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Book
Exploring public-private partnerships in Singapore : the success-failure continuum
Authors: ---
ISBN: 1000769186 1000769100 0429290705 Year: 2020 Publisher: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge,

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"This book looks at what drives effective management of public-private partnerships (PPP). It examines widely cited Singaporean cases pertaining to successful PPPs as well as those in failure (and subsequently contracted back in the public sector provision) in diverse areas of public service, such as water services, educational services, trade and logistical data services, residential services, acquisition and maintenance of military systems, research and development services, infrastructure, and sport services. The book begins each case with an overview (e.g., project goals (motivators), types of PPP, stakeholders, time period, assigned budget, and capital planning) and then specifically discusses critical success factors and/or risk factors, pertaining to the decisions to proceed with on-going PPPs or to return to self-operation (in-house public production) of services later, respectively. The book concludes with a discussion of lessons learned from Singaporean cases and contexts of PPPs and suggests more feasible strategies and conditions towards successful collaborative governance between public agencies and private counterparts for the new century. This book will appeal especially to public policy makers"--


Digital
Analyzing the Effects of Insuring Health Risks : On the Trade-off between Short Run Insurance Benefits vs. Long Run Incentive Costs
Authors: --- ---
Year: 2012 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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This paper constructs a dynamic model of health insurance to evaluate the short- and long run effects of policies that prevent firms from conditioning wages on health conditions of their workers, and that prevent health insurance companies from charging individuals with adverse health conditions higher insurance premia. Our study is motivated by recent US legislation that has tightened regulations on wage discrimination against workers with poorer health status (Americans with Disability Act of 2009, ADA, and ADA Amendments Act of 2008, ADAAA) and that will prohibit health insurance companies from charging different premiums for workers of different health status starting in 2014 (Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, PPACA). In the model, a trade-off arises between the static gains from better insurance against poor health induced by these policies and their adverse dynamic incentive effects on household efforts to lead a healthy life. Using household panel data from the PSID we estimate and calibrate the model and then use it to evaluate the static and dynamic consequences of no-wage discrimination and no-prior conditions laws for the evolution of the cross-sectional health and consumption distribution of a cohort of households, as well as ex-ante lifetime utility of a typical member of this cohort. In our quantitative analysis we find that although a combination of both policies is effective in providing full consumption insurance period by period, it is suboptimal to introduce both policies jointly since such policy innovation induces a more rapid deterioration of the cohort health distribution over time. This is due to the fact that combination of both laws severely undermines the incentives to lead healthier lives. The resulting negative effects on health outcomes in society more than offset the static gains from better consumption insurance so that expected discounted lifetime utility is lower under both policies, relative to only implementing wage nondiscrimination legislation.


Book
Analyzing the effects of insuring health risk: on the trade-off between short run insurance benefits vs. long run incentive costs.
Authors: --- ---
Year: 2012 Publisher: London Centre For Economic Policy Research,.

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Book
Labor Market Screening and Social Insurance Program Design for the Disabled
Authors: --- --- ---
Year: 2020 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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This paper studies the optimal design of social insurance programs for disabled workers by developing and estimating an equilibrium labor search model with screening contracts. In the model, firms may strategically use employment contracts, consisting of wage and job amenities, to screen out the disabled. The optimal structure of disability policies depends on firms' screening incentives, which may distort employment rates and contracts. By exploiting policy changes on the labor demand side for the disabled in the United States, we identify and estimate our equilibrium model to explore the optimal joint design of disability policies, including disability insurance (DI) and subsidies to firms accommodating disabled workers. We find that firm subsidies mitigate screening distortions; at the same time, they interact with DI by reducing the labor supply disincentives it generates. The optimal policy structure leads to a considerable welfare gain by simultaneously making firm subsidies and DI benefits more generous.

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Book
Analyzing the Effects of Insuring Health Risks : On the Trade-off between Short Run Insurance Benefits vs. Long Run Incentive Costs
Authors: --- --- ---
Year: 2012 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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Abstract

This paper constructs a dynamic model of health insurance to evaluate the short- and long run effects of policies that prevent firms from conditioning wages on health conditions of their workers, and that prevent health insurance companies from charging individuals with adverse health conditions higher insurance premia. Our study is motivated by recent US legislation that has tightened regulations on wage discrimination against workers with poorer health status (Americans with Disability Act of 2009, ADA, and ADA Amendments Act of 2008, ADAAA) and that will prohibit health insurance companies from charging different premiums for workers of different health status starting in 2014 (Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, PPACA). In the model, a trade-off arises between the static gains from better insurance against poor health induced by these policies and their adverse dynamic incentive effects on household efforts to lead a healthy life. Using household panel data from the PSID we estimate and calibrate the model and then use it to evaluate the static and dynamic consequences of no-wage discrimination and no-prior conditions laws for the evolution of the cross-sectional health and consumption distribution of a cohort of households, as well as ex-ante lifetime utility of a typical member of this cohort. In our quantitative analysis we find that although a combination of both policies is effective in providing full consumption insurance period by period, it is suboptimal to introduce both policies jointly since such policy innovation induces a more rapid deterioration of the cohort health distribution over time. This is due to the fact that combination of both laws severely undermines the incentives to lead healthier lives. The resulting negative effects on health outcomes in society more than offset the static gains from better consumption insurance so that expected discounted lifetime utility is lower under both policies, relative to only implementing wage nondiscrimination legislation.

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Book
Vamping the Stage

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