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Rationalizing Parliament examines how institutional arrangements in the French Constitution shape the bargaining strategies of political parties. The book investigates the decision by French cities to include in the Constitution legislative procedures aimed to 'rationalize' the policy-making role of parliament and analyses the impact of these procedures on policy outcomes, cabinet stability and political accountability. Drawing on diverse methodological approaches, including formal models, multivariate statistics, historical analysis and qualitative case studies, Professor Huber contributes to general theoretical debates about the endogenous choice of institutions, and about the exogenous impact of institutional arrangements on political decision-making. Through its use of theories developed in the American politics literature, the study reveals important similarities between legislative politics in the United States and in parliamentary systems and shortcomings in conventional interpretations of French institutional arrangements.
Political parties --- France, Parlement (1946-) --- France --- Politics and government --- 329 <44> --- -France --- -#A9712A --- Parties, Political --- Party systems, Political --- Political party systems --- Political science --- Divided government --- Intra-party disagreements (Political parties) --- Political conventions --- Politieke partijen. Partijwezen. Partijrecht--Frankrijk --- -France. Parlement (1946- ) --- 329 <44> Politieke partijen. Partijwezen. Partijrecht--Frankrijk --- #A9712A --- France. --- Social Sciences --- Political Science --- Political parties - Belgium --- France. - Parlement (1946- ) --- France - Politics and government - 1958 --- -Political parties
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Exclusion by Elections develops a theory about the circumstances under which 'class identities' as opposed to 'ethnic identities' become salient in democratic politics, and links this theory to issues of inequality and the propensity of governments to address it. The book argues that in societies with even modest levels of ethnic diversity, inequality invites ethnic politics, and ethnic politics results in less redistribution than class politics. Thus, contrary to existing workhorse models in social science, where democracies are expected to respond to inequality by increasing redistribution, the argument here is that inequality interacts with ethnic diversity to discourage redistribution. As a result, inequality often becomes reinforced by inequality itself. The author explores the argument empirically by examining cross-national patterns of voting behaviour, redistribution and democratic transitions, and he discusses the argument's implications for identifying strategies that can be used to address rising inequality in the world today.
Minorities --- Ethnicity --- Income distribution --- Democracy --- Self-government --- Political science --- Equality --- Representative government and representation --- Republics --- Distribution of income --- Income inequality --- Inequality of income --- Distribution (Economic theory) --- Disposable income --- Ethnic identity --- Group identity --- Cultural fusion --- Multiculturalism --- Cultural pluralism --- Suffrage --- Political aspects --- Economic aspects
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The laws that legislatures adopt provide the most important and definitive opportunity elected politicians have to define public policy. But the ways politicians use laws to shape policy varies considerably across polities. In some cases, legislatures adopt detailed and specific laws in efforts to micromanage policy-making processes. In others, they adopt general and vague laws that leave the executive and bureaucrats substantial autonomy to fill in the policy details. What explains these differences across political systems, and how do they matter? The authors address this issue by developing and testing a comparative theory of how laws shape bureaucratic autonomy. Drawing on a range of evidence from advanced parliamentary democracies and the American states, they argue that particular institutional forms have a systematic and predictable effect on how politicians use laws to shape the policy making process.
Separation of powers --- Political planning --- Bureaucracy --- Law --- Comparative government --- Political aspects --- Law and politics --- #SBIB:35H006 --- #SBIB:324H20 --- #SBIB:033.IO --- Comparative political systems --- Comparative politics --- Government, Comparative --- Political systems, Comparative --- Political science --- Interorganizational relations --- Public administration --- Organizational sociology --- Planning in politics --- Public policy --- Planning --- Policy sciences --- Politics, Practical --- Checks and balances (Separation of powers) --- Division of powers --- Powers, Separation of --- Constitutional law --- Delegation of powers --- Executive power --- Judicial independence --- Judicial power --- Judicial review --- Legislative power --- Bestuurswetenschappen: theorieën --- Politologie: theorieën (democratie, comparatieve studieën….) --- Law and legislation --- #A0506SO --- Social Sciences --- Political Science --- Law - Political aspects --- Separation of powers. --- Political planning. --- Bureaucracy. --- Comparative government. --- Political aspects.
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How do public laws, treaties, Senate confirmations, and other legislative achievements help us to gain insight into how our governmental system performs? This well-argued book edited by Scott Adler and John Lapinski is the first to assess our political institutions by looking at what the authors refer to as legislative accomplishment. The book moves beyond current research on Congress that focuses primarily on rules, internal structure, and the microbehavior of individual lawmakers, to look at the mechanisms that govern how policy is enacted and implemented in the United States. It includes essays on topics ranging from those dealing with the microfoundations of congressional output, to large N empirical analyses that assess current theories of lawmaking, to policy-centered case studies. All of the chapters take a Congress-centered perspective on macropolicy while still appreciating the importance of other branches of government in explaining policy accomplishment. The Macropolitics of Congress shines light on promising pathways for the exploration of such key issues as the nature of political representation. It will make a significant contribution to the study of Congress and, more generally, to our understanding of American politics. Contributors include E. Scott Adler, David Brady, Charles M. Cameron, Brandice Canes-Wrone, Robert S. Erikson, Grace R. Freedman, Valerie Heitshusen, John D. Huber, Ira Katznelson, Keith Krehbiel, John S. Lapinski, David Leblang, Michael B. MacKuen, David R. Mayhew, Nolan McCarty, Charles R. Shipan, James A. Stimson, and Garry Young.
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