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These proceedings hold the papers of the ICBMR 2016 conference, held between October 25-27, 2016, in Lombok, Indonesia. ICBMR is organized with a motivation to provide an international platform for the academicians, researchers and budding students around the world to share their research findings and to find international linkage for future collaborations in the areas of Finance, Banking, Capital Market, Accounting, International Business, Operations Management, Actuarials, Sharia, Economics, Marketing, Organization/ HRD Management, Strategic Management, Innovation Management, General Management, Management Information Systems, and Regional Economic Integration and Competitiveness.
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Using three waves of survey data from fishing villages in Aceh, Indonesia for 2005-09, the paper examines the determinants of local volunteer labor after the tsunami. Volunteer labor is the village public sector labor force for maintenance, clean-up and renovation of public capital. While also examining the effects on volunteerism of village destruction and trauma, pre-existing social capital, diversity, and aid delivery, the papers focuses on the effects of democratization. The tsunami and massive international aid effort prompted the settlement of the insurgency movement in Aceh, which had led to suspension of local elections over the prior twenty or more years. Until 2006, village heads who call volunteer days were effectively selected by village elites, who may highly value the public facilities maintained by volunteer labor. With elections, volunteer days fall under the new regime, with democratically elected village heads calling fewer volunteer days, which may appeal more to the typical villager. Identification comes from pseudo-randomized differential timing of elections.
Communities & Human Settlements --- Governance --- Social Development --- Urban Development
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Using three waves of survey data from fishing villages in Aceh, Indonesia for 2005-09, the paper examines the determinants of local volunteer labor after the tsunami. Volunteer labor is the village public sector labor force for maintenance, clean-up and renovation of public capital. While also examining the effects on volunteerism of village destruction and trauma, pre-existing social capital, diversity, and aid delivery, the papers focuses on the effects of democratization. The tsunami and massive international aid effort prompted the settlement of the insurgency movement in Aceh, which had led to suspension of local elections over the prior twenty or more years. Until 2006, village heads who call volunteer days were effectively selected by village elites, who may highly value the public facilities maintained by volunteer labor. With elections, volunteer days fall under the new regime, with democratically elected village heads calling fewer volunteer days, which may appeal more to the typical villager. Identification comes from pseudo-randomized differential timing of elections.
Communities & Human Settlements --- Governance --- Social Development --- Urban Development
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Indonesia has a tradition of corruption among local officials who harass and collect bribes from firms. Corruption flourished in the Suharto, pre-democracy era. This paper asks whether local democratization that occurred after Suharto reduced corruption and whether specific local politics, over and above the effects of local culture, affect corruption. We have a firm level data set for 2001 that benchmarks bribing activity and harassment at the time when Indonesia decentralized key responsibilities to local democratically elected governments. We have a second data set for 2004 on corruption at the end of the first democratic election cycle. We find that, overall, corruption declines between these time periods. But specific politics matter. Islamic parties in Indonesia are perceived as being anti-corruption. Our data show voting patterns reflect this belief and voters' perceptions have some degree of accuracy. In the first democratic election, localities that voted in legislatures dominated by secular parties, including Megawati's party, experienced significant relative increases in corruption, while the reverse was the case for those voting in Islamic parties. But in the second election in 2004, in those localities where corruption had increased under secular party rule, voters "threw the bums out of office" and voted in Islamic parties.
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Bribes by firms in Indonesia arise principally from regulations --licenses and levies --imposed by local government officials. Regulations generate direct revenues (fees) plus indirect revenues in the form of bribes. The expected value of the latter is capitalized into lower salaries needed by localities to compensate public officials. Localities in Indonesia are hampered by insufficient revenues from formal tax and transfer sources to pay competitive salaries plus fund demanded' levels of public services, because local tax rates are capped by the center and inter-governmental transfers are limited. Thus the direct and indirect revenues from local regulations are critical to local finances. The paper models and estimates the key aspects of corruption -- the relationship between bribes, time spent with local officials, and different forms of regulation. It models how inter-jurisdictional competition for firms limits the extent of local regulation and how greater sources of tax or inter-governmental revenues reduce the need for regulation and corruption. The paper estimates a large reduction in regulation in better funded localities. The findings are directly relevant to Indonesia where corruption is high and the country is in the throes of major decentralization and local democratization efforts.
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