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Non-fungible tokens, known as NFTs, are surfacing as an artistic haven for authors. Not only do they seem like a lucrative way to invest in digital art, but they also promise protection, remuneration and scarcity for artists on the blockchain. Promises that the internet and copyright law failed to keep. In the realm of blockchain, everything seemed to be possible, however, in the real world, things are more complicated. Unlike the promised protection NFTs make for authors, the image of NFTs through the lens of copyright law might not seem that colourful. In fact, an extensive body of European regulation and case law guard the domain of copyright protection. What subject matter is accorded copyright protection? What acts have the potential to be regulated by the rights of exploitation of authors? And what scenarios amount to copyright infringement? These questions have been carefully curated for literary and artistic works of analogue and digital nature; however, little legislation and jurisprudence exists concerning the products of web 3.0, specifically Art NFTs. This can result in a deep misunderstanding on behalf of NFT owners and buyers, and in worse case scenarios, cases of copyright infringement. With the purpose of studying the legal framework that surrounds NFTs, and clearing out the fog of illusion, this paper will rely on the European legal framework along with EU case law to answer this thesis’ main research question: “To what extent can Art NFTs be considered a copyright-protected subject matter and they a source of copyright infringement according to the EU copyright framework?” The paper will therefore start with a general overview of the technological ecosystem surrounding NFTs, to later dive into their elementary composition and the promises they make for digital artists, and how these elements translate into the legal notion of copyright law. The legal analysis consists of clarifying if Art NFTs can subsist copyright protection and which economic rights are indulged when one creates his own Art NFT. Finally, this analysis will present ownership scenarios that lead to copyright infringement.

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This thesis studies the copyrightability of application programming interfaces (API) in the Eu- ropean Union. The first part of this research covers the question whether or not an API can be qualified as a work that can be subjected to copyright is answered. Next, the requirements for copyrightability are examined and applied to the API. Lastly, using the above results, the notion of API copyright is analysed from a practical perspective, to find out how the European ap- proach is compatible with how APIs are viewed and used in practice. There are two relevant copyright protection systems for APIs: first, the general copyright with the Berne Convention as the main source, and second, copyright protection for computer pro- grams with the Software Directive as the main source. With regards to the first research topic, an API is considered a literary and artistic work that is subjectable to copyright. APIs are also a part of a computer program: those are also protectable insofar they also constitute the expression of its author’s own intellectual creation. Applying the requirement of ‘original expression’ to APIs, learns that they most likely cannot be protected by copyright for computer programs, because they are only responsible for only a certain degree of functionality of the computer program. This thesis further establishes that the current legal framework, and most notably the notion of ‘originality’, is insufficiently devel- oped to assess whether APIs can be such original expressions. Finally, analysing the topic of API copyright from a practical viewpoint, this thesis shows that realistically, API specifications ought not to be protectable by copyright, because of the lack of creativity in their creation and functional character.

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Gaming tore down the walls surrounding the metaverse and gave rise to the dematerialisation of fashion in these spaces. Non-Fungible Tokens, essentially a fingerprint proving ownership of digital items and tokenization, are complemented by the trust offered by trademark law in an uncertain environment plagued by misappropriation of trademarks and counterfeit goods and services. This research scrutinises the suitability of EU trademark law at the legal level to NFTs in the social gaming and fashion industry of the metaverse. Three subquestions intended to form a comprehensive answer to this central research question. The first subquestion examines to what extent NFTs can be protected under EU trademark law. After a technical introduction of NFTs, blockchain and smart contracts, this research concluded that specific assets NFTs link to are susceptible to registration as trademarks. It remains to be seen, however, whether brands will adapt their blanket approach filing strategy or rely on their existing trademarks. While an update of the trademark framework for blockchain domain names comparable to that of internet domain names is technically unfeasible, conservatory seizure of NFTs as in the Dutch Cryptobatz case presents a near term suitable option to strengthen trust in the regulatory framework with a sufficient level of protection. The second subquestion aims to give an answer to the question to what extent trademark owners have the possibility to react against the – possibly illegal – use of a trademark in commerce and other use in the metaverse. Since the metaverse intends to mirror our world and become a social hub for gamers, the relationship between trademarks and the protection of freedom of expression will often come into conflict with each other. This relationship was put to the test in the pending US Hermès v. MetaBirkins case. This case was used as a case study through the lens of EU trademark law, more specifically on the subject of immunizing artistic use through referential use and due cause defence. The third and last subquestion scrutinises the role of platforms and their responsibility. The pending US Nike v. StockX case was used as a case study to analyse the primary and secondary liability of intermediaries offering NFTs. StockX’ fundamental misunderstanding of NFTs as a method of commercialisation, rather than a product on its own, is likely to lead to primary liability since this constitutes misappropriation of a trademark. As regards secondary liability of intermediaries, this could be invoked in two types of infringement: cybersquatting and counterfeits. Although gaming platforms like Roblox aren’t – yet – required to police content, they might be increasingly motivated to provide brands with a digital counterfeit-free market.

