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The contributions gathered in this volume present the state of the art in key areas of current social ontology. They focus on the role of collective intentional states in creating social facts, and on the nature of intentional properties of groups that allow characterizing them as responsible agents, or perhaps even as persons. Many of the essays are inspired by contemporary action theory, emotion theory, and theories of collective intentionality. Another group of essays revisits early phenomenological approaches to social ontology and accounts of sociality that draw on the Hegelian idea of recognition. This volume is organized into three parts. First, the volume discusses themes highlighted in John Searle’s work and addresses questions concerning the relation between intentions and the deontic powers of institutions, the role of disagreement, and the nature of collective intentionality. Next, the book focuses on joint and collective emotions and mutual recognition, and then goes on to explore the scope and limits of group agency, or group personhood, especially the capacity for responsible agency. The variety of philosophical traditions mirrored in this collection provides readers with a rich and multifaceted survey of present research in social ontology. It will help readers deepen their understanding of three interrelated and core topics in social ontology: the constitution and structure of institutions, the role of shared evaluative attitudes, and the nature and role of group agents.
Intentionality (Philosophy) --- Social institutions --- Emotions. --- Ontology. --- Social aspects. --- Psychological aspects. --- Being --- Feelings --- Human emotions --- Passions --- Institutions, Social --- Philosophy. --- Philosophy and social sciences. --- Sociology. --- Personality. --- Social psychology. --- Philosophy of the Social Sciences. --- Personality and Social Psychology. --- Sociological Theory. --- Philosophy --- Metaphysics --- Necessity (Philosophy) --- Substance (Philosophy) --- Psychology --- Affect (Psychology) --- Affective neuroscience --- Apathy --- Pathognomy --- Social systems --- Sociology --- Social structure --- Act (Philosophy) --- Mind and body --- Social sciences --- Consciousness. --- Apperception --- Perception --- Spirit --- Self --- Social philosophy --- Social theory --- Mass psychology --- Psychology, Social --- Human ecology --- Social groups --- Personal identity --- Personality psychology --- Personality theory --- Personality traits --- Personology --- Traits, Personality --- Individuality --- Persons --- Temperament --- Social sciences and philosophy
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The contributions gathered in this volume present the state of the art in key areas of current social ontology. They focus on the role of collective intentional states in creating social facts, and on the nature of intentional properties of groups that allow characterizing them as responsible agents, or perhaps even as persons. Many of the essays are inspired by contemporary action theory, emotion theory, and theories of collective intentionality. Another group of essays revisits early phenomenological approaches to social ontology and accounts of sociality that draw on the Hegelian idea of recognition. This volume is organized into three parts. First, the volume discusses themes highlighted in John Searle’s work and addresses questions concerning the relation between intentions and the deontic powers of institutions, the role of disagreement, and the nature of collective intentionality. Next, the book focuses on joint and collective emotions and mutual recognition, and then goes on to explore the scope and limits of group agency, or group personhood, especially the capacity for responsible agency. The variety of philosophical traditions mirrored in this collection provides readers with a rich and multifaceted survey of present research in social ontology. It will help readers deepen their understanding of three interrelated and core topics in social ontology: the constitution and structure of institutions, the role of shared evaluative attitudes, and the nature and role of group agents.
Philosophy --- Cognitive psychology --- Social sciences (general) --- Social psychology --- Sociology --- Personality development --- psychosociale wetenschappen --- sociale psychologie --- sociologie --- filosofie --- sociale wetenschappen --- emoties --- bewustzijn --- persoonlijkheidsontwikkeling
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This volume examines the affective and social dimensions of self-related activities. This is a novel way of approaching traditional questions such as the scope and purpose of self-knowledge, the interrelation between the social and the individual person, and the significance of emotional appraisal. Focusing on self-evaluation instead of self-knowledge in shifting from a doxastic to an axiological perspective. The scientific added value created by this approach is threefold: i) it opens up a broader perspective on the structure of self-reflection which includes a matrix of values; ii) as valuations imply a social contact, it extends to social relations; iii) since affective attitudes are crucial for the recognition of values, it incorporates feelings and emotions. In short, self-evaluation is a conception of self-reflection which includes sociality and affectivity. This volume contains contributions by leading figures in philosophy of mind and action, emotion theory, and phenomenology. It allows a global view on the most recent reflections on the subject matter, being of interest for professional philosophers, as well as for researchers from various neighboring disciplines. .
Child development. --- Performance in children. --- Self Assessment (Psychology). --- Self-evaluation. --- Self-perception --- Self-evaluation --- Social comparison --- Social Sciences --- Psychology --- Self-perception. --- Social comparison. --- Social comparison theory --- Self-appraisal --- Self-estimate --- Self-rating --- Self-report --- Self-concept --- Self image --- Self-understanding --- Psychology. --- Philosophy of mind. --- Social sciences. --- Cognitive psychology. --- Cognitive Psychology. --- Philosophy of Mind. --- Social Sciences, general. --- Psychology, Cognitive --- Cognitive science --- Behavioral sciences --- Human sciences --- Sciences, Social --- Social science --- Social studies --- Civilization --- Mind, Philosophy of --- Mind, Theory of --- Theory of mind --- Philosophy --- Metaphysics --- Philosophical anthropology --- Mental philosophy --- Mind --- Science, Mental --- Human biology --- Soul --- Mental health --- Comparison (Psychology) --- Social perception --- Evaluation --- Perception --- Self-discrepancy theory --- Consciousness. --- Apperception --- Mind and body --- Spirit --- Self
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Cognitive psychology --- Psychology --- Social sciences (general) --- sociale wetenschappen --- cognitieve psychologie
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This volume examines the affective and social dimensions of self-related activities. This is a novel way of approaching traditional questions such as the scope and purpose of self-knowledge, the interrelation between the social and the individual person, and the significance of emotional appraisal. Focusing on self-evaluation instead of self-knowledge in shifting from a doxastic to an axiological perspective. The scientific added value created by this approach is threefold: i) it opens up a broadr perspective on the structure of self-reflection which includes a matrix of values; ii) as valauations imply a social contaxt, it extends to social relations; iii) since affective attitudes are crucial for the recognition of values, it incorparates feelings and emotions. In short, self-evaluation is a conception of self-refelection which includes sociality and affectivity. This volume contains contributions by leading figures in philosophy of mind and action, emotion theory, and phenomenology. It allows a global view on the most recent reflections on the subject matter, being of interest for professional philosophers, as well as for researchers from various nighboring disciplines.
Cognitive psychology --- Psychology --- Social sciences (general) --- sociale wetenschappen --- cognitieve psychologie
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Qu'est-ce qu'un collectif ? L'usage, volontaire, du substantif suggère que « collectif » renvoie non pas à une qualité, à un mode d'action ou à un type de processus, mais à une personne, un individu ou un sujet collectif. Donnant la parole à des auteurs de différents pays et de diverses traditions de pensée, les textes rassemblés font le point sur les débats, actuellement vifs en philosophie et en sciences sociales, concernant l'analyse des collectifs, et proposent des solutions originales aux problèmes qu'elle pose.
Social structure --- Collective behavior --- Group identity --- Organizational sociology --- Structure sociale --- Comportement collectif --- Identité collective --- Sociologie des organisations --- Philosophy --- Philosophie --- Philosophy and sociology --- Identité collective --- Participation (philosophie) --- Communauté --- Identité collective. --- Communauté. --- Philosophy. --- Organization, Social --- Social organization --- Anthropology --- Sociology --- Social institutions --- Social structure - Philosophy
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