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Book
Talent Management and Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion in Private-Sector Organizations: A Qualitative Review of Promising Practices
Authors: --- --- --- ---
Year: 2023 Publisher: RAND Corporation

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To support the Department of the Air Force's (DAF's) goal of building a more diverse, equitable, and inclusive workforce, researchers reviewed the academic literature and conducted interviews with representatives from private-sector organizations that were ranked as top employers for diversity. The authors detail promising practices regarding diversity, equity, and inclusion in talent management that might be relevant to DAF efforts.

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The Risk-Mitigation Value of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential: A Comprehensive Security Assessment of the TWIC Program
Authors: --- --- --- --- --- et al.
Year: 2020 Publisher: Santa Monica, Calif. RAND Corporation

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The Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC®) is one of multiple measures that the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) introduced to enhance security at U.S. ports. Anyone with unescorted access to a secure area at an MTSA-regulated facility, vessel, or outer continental shelf (OCS) facility must have a TWIC. Congress established TWIC to help prevent transportation security incidents. TWIC's primary function is to establish that the holder has passed a Transportation Security Administration (TSA) security threat assessment (STA); the TWIC card can also serve as identification. Each secure area at each regulated location must maintain an access control program and verify three things at every access point: identity, presence and validity of the TWIC card, and whether the person has a business purpose at that facility. Currently, facilities are required only to conduct visual verification of the TWIC card, either at each time of entry or at time of enrollment into a facility physical access control system (PACS). A pending regulation, which we call the TWIC-reader rule, would require that any high-risk facility electronically inspect the card and, using biometrics, match it to the holder. The governing legislation requires that an assessment of TWIC determine the program's value in mitigating the risk of terrorism and crime at ports. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security commissioned the Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center to complete that comprehensive assessment. In this report, the authors establish factors that increase or decrease TWIC's security value and determine what TWIC's value would need to be to offset the costs of establishing further access control requirements for facilities.

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Risk-Informed Analysis of Transportation Worker Identification Credential Reader Requirements

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A 2016 U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) regulation, "Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC)-Reader Requirements," requires certain maritime facilities determined to be of high risk to use electronic and biometric access control programs in the facilities' secure areas. The final version of this rule, known as the final reader rule, has been delayed (from 2020) until May 8, 2023, for three categories of facilities that handle certain dangerous cargoes (CDCs) in bulk. The USCG asked the Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center to reestimate the population of such regulated facilities that could be subject to the final reader rule delay, develop an objective risk assessment model for these facilities, and conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the regulation. This report describes the researchers' analytical efforts to address these three research areas. Because there is no database of Maritime Transportation Security Act-regulated facilities that has all the requisite information about CDCs that facilities handle in bulk, the researchers resorted to other data sources, such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's databases, an online survey, and interviews, to estimate the facility population. For the facility risk model, they used the modeling approach for assessing potential consequence included in the risk engine of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program, harmonizing the TWIC and CFATS programs in consequence assessment. Because there was no credible estimate for the probability of a transportation security incident, the researchers used a break-even analysis to assess whether the final reader rule is cost-effective.


Book
Criminal History Record Information Sharing with the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency: Education and Training Materials for State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Partners

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The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) is the federal agency responsible for conducting the background investigations and personnel vetting for 95 percent of the federal workforce, including current and prospective federal government employees and contractors. DCSA collects relevant criminal history record information (CHRI) as part of these investigations from federal and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) law enforcement and criminal justice agencies. SLTT organizations, however, are often unaware of DCSA's role, responsibilities, and authorities and unaccustomed to CHRI collection and federal background investigations generally. This lack of awareness can impede or delay DCSA's collection of CHRI. In turn, it can slow the investigation and vetting process for federal employees and contractors. To help address this challenge, Congress authorized DCSA to provide training and education assistance to SLTT communities in 2020 to streamline and improve access to historical criminal record data. DCSA then requested assistance from the RAND Corporation's National Defense Research Institute with developing educational and training materials to use in support of these activities. The objective of these materials is to develop and deepen SLTT agencies' knowledge and understanding of their federal statutory obligations to share CHRI with DCSA and to facilitate more effective and efficient CHRI sharing. The intent of these materials is to help create a more robust partnership between DCSA and the more than 18,000 law enforcement and criminal justice agencies nationwide. This report presents these materials and the underlying research conducted to build them.


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Strengthening the Defense Innovation Ecosystem

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Technological superiority is vital to U.S. national security and defense. The Department of Defense's (DoD's) direct investment in basic research and development remains critically important, but it is insufficient to retain a technological advantage against near-peer rivals, especially China, which is aggressively modernizing. DoD recognizes that it must leverage relevant private sector–developed technology. To that end, DoD has created an ecosystem of defense innovation labs, hubs, and centers to help bridge the technology innovation gap between private-sector firms and the U.S. military. These various defense innovation organizations (DIOs)—the Defense Innovation Unit, the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, the National Security Innovation Network, the Air Force's AFWERX, and the Army Applications Laboratory, among others—have proliferated over the past two decades and operate independently of one another to address specific but often similar needs. The authors identify and assess challenges to quickly harnessing emerging commercial technologies for military use within the existing defense innovation ecosystem, especially when much of this innovation is the product of individuals and businesses that have traditionally not worked with DoD. The authors examine the organizations, authorities, and processes—including innovation organizations, requirements, acquisition, and funding—that form the DoD's commercial technology pipeline (CTP). Then they use game play to test alternative approaches to potentially reform and strengthen the pipeline in ways that would accelerate the military's identification, development, and adoption of commercial technology.

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