance and robustness), resilience through adaptation and flexibility, and resilience through recovery and restoration. These approaches are broadly described in this report as: withstand, adapt, and recover. Communities seeking to develop more resilient operations can gain insight from applying the various methods described in the literature, and applying lessons derived from similar operational environments and how they addressed resilience. Recognizing that any given organization can incorporate all three of these approaches in various parts of an overall resilience plan, this report seeks to highlight organizations that will be most likely to emphasize one of these approaches over another"--Publisher's description.

Organizational resilience --- Organizational learning --- Crisis management --- Emergency management --- Crisis management. --- Emergency management. --- Organizational learning. --- Organizational resilience. --- History --- 2000-2099 --- Resilience of organizations --- Organizational change --- Learning organizations --- Learning --- Communities of practice --- Knowledge management --- Consequence management (Emergency management) --- Disaster planning --- Disaster preparedness --- Disaster prevention --- Disaster relief --- Disasters --- Emergencies --- Emergency planning --- Emergency preparedness --- Management --- Public safety --- First responders --- Crises --- Management of crises --- Problem solving --- Conflict management --- Planning --- Preparedness --- Prevention

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Resilience is the ability of a system, architecture, or organization to maintain critical capabilities during and following a threat or disruption. Assuring resilience can be a costly endeavor, and it requires innovative approaches in a financially constrained environment. Often these innovative approaches lead to modifications of non-materiel aspects of a system or organization; such aspects include emergency response planning, organizational culture or structure, and training. The impact of these modifications is challenging to quantify. This report is the result of a project that sought to identify non-materiel solutions for improving the resilience of the U.S. space enterprise and to develop an analytical approach for evaluating the impacts of the potential improvements. The authors conducted a review of industry methods for evaluating the materiel elements of space resilience and used concepts from those methods to develop a process for evaluating the non-materiel resilience of a system. The process and the tool they developed for performing resilience calculations and presenting the results -- Resilience Assessment Process and Portfolio Option Reporting Tool, or RAPAPORT (available at www.rand.org/t/TL184)-- have broad applications to any organization seeking to enhance resilience"--Publisher's description

Astronautics, Military --- Reliability (Engineering) --- Evaluation. --- Data processing. --- United States. --- Operational readiness.

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"Space is now a congested, contested, and competitive environment. Space systems must become more resilient to potential adversary actions and system failures, but changes to space systems are costly. To provide a complete look at resilience and possibly realize some benefit at lower cost, the Air Force asked RAND to identify non-materiel means--doctrine, organization, training, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy--to enhance space resilience over the near and far terms. The authors developed implementation options to improve resilience based on a notional space protection operational concept: enhancing the capability of space operators to respond, in a timely and effective manner, to adversary counterspace actions. Operators need actionable information, appropriate organization and tactics, and dynamic command and control, supported by appropriate tools and decision aids, relevant training and exercises, and qualified personnel brought into the career field. The authors also recommend that Air Force Space Command develop a formal, end-to-end, space protection concept of operations (CONOPS) that captures all elements needed to improve resilience. In addition, the CONOPS could potentially follow the tenet of centralized control and decentralized execution in certain situations, such as when responding to adversary counterspace actions. For the near-term options, the rough order of magnitude (ROM) nonrecurring engineering (NRE) cost of implementation is estimated to be between $2.5 million and $3.6 million. For the far-term options, the ROM NRE cost is estimated to be between $109 million and $166 million, with the ROM recurring cost between $4 million and $5.4 million per year"--Publisher's description.

