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When do special interests run rampant? Disentangling the role of elections, incomplete information and checks and balances in banking crises
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Year: 2001 Publisher: Washington, D.C.

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What does political economy tell us about economic development and vice versa?
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Year: 2004 Publisher: Washington, D.C. World Bank

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A review of the political economy of governance: from property rights to voice
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Year: 2004 Publisher: Washington, D.C. World Bank

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Elections, special interests, and the fiscal costs of financial crisis
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Year: 2004 Publisher: Washington, D.C. World Bank

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Democratization and clientelism: why are young democracies badly governed?
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Year: 2005 Publisher: Washington, D.C. World Bank

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Beyond legal origin and checks and balances: political credibility, citizen information, and financial sector development
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Year: 2007 Publisher: Washington, D.C. World Bank

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Insurgency and credible commitment in autocracies and democracies
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Year: 2007 Publisher: Washington, D.C. World Bank

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The Ethnicity Distraction ? : Political Credibility and Partisan Preferences in Africa
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Year: 2010 Publisher: Washington, D.C., The World Bank,

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Much of the research on ethnicity, development and conflict implicitly assumes that ethnic groups act collectively in pursuit of their interests. Collective political action is typically facilitated by political parties able to make credible commitments to pursue group interests. Other work, however, emphasizes the lack of political credibility as a source of adverse development outcomes. Evidence presented here uses partisan preferences across 16 Sub-Saharan African countries to distinguish these positions. The evidence is inconsistent with the credibility of party commitments to pursue collective ethnic interests: ethnic clustering of political support is less widespread than expected; members of clustered ethnic groups exhibit high rates of partisan disinterest and are only slightly more likely to express a partisan preference; and partisan preferences are more affected by factors, such as gift-giving, often associated with low political credibility. These findings emphasize the importance of looking beyond ethnicity in analyses of economic development.


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Collective Action, Political Parties and Pro-Development Public Policy
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Year: 2011 Publisher: Washington, D.C., The World Bank,

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Broad consensus exists that the ability of political actors to make credible commitments is key to development. An important and little-explored determinant of the credibility of political commitments is the existence of organizations that facilitate citizen collective action to sanction political actors who renege. This paper focuses on one essential organization, the political party. Three measures of political parties are used to assess cross-country differences in the degree to which politicians facilitate the ability of citizens to act in their collective interest. Each of these measures is associated with superior development outcomes, above and beyond the effects of competitive elections. These results have implications for understanding the extraordinary economic success of some East Asian countries and notable lags among others: East Asian non-democracies exhibit more institutionalized ruling parties than other non-democracies, while East Asian democracies exhibit equally or less institutionalized parties. The evidence suggests that greater research and policy emphasis be placed on the organizational characteristics of countries that allow citizens to hold leaders accountable.


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Insurgency and Credible Commitment in Autocracies and Democracies
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Year: 2007 Publisher: Washington, D.C., The World Bank,

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This paper suggests a new factor that makes civil war more likely: the inability of political actors to make credible promises to broad segments of society. Lacking this ability, both elected and unelected governments pursue public policies that leave citizens less well-off and more prone to revolt. At the same time, these actors have a reduced ability to build an anti-insurgency capacity in the first place, since they are less able to prevent anti-insurgents from themselves mounting coups. But while reducing the risk of conflict overall, increasing credibility can, over some range, worsen the effects of natural resources and ethnic fragmentation on civil war. Empirical tests using various measures of political credibility support these conclusions.

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