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Artificial Intelligence can be found in every field, and trademarks are no exception. In fact, the rapid growth of Artificial Intelligence in the last few years has led to the emergence of several applications intended to be used in e-Commerce to facilitate the consumer decision-making process. This new development threatens to eliminate the human factor or significantly diminish his/her role in the consumer decision-making process to the extent that humans are no longer the ones interacting with trademarks. Several questions naturally emerge one of which is about the functions of a trademark. This is why the central objective of this thesis is to disclose how Artificial Intelligence is currently interacting with the functions of a trademark as developed in the EU Trademark Law, especially during the consumer decision-making process and whether this interaction calls into question the functions of a trademark as we know them. The first chapter of this thesis focuses on the notion of Artificial Intelligence. It includes an overview of the efforts made over the years to establish a definition of Artificial Intelligence, a short explanation of its essential concepts and an outline of its current uses. The second chapter discusses the functions of a trademark. First, it provides some clarifications regarding the meaning of the term “functions” under Intellectual Property Law and the current EU Legal Framework on the Functions of a Trademark. Then follows an explanation of how the essential function of origin and the other economic functions of a trademark have evolved over the course of the CJEU's jurisprudence while also pointing out their main positive effects. After obtaining a better understanding of both Artificial Intelligence and the functions of a trademark in the previous chapters, the third chapter addresses the interplay between Artificial Intelligence and the functions of a trademark in the particular context of the consumer decision-making process. More specifically, this final chapter examines the specific Artificial Intelligence applications that can affect the consumer decision-making process and thus interact with trademarks, it clarifies the essential role of the human factor – the consumer – in this particular context, it tries to answer whether Artificial Intelligence actually challenges the functions of a trademark and evaluate whether the current EU legal framework is adequate for dealing with challenges created by this interplay.

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This thesis explores the right to freedom of expression in the cases of parody and satire. It addresses under what circumstances the right can be limited in the online world, based on relevant case law and guidance from both the European Union and the Council of Europe's legal framework. In addition, it tries to understand the role of online platforms when it comes to parody and satire. The introduction outlines the context and the research objectives, including the sources and the limitations of the research. Additionally, a high-level overview of the right of freedom of expression, in the cases of parody and satire, and its importance in European society is provided. The second chapter focuses on the limitations of the right to freedom of expression in the cases of parody and satire by examining primarily court cases from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Specifically, it compares cases falling under article 12 paragraph 2 to cases falling under article 17 of the Convention on Human Rights to better identify the limits of parody and satire under the Council of Europe’s legal framework. In addition, the limits of parody and satire under the European Union legal framework are also analysed. The thesis demonstrates, based on the criteria developed by the ECtHR and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), that while there are certain ‘hard’ limits, where parody and satire would not be permitted, in most cases, a case-by-case analysis is required. This analysis turns on a number of circumstances, including the context and the parties involved, which are outlined in the thesis. After defining these limits, the third chapter outlines the EU regulatory framework related to online platforms and tries to shed light on the intermediary liability regime of online platforms and its changes over the past twenty years. It is important to understand this regulatory framework in order to define the limits of parody and satire in the online world. In this context, the thesis looks at past and upcoming regulatory interventions at the EU level and compares the old regime (i.e. the E-Commerce Directive and the subsequent lex specialis) with the new one: i.e. the upcoming Digital Service Act (DSA). The thesis argues, among other things, that due to the growth in power and size of online platforms, it was necessary to introduce new legislation at EU level. Specifically, the DSA is analysed, focusing mainly on the parts related to intermediary liability and the responsibility of online service providers. More precisely, it provides a high-level overview of the expected due diligence obligations of online platforms, and their implication on the right to freedom of expression, in the cases of parody and satire. In the fourth chapter, the thesis reviews and compares the laws of three Member States (Germany, Austria and Italy) that have proposed or introduced laws regulating online platforms at the national level. As such, it tries to discern if any best practices can be deducted from those national interventions and if they included anything specific regarding the right to freedom of expression in the cases of parody and satire. The thesis concludes by arguing, that for the right to freedom of expression, too much (content) regulation can be detrimental as parody and satire often target natural persons, who can request the removal of such content.