Astronautics, Military --- Space security --- Organizational resilience --- Air Forces --- Military & Naval Science --- Law, Politics & Government --- History --- Resilience of organizations --- Outer space security --- Security of outer space --- Astronautics, Naval --- Military astronautics --- Naval astronautics --- Organizational change --- Security, International --- Space control (Military science) --- United States. --- Operational readiness. --- 2000-2099 --- AF (Air force) --- Air Force (U.S.) --- U.S.A.F. (Air force) --- United States Air Force --- US Air Force --- USAF (Air force) --- AB --- ABSh --- Ameerika Ühendriigid --- America (Republic) --- Amerika Birlăshmish Shtatlary --- Amerika Birlăşmi Ştatları --- Amerika Birlăşmiş Ştatları --- Amerika ka Kelenyalen Jamanaw --- Amerika Qūrama Shtattary --- Amerika Qŭshma Shtatlari --- Amerika Qushma Shtattary --- Amerika (Republic) --- Amerikai Egyesült Államok --- Amerikanʹ Veĭtʹsėndi͡avks Shtattn --- Amerikări Pĕrleshu̇llĕ Shtatsem --- Amerikas Forenede Stater --- Amerikayi Miatsʻyal Nahangner --- Ameriketako Estatu Batuak --- Amirika Carékat --- AQSh --- Ar. ha-B. --- Arhab --- Artsot ha-Berit --- Artzois Ha'bris --- Bí-kok --- Ē.P.A. --- EE.UU. --- Egyesült Államok --- ĒPA --- Estados Unidos --- Estados Unidos da América do Norte --- Estados Unidos de América --- Estaos Xuníos --- Estaos Xuníos d'América --- Estatos Unitos --- Estatos Unitos d'America --- Estats Units d'Amèrica --- Ètats-Unis d'Amèrica --- États-Unis d'Amérique --- Fareyniḳṭe Shṭaṭn --- Feriene Steaten --- Feriene Steaten fan Amearika --- Forente stater --- FS --- Hēnomenai Politeiai Amerikēs --- Hēnōmenes Politeies tēs Amerikēs --- Hiwsisayin Amerikayi Miatsʻeal Tērutʻiwnkʻ --- Istadus Unidus --- Jungtinės Amerikos valstybės --- Mei guo --- Mei-kuo --- Meiguo --- Mî-koet --- Miatsʻyal Nahangner --- Miguk --- Na Stàitean Aonaichte --- NSA --- S.U.A. --- SAD --- Saharat ʻAmērik --- SASht --- Severo-Amerikanskie Shtaty --- Severo-Amerikanskie Soedinennye Shtaty --- Si͡evero-Amerikanskīe Soedinennye Shtaty --- Sjedinjene Američke Države --- Soedinennye Shtaty Ameriki --- Soedinennye Shtaty Severnoĭ Ameriki --- Soedinennye Shtaty Si͡evernoĭ Ameriki --- Spojené obce severoamerick --- Spojené staty americk --- SShA --- Stadoù-Unanet Amerika --- Stáit Aontaithe Mheirice --- Stany Zjednoczone --- Stati Uniti --- Stati Uniti d'America --- Stâts Unîts --- Stâts Unîts di Americhe --- Steatyn Unnaneysit --- Steatyn Unnaneysit America --- SUA --- Sŭedineni amerikanski shtati --- Sŭedinenite shtati --- Tetã peteĩ reko Amérikagua --- U.S. --- U.S.A. --- United States of America --- Unol Daleithiau --- Unol Daleithiau America --- Unuiĝintaj Ŝtatoj de Ameriko --- US --- USA --- Usono --- Vaeinigte Staatn --- Vaeinigte Staatn vo Amerika --- Vereinigte Staaten --- Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika --- Verenigde State van Amerika --- Verenigde Staten --- VS --- VSA --- Wááshindoon Bikéyah Ałhidadiidzooígí --- Wilāyāt al-Muttaḥidah --- Wilāyāt al-Muttaḥidah al-Amirīkīyah --- Wilāyāt al-Muttaḥidah al-Amrīkīyah --- Yhdysvallat --- Yunaeted Stet --- Yunaeted Stet blong Amerika --- ZDA --- Združene države Amerike --- Zʹi͡ednani Derz͡havy Ameryky --- Zjadnośone staty Ameriki --- Zluchanyi͡a Shtaty Ameryki --- Zlucheni Derz͡havy --- ZSA