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The definition of a relevant market is crucial in many antitrust cases. The assessment whether a firm is in a dominant position or not depends highly on the market that has been defined as comprising all competitive constraints to its behaviour. The ongoing case of the European Commission against Google’s mobile operating system Android is an example of such a case, which additionally includes a very specific type of product: multi-sided platforms. The particular nature and functioning of such platforms leaves most common methods of market definition useless and inappropriate. This thesis will use the growing literature on multi-sided platforms to assess the functioning of these products. Further, a prominent precedent case and a close consideration of the general business strategy of Google will help to reveal and to understand how Android works. What role it and other adjacent software play in this wider business strategy of Google. And what the competitive environment is in which these products are operated. The main insights will be that it makes little sense to consider these products without taking into account their interdependent relationship and the competition they face from firms operating with a different business model. It are in fact these various business models that are competing with each other on a higher level, rather than the single products with each other. Comparing these findings with the markets the European Commission has defined as being the relevant markets in this case, hints that the Commission might possibly be missing important aspects of the competition that is taking place between these products and their parent firms.

Sciences économiques & de gestion > Economie générale & histoire de la pensée économique

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This thesis analyzes the Commission's competition policy enforcement since the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003, introducing the commitments procedure. The analysis is carried out against the background that the optimal procedure choice depends on the uncertainty the Commission has related to the importance of the harm and the probability of conviction. With a representative sample of antitrust cases, it is attempted to determine which factors impacting the uncertainty and the probability of conviction have indeed a significant impact on the procedure choice.

EU Commission competition enforcement --- Sciences économiques & de gestion > Microéconomie