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Financial crises are endogenized through corporate and interbank market institutions. Single-bank financing leads to a pooling equilibrium in the interbank market. With private information about one’s own solvency, the best illiquid banks will not borrow but rather will liquidate some premature assets. The withdrawals of the best banks from the interbank market may lead more solvent but illiquid banks to withdraw from the market, until the interbank market collapses. However, multi-bank financing leads to a separating equilibrium in the interbank market. Thus, bank runs are limited to illiquid and insolvent banks, and idiosyncratic shocks never trigger a contagious bank run.
Banks and Banking --- Finance: General --- Financial Risk Management --- Labor --- Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy --- Central Banks and Their Policies --- Current Account Adjustment --- Short-term Capital Movements --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Bankruptcy --- Liquidation --- General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) --- Financial Crises --- Portfolio Choice --- Investment Decisions --- Labor Demand --- Finance --- Banking --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Labour --- income economics --- Interbank markets --- Financial crises --- Bank solvency --- Liquidity --- Financial markets --- Financial sector policy and analysis --- Asset and liability management --- Self-employment --- Banks and banking --- International finance --- Economics --- Self-employed --- Korea, Republic of
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This paper develops a model of the lender of last resort. It provides an analytical basis for “too big too fail” and a rationale for “constructive ambiguity”. Key results are that if contagion (moral hazard) is the main concern, the Central Bank (CB) will have an excessive (little) incentive to rescue banks and the resulting equilibrium risk level is high (low). When both contagion and moral hazard are jointly analyzed, the CB’s incentives to rescue are only slightly weaker than with contagion alone. The CB’s optimal policy may be non-monotonic in bank size.
Banks and Banking --- Finance: General --- Financial Risk Management --- Industries: Financial Services --- Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General --- Central Banks and Their Policies --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation --- General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation --- Financial Institutions and Services: General --- Banking --- Finance --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Moral hazard --- Lender of last resort --- Commercial banks --- Open market operations --- Financial sector policy and analysis --- Financial crises --- Financial institutions --- Central banks --- Distressed institutions --- Banks and banking --- Financial risk management --- Banks and banking, Central --- Financial services industry --- Japan
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The fundamental importance of economic institutions for economic growth through their impact on technological change has been argued, reconfirmed by recent empirical studies, but not examined theoretically. This paper tries to fill that gap. In the model proposed, economic growth is affected by the efficiency and riskiness of research and development (R&D), which are endogenized through financial institutions. The theory and its results shed lights on the debate of convergence versus divergence; the “East Asia miracle” versus the East Asia financial crisis; and the rise and fall of centralized economies.
Banks and Banking --- Labor --- Industries: Financial Services --- Macroeconomics: Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment: General (includes Measurement and Data) --- Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Labor Demand --- Banking --- Labour --- income economics --- Finance --- Self-employment --- Project loans --- Banks and banking --- Self-employed --- Loans
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We provide a model of contagion where countries borrow or lend for consumption smoothing at the market interest rate or a lower IMF rate. Highly indebted countries hit by large negative shocks to output will default. The resulting reduction in loanable funds raises interest rates, increases the vulnerability of other indebted countries, and can generate further rounds of defaults. In this environment the IMF can limit default and internalize the externality generated by contagion through its lending with conditionality. We characterize the IMF's optimal lending decision in mitigating the loss in world consumption.
Finance: General --- Financial Risk Management --- Macroeconomics --- Industries: Financial Services --- Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy --- Policy Objectives --- Policy Designs and Consistency --- Policy Coordination --- International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions --- International Lending and Debt Problems --- Macroeconomics: Consumption --- Saving --- Wealth --- General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation --- Financial Crises --- Finance --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Consumption --- International capital markets --- Loans --- Financial contagion --- Financial crises --- National accounts --- Financial markets --- Financial institutions --- Financial sector policy and analysis --- Moral hazard --- Economics --- Capital market --- Financial risk management --- United States
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This paper develops a simple model of an international lender of last resort (ILOLR). The world economy consists of many open economies, each with a banking system and a central bank operating under a pegged exchange rate regime. The fragility of the banking system and the limited ability of a domestic central bank to provide international liquidity together can cause currency and banking crises. An international interbank market can help an economy with the needed international liquidity, but with potential costs of international financial contagion. An ILOLR can play a useful role in providing international liquidity and reducing international contagion.
Banks and Banking --- Finance: General --- Financial Risk Management --- Macroeconomics --- Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General --- Central Banks and Their Policies --- International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions --- International Policy Coordination and Transmission --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation --- General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) --- Financial Crises --- Portfolio Choice --- Investment Decisions --- Foreign Exchange --- Finance --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Banking --- Financial markets --- Financial crises --- Asset and liability management --- International finance --- Banks and banking --- Liquidity --- Economics --- Banks and banking, Central --- Currency crises --- United States
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When a nation can finance its investments via foreign-currency denominated debt or domestic-currency claims, what is the optimal capital structure of the nation? Building on the functions of fiat money as both medium of exchange, and store of value like corporate equity, our model connects monetary economics, fiscal theory and international finance under a unified corporate finance perspective. With frictionless capital markets both a Modigliani-Miller theorem for nations and the classical quantity theory of money hold. With capital market frictions, a nation's optimal capital structure trades off inflation dilution costs and expected default costs on foreign-currency debt. Our framing focuses on the process by which new money claims enter the economy and the potential wealth redistribution costs of inflation.
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