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In a vitally important book for anyone interested in nuclear proliferation, defense strategy, or international security, Matthew Kroenig points out that nearly every country with a nuclear weapons arsenal received substantial help at some point from a more advanced nuclear state. Why do some countries help others to develop nuclear weapons? Many analysts assume that nuclear transfers are driven by economic considerations. States in dire economic need, they suggest, export sensitive nuclear materials and technology-and ignore the security risk-in a desperate search for hard currency. Kroenig challenges this conventional wisdom. He finds that state decisions to provide sensitive nuclear assistance are the result of a coherent, strategic logic. The spread of nuclear weapons threatens powerful states more than it threatens weak states, and these differential effects of nuclear proliferation encourage countries to provide sensitive nuclear assistance under certain strategic conditions. Countries are more likely to export sensitive nuclear materials and technology when it would have the effect of constraining an enemy and less likely to do so when it would threaten themselves. In Exporting the Bomb, Kroenig examines the most important historical cases, including France's nuclear assistance to Israel in the 1950's and 1960's; the Soviet Union's sensitive transfers to China from 1958 to 1960; China's nuclear aid to Pakistan in the 1980's; and Pakistan's recent technology transfers, with the help of "rogue" scientist A. Q. Khan, from 1987 to 2002. Understanding why states provide sensitive nuclear assistance not only adds to our knowledge of international politics but also aids in international efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons.

Polemology --- Arms transfers --- Military assistance --- Nuclear nonproliferation --- Nuclear weapons --- Security, International. --- Technology transfer --- Political aspects. --- Collective security --- International security --- Export of nuclear materials --- Export of nuclear technology --- International control of nuclear energy --- Nonproliferation, Nuclear --- Nuclear energy --- Nuclear exports --- Nuclear proliferation --- Proliferation, Nuclear --- Arms aid --- Foreign aid program --- Foreign assistance --- Military aid --- Mutual defense assistance program --- Technological transfer --- Transfer of technology --- Arms sales --- Arms traffic --- Foreign military sales --- Military sales --- Munitions --- Sale of military equipment --- Atomic weapons --- Fusion weapons --- Thermonuclear weapons --- International control --- International relations --- Disarmament --- International organization --- Peace --- Nuclear arms control --- Nuclear-weapon-free zones --- Military policy --- Diffusion of innovations --- Inventions --- Research, Industrial --- Technology and international relations --- Foreign licensing agreements --- Technological forecasting --- Technological innovations --- Technology --- International trade --- Arms race --- Defense industries --- Weapons of mass destruction --- No first use (Nuclear strategy) --- Nuclear disarmament --- Nuclear warfare --- International cooperation

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What kind of nuclear strategy and posture does the US need to defend itself and its allies? According to conventional wisdom, the answer to this question is straightforward: the US needs the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and respond with a devastating nuclear counterattack. These arguments are logical and persuasive, but, when compared to the empirical record, they raise an important puzzle. Empirically, we see that the US has consistently maintained a nuclear posture that is much more robust than a mere second-strike capability. How do we make sense of this contradiction? Scholarly deterrence theory argues that the explanation is simple - policymakers are wrong. This work takes a different approach. Rather than dismiss it as illogical, it explains the logic of American nuclear strategy.

Nuclear weapons --- Government policy --- United States --- Military policy.

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Political sociology --- Politics

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This volume examines the causes and consequences of nuclear postures and nonproliferation policies. The real-world importance of nuclear weapons has led to the production of a voluminous scholarly literature on the causes and consequences of nuclear weapons proliferation. Missing from this literature, however, is a more nuanced analysis that moves beyond a binary treatment of nuclear weapons possession, to an exploration of how different nuclear postures and nonproliferation policies may influence the proliferation of nuclear weapons and subsequent security outcomes. This volume addresses this deficit by focussing on the causes and consequences of nuclear postures and nonproliferation policies. It is the aim of this book to advance the development of a new empirical research agenda that brings systematic research methods to bear on new dimensions of the nuclear weapons phenomenon. Prior to the contributions in this volume, there has been little evidence to suggest that nuclear postures and policies have a meaningful impact on the spread of nuclear weapons or security outcomes. This book brings together a new generation of scholars, advancing innovative theoretical positions, and performing quantitative tests using original data on nuclear postures, nonproliferation policies, and WMD proliferation. Together, the chapters in this volume make novel theoretical, empirical, and methodological contributions to the field of nuclear weapons proliferation.

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION --- NUCLEAR WEAPONS--GOVERNMENT POLICY