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The U.S. government spends enormous resources each year on the gathering and analysis of intelligence, yet the history of American foreign policy is littered with missteps and misunderstandings that have resulted from intelligence failures. In Why Intelligence Fails, Robert Jervis examines the politics and psychology of two of the more spectacular intelligence failures in recent memory: the mistaken belief that the regime of the Shah in Iran was secure and stable in 1978, and the claim that Iraq had active WMD programs in 2002. The Iran case is based on a recently declassified report Jervis was commissioned to undertake by CIA thirty years ago and includes memoranda written by CIA officials in response to Jervis's findings. The Iraq case, also grounded in a review of the intelligence community's performance, is based on close readings of both classified and declassified documents, though Jervis's conclusions are entirely supported by evidence that has been declassified. In both cases, Jervis finds not only that intelligence was badly flawed but also that later explanations-analysts were bowing to political pressure and telling the White House what it wanted to hear or were willfully blind-were also incorrect. Proponents of these explanations claimed that initial errors were compounded by groupthink, lack of coordination within the government, and failure to share information. Policy prescriptions, including the recent establishment of a Director of National Intelligence, were supposed to remedy the situation. In Jervis's estimation, neither the explanations nor the prescriptions are adequate. The inferences that intelligence drew were actually quite plausible given the information available. Errors arose, he concludes, from insufficient attention to the ways in which information should be gathered and interpreted, a lack of self-awareness about the factors that led to the judgments, and an organizational culture that failed to probe for weaknesses and explore alternatives. Evaluating the inherent tensions between the methods and aims of intelligence personnel and policymakers from a unique insider's perspective, Jervis forcefully criticizes recent proposals for improving the performance of the intelligence community and discusses ways in which future analysis can be improved.

Intelligence service --- Iraq War, 2003-2011 --- Weapons of mass destruction --- Evaluation --- Military intelligence --- Evaluation. --- United States. --- Iran --- History --- Anglo-American Invasion of Iraq, 2003-2011 --- Dawn, Operation New, 2010-2011 --- Gulf War II, 2003-2011 --- Iraqi Freedom, Operation, 2003-2010 --- New Dawn, Operation, 2010-2011 --- Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003-2010 --- Operation New Dawn, 2010-2011 --- Operation Telic, 2003-2011 --- Persian Gulf War, 2003-2011 --- Telic, Operation, 2003-2011 --- Counter intelligence --- Counterespionage --- Counterintelligence --- Intelligence community --- Secret police (Intelligence service) --- Agjencia Qendrore e Inteligjencës --- Central Intelligence Agency (U.S.) --- CIA (Central Intelligence Agency (U.S.)) --- CIP (United States. Centrālās izlūkošanas pārvalde) --- Mei-kuo chung yang chʻing pao chü --- National Security Council (U.S.). --- Si Aing Ei --- T︠S︡entralʹnoe razvedyvatelʹnoe upravlenie SShA --- T︠S︡RU SShA --- T︠S︡RU (T︠S︡entralʹnoe razvedyvatelʹnoe upravlenie SShA) --- ЦРУ США --- ЦРУ (Центральное разведывательное управление США) --- Центральное разведывательное управление США --- ארצות הברית. --- 美國. --- War on Terrorism, 2001-2009 --- Public administration --- Research --- Disinformation --- Secret service --- National Security Council (U.S.) --- CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) --- Polemology --- United States --- Case studies --- United States. Central Intelligence Agency --- Revolution, 1979 --- Iraq --- Intelligence service - United States - Evaluation - Case studies --- Iraq War, 2003-2011 - Military intelligence - United States - Evaluation --- Weapons of mass destruction - Iraq --- Iran - History - Revolution, 1979 --- United States of America

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War on Terrorism, 2001-2009 --- Deterrence (Strategy) --- War --- World politics --- International relations --- Security, International --- Balance of power --- Bush, George Walker, --- Political and social views --- United States --- Foreign relations --- World politics - 21st century --- Bush, George Walker, - 1946- - Political and social views --- United States - Foreign relations - 2001 --- -War on Terrorism, 2001-2009 --- Bush, George Walker, - 1946 --- -United States

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Based on more than three decades of observation, Robert Jervis concludes in this provocative book that the very foundations of many social science theories--especially those in political science--are faulty. Taking insights from complexity theory as his point of departure, the author observes that we live in a world where things are interconnected, where unintended consequences of our actions are unavoidable and unpredictable, and where the total effect of behavior is not equal to the sum of individual actions. Jervis draws on a wide range of human endeavors to illustrate the nature of these system effects. He shows how increasing airport security might actually cost lives, not save them, and how removing dead trees (ostensibly to give living trees more room) may damage the health of an entire forest. Similarly, he highlights the interconnectedness of the political world as he describes how the Cold War played out and as he narrates the series of events--with their unintended consequences--that escalated into World War I. The ramifications of developing a rigorous understanding of politics are immense, as Jervis demonstrates in his critique of current systemic theories of international politics--especially the influential work done by Kenneth Waltz. Jervis goes on to examine various types of negative and positive feedback, bargaining in different types of relationships, and the polarizing effects of alignments to begin building a foundation for a more realistic, more nuanced, theory of international politics. System Effects concludes by examining what it means to act in a system. It shows how political actors might modify their behavior in anticipation of system effects, and it explores how systemic theories of political behavior might account for the role of anticipation and strategy in political action. This work introduces powerful new concepts that will reward not only international relations theorists, but also all social scientists with interests in comparative politics and political theory.

Complexity (Philosophy) --- Social systems. --- Complexity (Philosophy). --- International relations. Foreign policy --- Political philosophy. Social philosophy --- International relations.

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830 Economie --- 855.1 Strategie --- 872 Massavernietigingswapens --- 876 Veiligheidspolitiek --- Polemology --- Nuclear warfare --- World politics --- Coexistence (World politics) --- Peaceful coexistence --- Atomic warfare --- CBR warfare --- Nuclear strategy --- Nuclear war --- Thermonuclear warfare --- War --- Nuclear crisis control --- Nuclear weapons

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