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Book
Private Information and Insurance Rejections
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Year: 2012 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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The Policy Elasticity
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Year: 2013 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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Knowledge of Future Job Loss and Implications for Unemployment Insurance
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Year: 2015 Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research

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Measuring Ex-Ante Welfare in Insurance Markets
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Year: 2018 Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research

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Unified Welfare Analysis of Government Policies
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Year: 2019 Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research

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Case for Using the MVPF in Empirical Welfare Analysis
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Year: 2022 Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research

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Book
Choice in Insurance Markets
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Year: 2020 Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research

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Measuring Economic Efficiency Using Inverse-Optimum Weights
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Year: 2014 Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research

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Digital
Private Information and Insurance Rejections
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Year: 2012 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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Across a wide set of non-group insurance markets, applicants are rejected based on observable, often high-risk, characteristics. This paper argues private information, held by the potential applicant pool, explains rejections. I formulate this argument by developing and testing a model in which agents may have private information about their risk. I first derive a new no-trade result that theoretically explains how private information could cause rejections. I then develop a new empirical methodology to test whether this no-trade condition can explain rejections. The methodology uses subjective probability elicitations as noisy measures of agents beliefs. I apply this approach to three non-group markets: long-term care, disability, and life insurance. Consistent with the predictions of the theory, in all three settings I find significant amounts of private information held by those who would be rejected; I find generally more private information for those who would be rejected relative to those who can purchase insurance; and I show it is enough private information to explain a complete absence of trade for those who would be rejected. The results suggest private information prevents the existence of large segments of these three major insurance markets.


Digital
The Inequality Deflator : Interpersonal Comparisons without a Social Welfare Function
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Year: 2014 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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This paper develops a tractable method for resolving the equity-efficiency tradeoff that modifies the Kaldor-Hicks compensation principle to account for the distortionary cost of redistribution. Weighting measures of individual surplus by the inequality deflator corresponds to searching for local Pareto improvements by making transfers through the income tax schedule. Empirical evidence consistently suggests redistribution from rich to poor is more costly than redistribution from poor to rich. As a result, the inequality deflator weights surplus accruing to the poor more so than to the rich. Regardless of one's own social preferences, surplus to the poor can hypothetically be turned into more surplus to everyone through reductions in distortionary taxation. I estimate the deflator using existing estimates of the response to taxation, combined with a new estimation of the joint distribution of taxable income and marginal tax rates. I show adjusting for increased income inequality lowers the rate of U.S. economic growth since 1980 by roughly 15-20%, implying a social cost of increased income inequality in the U.S. of roughly $400 billion. Adjusting for differences in income inequality across countries, the U.S. is poorer than countries like Austria and the Netherlands, despite having higher national income per capita. I conclude by providing an empirical framework for characterizing the existence of local Pareto improvements from government policy changes.

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