Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

This paper presents a theory of the maturity of international sovereign debt and derives its implications for the reform of the international financial architecture. It presents a general equilibrium model in which the need to roll over external debt disciplines the policies of debtor countries but makes them vulnerable to unwarranted debt crises owing to bad shocks. The paper presents a welfare analysis of several measures that have been discussed in recent debates, such as the adoption of renegotiation-friendly clauses in debt contracts and the establishment of an international bankruptcy regime for sovereigns.

International finance. --- Debts, External. --- Capital movements. --- Capital flight --- Capital flows --- Capital inflow --- Capital outflow --- Flight of capital --- Flow of capital --- Movements of capital --- Balance of payments --- Foreign exchange --- International finance --- Debts, Foreign --- Debts, International --- External debts --- Foreign debts --- International debts --- Debt --- Investments, Foreign --- International monetary system --- International money --- Finance --- International economic relations --- Exports and Imports --- Financial Risk Management --- Investments: Bonds --- Public Finance --- General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) --- International Lending and Debt Problems --- Financial Crises --- Debt Management --- Sovereign Debt --- Investment & securities --- International economics --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Public finance & taxation --- Collective action clauses --- External debt --- Financial crises --- Public debt --- Debt default --- Bonds --- Debts, External --- Debts, Public --- Argentina

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

This paper considers how an international lender of last resort (LOLR) can prevent self-fulfilling banking and currency crises in emerging economies. We compare two different arrangements: one in which the international LOLR injects liquidity into international financial markets, and one in which its resources are used to back domestic banking safety nets. Both arrangements would require important changes in the global financial architecture: the first one would require a global central bank issuing an international currency, while the second one would have to be operated by an "international banking fund" closely involved in the supervision of domestic banking systems.

Banks and Banking --- Finance: General --- Financial Risk Management --- Foreign Exchange --- Money and Monetary Policy --- Current Account Adjustment --- Short-term Capital Movements --- International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation --- Monetary Systems --- Standards --- Regimes --- Government and the Monetary System --- Payment Systems --- Bankruptcy --- Liquidation --- General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation --- Banking --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Currency --- Foreign exchange --- Monetary economics --- Finance --- Lender of last resort --- Exchange rates --- Currencies --- Bank solvency --- Financial crises --- Money --- Financial sector policy and analysis --- Currency mismatches --- Banks and banking --- Banks and banking, Central --- Financial risk management --- United States

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)