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Book
Better Than Most : Teacher Beliefs about Effort and Ability in Uganda
Authors: --- ---
Year: 2018 Publisher: Washington, D.C. : The World Bank,

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Abstract

Do teachers have accurate beliefs about their effort and ability? This paper explores this through a survey experiment in public-private partnership schools in Uganda, wherein teacher self-beliefs are contrasted with their beliefs about other teachers in the same school. The study finds that, on average, teachers tend to rate ability, effort, and job satisfaction more positively for themselves than for other teachers. This tendency is called high relative self-regard. The study finds no systematic evidence of high relative self-regard around perceptions of student engagement quality and available support structures. More experienced teachers are less likely to exhibit high relative self-regard, while teachers showing low effort are more likely to exhibit it. This is analogous to the Dunning-Kruger effect in psychology, except respondents rate themselves as better than most (not better than average) and variation is explored over effort (not cognitive ability). High relative self-regard is less pronounced in owner-managed public-private partnership schools, suggesting that when principle-agent problems are less severe, schools find ways to correct for inaccurate teacher self-beliefs. These results provide suggestive evidence of cognitive biases that help teachers rationalize suboptimal effort in the classroom. This in turn points to the importance of providing objective feedback to teachers about their effort and performance as one potential way to improve their performance. Teacher self-beliefs are important areas of intervention because they are likely to affect how teachers optimize their effort and training investments. Self-beliefs are also likely to affect how teachers respond to changes in incentive and accountability regimes.


Book
Deterring Kickbacks and Encouraging Entry in Public Procurement Markets : Evidence from Firm Surveys in 88 Developing Countries
Authors: --- ---
Year: 2017 Publisher: Washington, D.C. : The World Bank,

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Abstract

There is relatively little systematic evidence on the links between procurement systems and outcomes such as competition and corruption levels. This paper adds to the evidence base, using data on almost 34,000 firms from the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys, in 88 countries that also have procurement systems data from Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessments. The analysis finds that in countries with more transparent procurement systems, where exceptions to open competition in tendering must be explicitly justified, firms are more likely to participate in public procurement markets. Moreover, firms report paying fewer and smaller kickbacks to officials in countries with more transparent procurement systems, effective and independent complaint mechanisms, and more effective external auditing systems. These findings-particularly on kickbacks-are robust to the inclusion of many controls and to a range of sensitivity tests. The study finds evidence that better procurement systems matter more for smaller firms' participation in procurement markets and payment of kickbacks to obtain contracts, consistent with the view that information and transactions costs that are incurred in learning about bidding opportunities and fulfilling bidding requirements are more onerous for smaller firms. Falsification tests show that other, non-procurement indicators from the PEFA assessments are not associated with procurement outcomes, and that the PEFA procurement indicators are not strongly associated with other "governance"-related outcomes in firm surveys that are unrelated to procurement.

Keywords

Bribery --- Corruption --- Kickbacks --- Procurement

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