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Zonder onderwerpscode: wereldeconomie, ontwikkelingsproblematiek

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Zonder onderwerpscode: wereldeconomie, ontwikkelingsproblematiek

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Zonder onderwerpscode: wereldeconomie, ontwikkelingsproblematiek

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Much of the research on ethnicity, development and conflict implicitly assumes that ethnic groups act collectively in pursuit of their interests. Collective political action is typically facilitated by political parties able to make credible commitments to pursue group interests. Other work, however, emphasizes the lack of political credibility as a source of adverse development outcomes. Evidence presented here uses partisan preferences across 16 Sub-Saharan African countries to distinguish these positions. The evidence is inconsistent with the credibility of party commitments to pursue collective ethnic interests: ethnic clustering of political support is less widespread than expected; members of clustered ethnic groups exhibit high rates of partisan disinterest and are only slightly more likely to express a partisan preference; and partisan preferences are more affected by factors, such as gift-giving, often associated with low political credibility. These findings emphasize the importance of looking beyond ethnicity in analyses of economic development.

Candidates --- Constituencies --- Constituency --- Decision making --- Democracies --- Democracy --- Democratic development --- Democratic process --- Democratic regimes --- Education --- Education and Society --- Educational Sciences --- Election --- Elections --- Electorate --- Governance --- Health --- Nutrition and Population --- Parliamentary Government --- Policy issues --- Political campaigns --- Political parties --- Political party --- Political systems --- Population Policies --- Public good --- Public interest --- Public services --- Social Development --- Social Inclusion & Institutions

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This paper suggests a new factor that makes civil war more likely: the inability of political actors to make credible promises to broad segments of society. Lacking this ability, both elected and unelected governments pursue public policies that leave citizens less well-off and more prone to revolt. At the same time, these actors have a reduced ability to build an anti-insurgency capacity in the first place, since they are less able to prevent anti-insurgents from themselves mounting coups. But while reducing the risk of conflict overall, increasing credibility can, over some range, worsen the effects of natural resources and ethnic fragmentation on civil war. Empirical tests using various measures of political credibility support these conclusions.

Armed Conflict --- Citizen --- Citizens --- Civil War --- Conflict and Development --- Emerging Markets --- Ethnic Groups --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Literacy --- Governance --- Health, Nutrition and Population --- Labor Policies --- Natural Resources --- Parliamentary Government --- Policies --- Policy --- Policy Research --- Policy Research Working Paper --- Political Parties --- Political Systems and Analysis --- Politics and Government --- Popular Support --- Population --- Population Policies --- Post Conflict Reconstruction --- Private Sector Development --- Progress --- Public Information --- Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures --- Quality of Education --- Secondary School --- Segments of Society --- Social Conditions --- Social Conflict and Violence --- Social Development --- Social Protections and Labor --- Wars