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The Mexican, Asian, and Russian crises of the mid- and late 1990s have renewed interest among policymakers in the determinants and effects of private capital inflows. This paper analyzes whether policies can affect the composition of capital inflows and whether different compositions aggravate crises. The results support the view that, while fundamentals matter, capital controls can affect the mix of capital inflows that countries receive. The results also show that during the Asian crisis, countries with more yen-denominated debt faired worse, while during the Mexican crisis larger short-term debt stocks increased the severity of the crisis.

Exports and Imports --- Foreign Exchange --- International Finance: General --- Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance: General --- International Financial Markets --- International Investment --- Long-term Capital Movements --- International economics --- Currency --- Foreign exchange --- Finance --- Capital flows --- Capital inflows --- Foreign direct investment --- Real exchange rates --- Exchange rate arrangements --- Balance of payments --- Capital movements --- Investments, Foreign --- United States

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Following the 1997-98 financial turmoil, crisis countries in Asia moved toward either floating or fixed exchange rate systems, reinforcing the bipolar view of exchange rate regimes and the "hollow middle" hypothesis. But some academics have claimed that the crisis countries' policies have been similar in the post- and pre-crisis periods. This paper analyzes the evidence and concludes that, except for Malaysia, which adopted a hard peg and imposed capital controls, the other crisis countries are floating more than before, though less than "real" floaters do. Further, the crisis countries' policies during the post-crisis period can be justified on second-best arguments.

Finance: General --- Financial Risk Management --- Foreign Exchange --- Current Account Adjustment --- Short-term Capital Movements --- Studies of Particular Policy Episodes --- Development Planning and Policy: Trade Policy --- Factor Movement --- Foreign Exchange Policy --- Financial Crises --- International Financial Markets --- Currency --- Foreign exchange --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Finance --- Exchange rates --- Exchange rate policy --- Exchange rate arrangements --- Financial crises --- Currency markets --- Financial markets --- Foreign exchange market --- Malaysia

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International finance --- Developing countries

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September 1996 Bilateral and multilateral creditors have made a significant effort to increase financial resources flowing to low-income African countries, helping them expand their import capacity. But the increasing share of pure grants and debt relief from bilateral donors in recent years has not allowed these countries to reduce their total indebtedness and solve their debt-overhang problem. Debt relief from bilateral donors has been neutral regarding recipient countries' import capacity. Hernández and Katada analyze the effects of bilateral debt forgiveness (part of official development assistance) on 32 low-income countries in Africa (1984-93). Asking whether it makes a difference for recipient countries to receive pure grants rather than official development assistance (ODA) debt relief, they focus on how one form of aid or the other affects the countries' import capacity. They conclude that: Grants allowed recipient countries to significantly expand their import capacity for 1984-93 as grants and import capacity have been increasing since 1984. But the increasing share of concessional lending and debt relief in recent years has not allowed these countries to reduce their total indebtedness and solve their debt overhang problem. Their arrears increased significantly. The biggest recipients of debt relief also received the lion's share of the increase in pure grants. Debt forgiveness and pure grants were allocated in a way not entirely consistent with standard economic hierarchies (such as poverty levels, indebtedness, and access to alternative sources of finance). Bilateral ODA debt forgiveness appears to be neutral in the sense of not having any significant impact on recipient countries' capacity to import. Bilateral ODA debt forgiveness has neither increased or curtailed the import capacity of the major recipient countries. During 1989-93, multilateral lending replaced the decrease in bilateral lending that, in turn, was caused by an increase in grants. (Bilateral ODA debt relief implies smaller cash flows because it is pseudo or accounting money and because with it goes reduced new lending from bilateral sources.) Private creditors have typically withdrawn money from the countries in the sample as grants increased. And debt relief has had a crowding-out effect on new lending. Bilateral donors are switching their development finance to Africa from concessional and nonconcessional lending to a combination of pure grants and ODA debt relief. This paper - a product of the International Finance Division, International Economics Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to monitor developments in highly indebted low income countries.

Banking law. --- Bank failures --- Law and legislation.

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